HOW TO PLAY WHIST

*Rich'd By A. Proctor*

[New York, 1885]
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
A (the Duke of Cumberland) having the lead, with this magnificent hand, and leading correctly, did not win a single trick.

# PREFACE.

THE following chapters on the Theory and Practice of Whist originally appeared in *Knowledge*, and there had the advantage of the criticisms and suggestions of some of the finest exponents of the game. These criticisms have in many cases led to important modifications and improvements. The treatise has no claim to novelty as regards Whist principles; in fact, outside the modern Signalling system and the absolute rejection of the Singleton lead, there is very little difference between the Whist of to-day and the Whist of Hoyle and Matthews.

The method of presenting the Leads here adopted is much more easily followed than that usually employed. Learners are deterred by the multitudinous rules for leading from such and such hands, but grasp at once the rules for leading such and such cards. The gain in simplicity is great. For instance, there are hundreds of hands from which the Ace is "the correct card" to play, while there are only two conditions under which Ace should be led originally; moreover, when these two conditions have been noted, the meaning of an Ace lead is recognized at once. So it is with the two original King leads, the one original Queen lead, and so forth. In less than half an hour, by the method supplied here, the right card to lead and the right meaning of each lead, can be fully learned. I have extended the same method, as far as possible, to play second hand and third hand.

As regards the general conduct of the game, the chief point of novelty in this work is that I have been careful to correct the com-

mon error that, because scientific Whist involves the long-suit sys-
tem at starting, therefore the whole play of each hand should pro-
ceed on that system. Many of the rules which beginners learn are
suitable only for the long-suit method ; yet there is scarcely one
hand in ten in which one side or the other has not to give up (some-
times quite early) all idea of bringing in a long suit. If I were
asked what I regarded as the most valuable working quality in a
partner, I should answer—Readiness in determining whether an
aggressive game, aiming at the bringing in of a long suit, should be
entered on, or a defensive policy pursued.

With regard to the system of Signalling, I sympathize with the
objections which have been urged against it by many fine players;
but the system *must* be learned by all who wish to play Whist suc-
cessfully. It must be learned for defence if not for attack. A
player is not much worse off than his fellows if he determines, *and
lets the table know he has determined*, never to *play* the call for
Trumps, the Echo, or the Penultimate. He may even safely de-
termine never to *respond to* the signal—indeed, with too many part-
ners this is a most necessary precaution. Yet he can never escape
the duty of *noticing* the signal. If he fail to do so, he will ere long
find himself forcing the enemy's weak trump hand and omitting to
force the strong (mistaking a response to the signal for an original
trump lead) or committing some other Whist enormity. But I in-
cline to judge from the objections of Pembridge, Mogul, and other
strong players to the Signalling system, that they have not noticed
its full meaning. For they speak of the Echo and Penultimate as
if these conventions were seldom available. Especially is the Pe-
nultimate of frequent use. Scarcely a hand is played without it.
If my partner always leads the lowest but one from a five-card suit
(not headed by cards requiring a high-card lead), then, if he leads a
two, or a card which is shown by the play of the others or by my
own hand to be the lowest of his suit, I know that he has not more
than three cards left in the suit; and if the lead is not a forced one,
I can infer pretty safely that he has just three left. This may prove
most important knowledge, not only by showing the limits of the

suit, but by guiding me as to forcing the enemy in that suit. I put myself and my partner at a disadvantage, then, if I fail to observe the Penultimate modern method of play.

The full importance of the modern system can only be understood when we recognize that:

{ 1. If / 2. Unless } you have justifying strength in trumps, and at least one long and strong suit, or you can assist your partner in what he shows to be his long and strong suit,

{ signal / do *not* signal } for trumps.

{ 3. If / 4. Unless } you have, or had originally, at least four trumps,

{ echo / do *not* echo } in response either to the signal or to your partner's trump lead.

{ 5. If / 6. Unless } you have at least five cards in a suit play the { lowest but one / lowest card } except where the leading cards are such that a high card has to be played.

But I cannot too carefully warn the learner to be most chary of displaying the Trump signal; and especially to reject, as altogether unsuitable for *him*, Pole's rule, that you should always signal from five trumps.

My own experience has been that the various conventions, so far from taxing the memory, serve greatly to help it. This had been already noticed in the case of the customary rules for leading, discarding, returning leads, and the like. Every act of attention to a rule helps to record the play in the mind. I cannot, indeed, understand why there should be any more effort in noticing signals than in trying to ascertain *in other ways* (as by examining your hand at starting) your prospects of success or failure.

The learner will soon find that at times he must go counter to the customary rules if he would win or save a game. Hand XXVII., p. 122, is a remarkable case in point. Here Mr. Lewis neither led trumps from five, nor Ace from Ace four others in his long plain suit; because to have followed either rule would have been running counter to the only rule of play which is absolutely general—PLAY TO WIN.

The forty illustrative games are nearly all from actual play. They are chiefly intended to illustrate Whist principles, the way of forming inferences at Whist, and so forth. Several are fine examples of Whist strategy. A few have been selected as examples of bad play. They differ from any such series hitherto published in being fully annotated,* and in having the full hand of each player displayed (with score, trump card, etc.), as if set round the Whist-table itself. The games (contributed to *Knowledge* originally) by Mr Lewis are particularly valuable.

The Whist Whittlings include Whist stories, maxims, notes, curiosities, and problems.

To make the work complete, the Laws and Etiquette of Whist are added, and a glossary of Whist Terms in more or less common use.                    FIVE OF CLUBS.

                    (Richard A. Proctor.)

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* Of the five games given by Professor Pole, two are unsound, the play approved being bad; two are merely examples of play from overwhelming strength, and the fifth (and last) is merely a Whist curiosity.

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# HOW TO PLAY WHIST.

## INTRODUCTION.

WHIST, properly played, is the finest of all card games; perhaps—not even excepting chess—the finest of all sedentary games. But Whist, as it is often played, without any knowledge or appreciation of the real nature of the game, seems to have nothing making it better worth playing than Pope Joan or Beggar my Neighbor, and to be decidedly inferior to Euchre. There is an intermediate kind of Whist, the game played by persons who have a keen perception of the strategy of the game, but no knowledge of its language, which may be full of interest or full of annoyance, as the cards may happen to lie. To watch a proficient in this kind of Whist, playing a good hand, and ably supported by a steady-going partner who understands his ways, one would say Whist was the most delightful of all games; but to see him playing an average hand, and to note his wrath when his partner, considering his own hand, fails to play precisely as he wishes, one would say Whist was a rather severe form of punishment.

The present little treatise on Whist, and the problems, games, etc., which accompany it, are intended to indicate the nature of the only game of Whist which is worth playing—Whist as a game between two forces, two pairs of partners, each pair having between them twenty-six cards. The game thus played (that is, with constant reference by each player to the fact that he has a partner) may be regarded as a really scientific game. It is often called the book game, theoretical play, and by other names, implying that a fine player need care very little about it. But it is in truth the only common-sense, practically sound form of the game, and no one can be regarded as a really good, still less as a fine, player who does not

play it. It has, moreover, the additional advantage of being read-ily learned by those who have not the capacity for really great play; and when it has been learned, such players, though never brilliant, become good and safe partners. Moreover, by learning the rules of scientific Whist, which seem at first an extra trouble to the mem-ory, the learner finds that his power of remembering the fall of the cards is greatly increased. It is, indeed, the purposeless nature of ordinary unscientific Whist-play which makes it so difficult for the bad player to remember what cards have been played, and by whom. So soon as he has adopted just principles of play, each hand is played according to a plan, the development of which is full of interest, so that the stages are easily remembered. Each card is played with a purpose, and, whether the purpose succeed or fail, the result is noted and remembered, whereas, when there is no purpose, the memory has no such aid.

In the scientific game of Whist you give your partner (always at the beginning, and almost always throughout the play of the hand) all the information in your power within the rules of the game. Cases may arise towards the end of a hand where it becomes clear that your partner can do nothing, and nothing can be lost by mis-leading him; then, and then only, false cards (deceiving him, but deceiving the adversaries also) may be usefully played. To this the objection is repeatedly made—especially by brilliant one-hand players—"a player has but one partner while he has two adversa-ries, and by playing so as to give information to one friend he gives information to two enemies, or the harm exceeds the good twofold." The true answer to this objection does not seem to me to have been recognized by Pole, Cavendish, Clay, and other masters of the game, who have yet, of course, known perfectly well from practice that it is advantageous to give your partner all the information in your power. Cavendish says the objection would have considera-ble force if you were compelled to expose the whole of your hand, but you possess the power of selecting what facts shall be an-nounced and what concealed. Pole says the objection "involves a confusion in reasoning; for, if the opponents are equally good players, they will adopt the same system, and the positions must be equal; and if they are not good players, they will be incapable of profiting by the indications you give, and the whole advantage will rest with you;" adding that "even good players seldom pay so

much heed to their opponents' as to their partners' indications."
Pole and Drayson agree in saying that by not giving your partner
information, you run the risk of having to fight three opponents
single-handed. Clay does not specifically consider the objection.

The true answer seems to me to be different from any of these.
The reply of "Cavendish" implies that you may without disadvan-
tage play false cards in the adversaries' suits: which is not often
(though occasionally) the case. Pole's reply takes the system for
granted, by assuming that good opponents will follow it; and cer-
tainly he does not reason soundly in suggesting that even good op-
ponents pay less attention to their opponents' than to their partners'
indications. It is also an exaggeration to speak of a partner as be-
coming a third opponent if not duly informed as to your cards; he
may spoil a part of your plans, but cannot play as an opponent
throughout, as that seems to imply. (The mischief is bad enough,
without exaggeration.) The real reason why information to your
partner is so important as to outweigh the knowledge given to the
adversary, is that it is only by giving him information that your
cards can be combined with his in the strategy of the hand. You
tell him points about your hand which he can utilize, let the oppo-
nents do what they will, although, of course, you may also give
him information which he cannot utilize, whether because the ad-
versaries have also learned it or not. Cases of the latter kind count
neither one way nor the other; if you had not suggested such and
such a plan he would not have tried it, and when you have told
him he has not succeeded; so that you are none the worse: all the
cases of the former kind are so much clear gain.

Take a familiar instance. I lead Ace, and follow with Queen of
my best suit. My partner *knows* that I have the Knave left, and (if
it is an original lead) he has reason to think I also have a small card
left. Suppose he has the King in his own hand and a small one left
after the first round. Now, according to the state of the score and
of his own hand, it may be better to let the trick fall to my Queen,
or to take it with his King, leaving me still the command of the suit
with my Knave. By my play, showing that I have the Knave, I
have left it open to him to do whichsoever of these two things may
be best for both of us; and this choice he has, let the opponents act
as they please. But suppose that, instead of following the recog-
nized line of play for such cards, I lead the second round with my

small card. My partner plays his King, and, let us suppose, wins the trick. He cannot now play as he would (as it might be absolutely essential to success that he should) if he knew that I had the command of the suit. On the contrary, so far as he can understand me at all, he thinks I have three small cards of the suit left, and that probably (it is nearly two to one) the Queen lies with one of the adversaries. His consequent play in this case spoils our common game, whereas in the other case his play advances our common game. In either case it is *his* play, not the opponents', which affects our combined game for good or for ill.

In fine, instead of the maxim, "It is more useful to inform your partner than to deceive your adversary," I would substitute this, "Your single partner can do more good than both your adversaries can do harm, by utilizing information you may give by your play." (Good here includes the avoidance of harm; we might supplement the rule by saying that your partner is likely to do much more mischief through ignorance of your hand, than could be counterpoised by any good which the adversaries might chance to do you.)

It is the recognition by good players of this rule, as resulting from the general principle that partners should play in harmony and with a common purpose, which has led to the adopted system of Whist strategy. There are commonly more ways than one in which, if the partner's cards were seen, the qualities of the combined hands might be used; but there is only one system by which, in the actual method of play, your partner can work in harmony with you. That system being adopted, the principles guiding us in the opening of a hand, and determining the play of first, second, third, and fourth player, are readily deduced.

Our books of Whist seem, indeed (and it has always seemed to me a fault in them), to require that the learner should know multitudinous rules for leading, and for playing second, third, and fourth; but in reality all these rules depend on two general principles: First, to play suits so as to make as many tricks in them as possible, taking duly into account the chance of their being ruffed; secondly, to play your best suit so as to get it established as early as possible, where there is a chance of bringing it in after trumps are out, or of using it to force out the enemy's trumps. I do not say that the player ought at once to know, from his knowledge of these principles, his proper course as leader, second, third, or fourth player. He

has not time to go through all the considerations involved in apply-ing these principles to particular cases. He must be content, there-fore, to retain a number of rules for such cases in his memory. But his memory will be greatly helped, and the number of rules will be greatly diminished, when he recognizes the general principles on which modern Whist-play proceeds.

I shall now consider the various leads suggested by these princi-ples, the play of second, third, and fourth hand, etc., endeavoring so to treat the matter that the memory may be as much as possible helped to retain the resulting rules, by recognizing the string on which these seemingly scattered beads of Whist wisdom are in re-ality strung.

# Chapter I.

## *THE LEAD.*

### General remarks on leading.

So soon as we have accepted the general principle that in Whist each player is to consider his partner's hand as well as his own, and that to make the most of the combined hands each partner must play a game which the other understands, we are at once able to decide on the proper way of conducting Whist strategy. Were it otherwise, the first consideration of each player would naturally be the nature of his own hand. He would play so as either to make all his strong cards at once, or to adopt the course which seemed to him best for making them in the long run. If he had a short suit he would try to get rid early of the cards of that suit, in order presently to trump the remaining good cards of the suit. And he would play his trumps solely with the object of making as many of them as he could. When every player follows such a course as this, the fortunes of the different hands run very much as they do with good play, but the game is not Whist. It becomes simply a chance game, each player's success depending on the number of good cards which happened to fall to his share, or on the fortuitous occurrence of short suits with opportunities for trumping them. The advantage of the scientific game is that it requires skilful strategy, and calls into action many useful faculties.

To tell my partner anything about the constitution of my hand, I must, in the first place, follow a systematic and generally understood method of selecting a suit to lead from, and, in the second place, I must open in the correct way a suit so selected.

Now, considering first the selection of a suit, we note that there is only one quality which, being common to all hands, can be adopted for systematic guidance. A player tells his partner nothing useful by playing out his good cards, even if he made the best use he could

of them for himself by showing them at once. Leading from a short suit again is not only bad in itself—especially the atrocious lead from a single card which weak players affect—but it is not a method of leading systematically available, for not every hand possesses a suit of fewer than three cards. But every hand must possess a suit of four cards, at least—that is, a long suit. If, then, for no other reason, still for this, that, by so opening the hand, partner learns that one holds four, at least, of that suit (save in a few exceptional cases), the long suit would be a good one to lead, if that were always understood to be the meaning of the lead.

But, apart from this, there is a manifest advantage—other things being equal—in leading from the long suit. This suit always has an element of strength, even though every card be small. Suppose, for instance, I have 2, 3, 4, 5 of a suit, an opponent has Ace, King, Queen, and the remaining six cards equally divided between the other players. Then (though I by no means advise a lead from 2, 3, 4, 5), if the holder of Ace, King, Queen draw three rounds, I remain with 5; and, when trumps are drawn, that small card, if I get a lead, is as good as a trump; or, if I obtain a lead before all the trumps are drawn, that small card would either make a trick or draw a trump from the enemy, as well as an Ace or a King. By leading from a long suit, and getting that suit so far exhausted that I have commanding strength in it, I secure an element of strength for my hand which comes next in efficiency to strength in trumps.

For the double reason, then, first that in that way you can tell your partner the chief constituent of your hand; secondly, that by so playing you are likely to strengthen your hand, your first lead should be from your longest suit.

Of course, this rule, like all rules relating to a game so varied and complex as Whist, is not without exceptions.

I showed just now that a hand of four very small cards has a *certain element* of strength, which is wanting in a suit of the three highest cards; yet the latter has, of course, the greater strength. If you have two suits thus constituted, one long, but very weak, the other a three-card suit of good strength so far as the individual cards are concerned, you would be showing your partner best the chief constituent of your hand by leading from the shorter but strong suit, than by leading from the other. But a three-card suit must be very strong, or a four-card suit very weak, for the former to be preferred

in this way.    There are several reasons for this, besides the general reason that long-suit leads, followed systematically, instruct the partner best.    A suit which is short with you is likely to be long with one or another of your opponents; and, if so, you are playing their game by leading it.    Again, commanding cards of a short suit are more useful as cards of re-entry, that is to give you a lead later in the game, than they can possibly be if used early in the play of the hand.    If your long suit is very weak, your partner will very soon find that to be the case, and, by showing you where his strength lies, can serve your game, as a rule, better than you can serve his by opening a three-card suit, unless it be of absolutely commanding strength.

When, having the original or first lead, we are obliged to lead from a short suit, or when we have four trumps not very strong, and three of each of the other suits, we should, in general, select that suit which is least likely to injure our partner or to benefit the adversary. Of course, if your best short suit is very strong, as Ace King Queen, Ace Queen Knave, Ace King Knave, or the like, you lead as from strength.    Again, if you have to lead from Ace, or King, or Queen, and two small ones, you lead the smallest, so as not to throw away the command of the suit.    You suggest, indeed, to your partner that you have led from numerical strength; but that is the misfortune of your position.    It is better to do that than to give up the command in what may be a strong suit of one of the adversaries.    When you have Knave and two small ones, you should lead Knave; because the card cannot help you against strength held by the adversary, and if your partner is strong it may help him.

But your best way of helping your partner, when you are obliged to lead from a short suit originally, is to play from a suit in which you have a strong sequence, such as Queen, Knave, ten; or Queen, Knave, and another; or Knave, ten, and another.    By leading the highest from such a sequence you help your partner, if he is strong in the suit, without materially weakening yourself, if the enemy should be strong in it.    Next to such hands come hands in which you have two honors and a small one.    The proper leads from three-card suits, as well as from long suits, will be considered in detail later.

In considering thus far the lead from a suit of three cards, we have dealt with the original lead.    If you have not the original lead, then,

even though only a single round has been played, you can generally form some idea of the suit you should select from among three weak non-trump suits. Thus, if your partner has led, and you have taken the trick, you should of course return his lead. Leading any other suit would imply that you had considerable strength in that suit, and certainly length in it.

It can scarcely ever be advisable, no matter how your hand is constituted, to lead from Ace, King, or Queen, and one other. To lead from Ace King, or King Queen, or Queen Knave, alone, may, in certain cases (never as an original lead), be better than leading from a weak three-card suit. But in most cases of that kind it is better to lead from your four-card trump suit, even though it be weak.

If you are fourth in hand, it is seldom right to lead from the suit opened by your left-hand adversary: unless, indeed, you took the trick very cheaply, or the fall of the cards in the first round showed that he is not very strong in that suit, in which case, by leading through him, you put him at a disadvantage. Many players seem to think that the excellent general rule, lead *through* strength (that is, lead a suit in which your left-hand adversary has high cards) is a rule to be universally followed, when you have no good suit of your own and do not know which is your partner's best suit. But if your left-hand adversary leads from a suit both strong and long, and you, making first trick, lead through him in that suit, you are simply playing his game. Of the other two suits (outside trumps), you select that which you can lead with least chance of aiding the adversaries. If it is a short suit, you should generally play the best of the suit: it is an even chance that your partner is strong in it.

If you are second player, and take the first trick, you can hardly go wrong. Leading the suit your right-hand adversary had led would be doubly disadvantageous: you would be probably leading up to strength, and certainly helping to establish his suit. Of the other two suits, outside trumps, you select the best, and, if short in it, play the card most likely to help your partner. If you have thus led from a short suit, in which your left-hand adversary is strong, you at any rate lead through his strength. If your high card makes, and you then play a low one, your partner knows you have led from a short suit (or that you have made a forced lead), and infers that either you have four trumps, and no other four-card suit, or that

your only four-card suit is very weak. His own hand will help to show which of the two explanations is the more probable.

With a five-card suit, however small the individual cards, it is seldom wrong to lead from the long suit, if you have good cards of re-entry. Cavendish, in his "Card Essays," says that the long suit should be led from, even with such a hand as this: Ace, King, Queen of Spades; eight of Clubs; Ace, King, Queen, and three of Diamonds (trumps); nine, eight, six, four, three of Hearts.

The customary way of treating leads at Whist is found perplexing by beginners. A number of suits are considered, and the proper lead from each is indicated, with perhaps the play second round, until the learner wonders how much he is expected to remember of what appears to him a perfectly heterogeneous collection of rules. Thus, take Captain Campbell Walker's very useful book, "The Correct Card." In this there are 36 cases of suits headed by an Ace, with the play for each; 18 cases of suits headed by King; 7 of suits headed by Queen; 9 of suits headed by Knave; 4 of suits headed by ten; and 2 of suits headed by a small card. In all, 76 cases are considered. The natural idea of the learner is that he ought to commit to memory all these 76 cases, with the exceptions noted in nineteen notes, before he can lead properly; while, after that, he will have to learn an equally voluminous series of rules for play second hand, third hand, and fourth hand. He naturally despairs of accomplishing this without giving much more time to the matter than the game, good though it is, seems worth.

But even when the learner has committed all these rules to memory, he still finds that there is something — embodied, indeed, in them, but not obviously expressed by them—which it is absolutely essential that he should grasp. He requires to know not only what he should lead from a given suit, but what each lead means.

Now it does not seem to have been noticed by writers on Whist that by beginning at the other end they get rules much more easily remembered, because at once made practically available, and also much fewer in number. In point of fact, the rules which seem without system *have* a system at the back of them, and this system is at once displayed when we reverse the usual method of presenting the rules for leading, and begin by asking what particular leads may mean. Afterwards, if we have plenty of time to waste, we may col-

lect together a few hundreds of such rules and exceptions as appear in Captain Walker's book.

## WHEN TO LEAD AN ACE.

We begin, then, by considering, *not* the multitudinous leads from suits headed by an Ace, but from what suits, containing an Ace, the Ace should be led. It will be seen that there are only a few cases in which Ace is led, and these easily remembered; and also that, once we know when an Ace should be led, we know what the Ace lead means.

When, then, should an Ace be led?

From long suits, and from suits of not less than three, Ace is only led:

(1) from Ace and four or more others (not including King).

(2) from Ace, Queen, Knave, with or without others.

From suits of two cards (which it can hardly ever be right to open—and never as an original lead) containing an Ace, Ace is always led.

From long suits, then, or suits of three, which only are in question in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, there are only two cases to be considered.

The play second round, supposing the Ace not trumped, will show from what sort of suit the Ace was led. For,

(1) If Ace is led from Ace, four small ones, or more, a small card is led second round.

(2) If Ace is led from Ace, Queen, Knave, and others, either the Queen or the Knave is played second round—the Queen, if the suit did not originally contain more than four cards, the Knave if it did.

Thus, when your partner leads an Ace, you know at once that he has not the King. If you have the Queen or the Knave, you know he has not led from Ace, Queen, Knave, and therefore that he has four more cards in the suit.

If the lead is not an original lead, and the play has given reason to believe that your partner has been driven to a forced lead, the Ace may have been led from Ace and another. This seldom happens, but when it does the previous circumstances of the play, and what follows the forced lead (together with the study of your own hand), will almost always show you that the lead has not been from strength.

We may note, in passing, that on the Continent, Ace is led from Ace and three others (not including King), though the laws of probability point to the play as not the best. It is well to remember, however, when playing with Continental players, that this is the rule with them.

An exceptional case, when Ace is led from Ace, King, and others, is considered under the next heading.

### WHEN TO LEAD KING (PLAIN SUITS).

From a long suit, or from a suit of three at least, King is only led under two conditions, viz. :

(1) From Ace, King, and others.

(2) From King, Queen, and others.

In the case of a forced lead from King and one other, the King is always led.

In case (1), follow the King with the Ace, unless you hold Ace, King, Queen, in which case play Queen second round. In case (2), if your King wins, lead a small one, unless you hold Knave also, when follow with Queen, or Knave, according as you held four, or more, originally.

Young players, when corrected for leading Ace from Ace, King, and others, ask what difference it can make, seeing that both cards are of equal strength. To this they add sometimes that, as it is a recognized rule to lead the highest of a sequence (following suit with the lowest), there seems a disadvantage in making what appears like an unnecessary exception.

So far as making the strong cards of your suit is concerned, it is a matter of indifference whether you lead Ace or King. But if you follow the rule of leading King from King, Ace, and others, you enable your partner to understand you better. You make your Ace leads more intelligible. If you led Ace uniformly from Ace King, an Ace lead might mean any of three things: (i.) Ace four or more, (ii.) Ace, Queen, Knave, with or without others, and (iii.) Ace, King, and others. Your partner would often be in doubt which of the three you led from; whereas he can scarcely ever be in doubt which of the two ordinary cases is in question, even though you should be unable to follow up your lead.

As for the lead of King from Ace, King, and others being an exception to the useful general rule, '' Lead the highest from a se-

quence," the point is of no importance; for the exception is not one that can ever cause any confusion. In fact it is becoming a recognized Whist principle that one of the great uses of general rules is that they afford an opportunity for giving your partner information by departing from them in certain recognized cases. Of this we saw an example in the lead second round from Ace, Queen, Knave, with or without others (p. 11, l. 25–28). After winning with the Ace, the Queen would be the proper lead, if we followed the general rule of leading the highest of a sequence. When the original suit is only of moderate length (three or four), the Queen is led; but when the suit is of more than average length (five or more), we depart from the rule, and lead Knave second round. Thus, whether we follow the general rule or depart from it, we give our partner information, yet without in any way affecting the strength of our suit.

There is one case, and one only, in which from Ace, King, and others, Ace should be led:

If, before getting the lead, you have trumped in one suit, and should then lead King of another suit, your partner, if he had no cards in the suit (a contingency always to be considered) might see an opportunity of establishing a cross ruff or seesaw, by which, perhaps, four or five tricks might be made. He would, therefore, trump your King, considering that Ace might lie with fourth player, and lead the suit which you had trumped. To avoid this, you lead in such a case your Ace first, then your King.

When a King has been led first round, your partner knows from the way the cards fall whether the lead was from Ace, King, and others, or from King, Queen, and others. If you have led from King, Queen, one of the opponents will generally cover your King with Ace. If neither plays the Ace, your partner may be almost certain you hold it. But, as a matter of fact, no one at the table remains in doubt about the meaning of a King lead, unless the King is trumped, or the play shows that there will be a ruff next round. For if the King makes, Ace usually follows at once if the lead was from Ace, King; and a small card if the lead was from King, Queen (in which case—the first round having passed—the Ace is usually with partner): for it is generally bad play to pass an opponent's King if you hold the Ace.

Thus, just as when the Ace is led (in any case except that of a forced lead), the second round at once shows which of the two suits

has been opened from which Ace should be led; so is it when a King is led: we can always tell from the second round at latest what suit has been led from—Ace, King, and others, or King, Queen, and others.

There is one exception—very seldom advisable in plain suits— viz., when the King is led from Ace, King, Knave, with or without others. Then leader sometimes changes suit, that he may be led up to and finesse with the Knave.

### WHEN TO LEAD QUEEN (PLAIN SUITS).

The Queen is led from a long suit, or from a suit of three at least, only in the following cases:

(1) Queen, Knave, ten, with or without small ones.
(2) Queen, Knave, and one small one.

In the case of a forced lead from Queen and one other, the Queen is always led.

After Queen from suit (1), Knave is led, if there is only one card, or none, below the ten; ten if there are more.

### WHEN TO LEAD KNAVE (PLAIN SUITS).

The Knave is led from a long suit, or from a suit of three at least, only in the following cases:

(1) King, Queen, Knave, and not less than two others (not in-
       cluding ten).
(2) Knave, ten, nine, with or without others.
(3) Knave and two others.

In the case of a forced lead from Knave and one other, Knave is always led.

After Knave from suit (1), King is led whether Ace has fallen or not; from suit (2), ten is led if there is only one card, or none below the nine; nine, or lowest of head sequence, if there are more.

### WHEN TO LEAD TEN (PLAIN SUITS).

The ten is led from a long suit, or a suit of three, only in the fol-
lowing cases:

(1) King, Queen, Knave, ten, with or without others (not in-
       cluding nine).
(2) King, Knave, ten, with or without others.
(3) Ten, nine, eight, seven.
(4) Ten, two others.

After leading ten from (1), follow with King, if you have no small cards, otherwise with Knave; if ten, led from (2) should win, lead a small one, if you have one, otherwise wait to be led through; after ten from (3), lead nine; after ten from (4), lead highest left.

### WHEN TO LEAD NINE (PLAIN SUITS).

Lead nine from four-card or three-card suit, only in the following cases:

(1) King, Knave, ten, nine, with or without small ones (not including eight).
(2) Nine, eight, seven, six.
(3) Nine and two others.

### WHEN TO LEAD A SMALL CARD (PLAIN SUITS).

A small card is led from Ace, two or three small ones (except by Continental players, who lead Ace, as already mentioned, from Ace three small ones); from King and others, not including Queen; from Queen, Knave, and small ones (two or more); from Queen or Knave and small ones; from ten and small ones (three at least); from a suit of four small ones, when the lowest is played; and from a suit of fewer than four small ones (a forced lead), when the highest is played.

### WHEN TO LEAD LOWEST BUT ONE.

From a suit of five cards or more, not headed by the Ace, the lowest but one is played. This lead is called the *Penultimate*.

[Some add to this the *Ante-penultimate* lead, or lowest but two from six or more.]

### ADDENDUM TO PLAIN SUIT LEADS.

The leads above considered are supposed to be either original leads from long or strong suits, or forced leads with no knowledge of your partner's strength in the suit led. In every case of a forced lead from a short suit, where you have reason to believe that your partner has strength in the suit, the highest is played, so that from Ace two others you lead Ace in this case, following with the next highest. Similarly, from King two others you play King, then next highest; from Queen two others, Queen, then next highest; from Knave two others, Knave, then next highest. This last is the constant lead from Knave two others (so from ten two others, you

play ten, then next highest): when your partner has not indicated strength, there is some use in leading lowest from Ace two others, King two others, or Queen two others; but manifestly keeping back the Knave or ten (with two others) can be of no use to you, while playing it may help your partner.

### THE LEAD IN TRUMPS.

The lead in trumps differs in one important respect from the lead in plain suits—there is no fear that a good card will be lost, if kept back, by being trumped. We can, therefore, play with safety a waiting game; indeed, it is often advantageous to do so, because so much often depends on winning the last round in trumps.* Another difference between trump cards and others arises from the circumstance that you need not so carefully indicate your strength by playing an obviously winning card; for there is no possibility of your partner hurting you by trumping a card which he may mistake for a losing one. The chief variations of the trump lead from a lead in plain suits depend on these considerations—principally on the former.

Thus, in trumps, from Ace, King, and not more than five others, a small card should be played; this insures the numerical command in trumps if you have five others, and is the best way towards obtaining it if you have less than five. Besides, by this course you give your partner a good chance of winning the first trick. Of course, if you have six small ones besides Ace and King, you have the numerical command, even if all the remaining trumps are in one hand; you therefore play King, then Ace.

Again, from Ace, King, Queen, alone, in plain suits, you lead King, then Queen. In trumps, having no fear that Queen will be lost, you lead Queen first, then King. So with Ace, King, Queen, Knave, you lead King first in plain suits; in trumps you lead the lowest of the sequence, the Knave.

Again, in plain suits from Ace and four or more others, not including King, you lead Ace, because of the risk that in the second round it might be trumped. Having no such fear in the trump

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* We do not mean simply having the last winning trump, for this may be left in, and the opponents' strong suits yet played out to the bitter end; but winning the last round of trumps, so as to be able to bring in a strong suit either of your own or your partner's.

suit, you lead the smallest but one, unless you have at least six small ones, in which case, being sure of the numerical command, you lead Ace.

In trumps from King, Queen, and two or more small ones, a small card is led, instead of the King, as in plain suits; but with more than five small ones, begin with King.

Some trump leads differ from plain-suit leads and ordinary trump leads, on account of the trump card being of a particular value. Thus, from Ace, Knave, ten, and nine, the nine would be led in plain suits; so, also, nine would be led in trumps, unless Queen is turned up on the left, when Ace should be played. Again, from King, Knave, two or more small ones, the lowest is led in plain suits, and ordinarily in trumps; but if ten is turned up to the right, the Knave is led. In trumps, from Knave, ten, eight, with one or more small ones, lead the lowest, as in plain suits, unless nine is turned up on your right, when lead Knave.

### SYNOPSIS OF LEADS.

It may now be convenient to sum up the various leads, in such a form that they can be readily studied at a glance and easily remembered. We would invite those who have tried to retain in their recollection the multitudinous leads given in the books heretofore published, to note how simple the Whist leads are when viewed as we have presented them. We venture to say—indeed we *know*, having tested the matter—that a more perfect knowledge of the leads at Whist can be gained in a week by considering when to lead Ace, King, Queen, and so forth, than in two months at least by the usual method of considering what card to lead from each of the numerous combinations which the cards may present. Moreover it is found in practice that a learner who has followed our method at once picks up the habit of interpreting the leads of others, whereas one who has followed the other method is often a long time in passing from a knowledge of what he should lead to the ready recognition (instant recognition, it should be, after a little practice) of the meaning of any given lead.

### LEADS IN PLAIN SUITS.

Lead Ace, from Ace, with four or more others, not including King; from Ace, Queen, Knave, with or without others; from Ace,

two others (not including King), if you have reason to believe that your partner has strength in the suit; and from Ace one other, whatever this other may be. The last two cases are, of course, forced leads.

After leading Ace, from Ace four or more, follow * with lowest (unless you adopt Drayson's plan of following with lowest but one if there are more than four others). After leading Ace from Ace, Queen, Knave, follow with Queen if you have not more than one small one of the suit, otherwise follow with Knave. When you lead Ace from Ace two others (forced lead), follow with highest. Lead Ace from Ace, King, and others, when you have trumped another suit, lest your partner should trump your King to establish a cross ruff.

Lead King, from Ace, King, and others; from King, Queen, and others (unless these others, being more than two, include the Knave); from King two others (forced lead), if you have reason to believe that your partner has strength in the suit; and from King one other (forced lead) whatever that other may be.

After leading King from Ace, King, and others, follow with Ace, unless you hold Queen, in which case follow with Queen, or unless you hold Knave, in which case you may sometimes (if the state of the score seems to render it advisable) change suit, that you may be led up to and finesse the Knave. After leading King from King, Queen, and others, if King makes, follow with small one, unless you hold Knave also, when follow with Queen (not with small one, because Ace *may* have been held up). When you lead King from King two others (forced lead), follow with highest if King makes.

Lead Queen from Queen, Knave, ten, with or without others; from Queen, Knave, and one small one (forced lead); from Queen two others, not including Knave (forced lead), only if you have reason to believe that your partner has strength in the suit; and from Queen and another (forced lead) whatever that other may be.

After leading Queen from Queen, Knave, ten, follow with Knave, unless you have five or more, when follow with lowest of the Queen, Knave, ten sequence. After forced lead from Queen two others, if Queen makes, follow with highest.

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* When we thus speak of second round, we do not wish the reader to forget that the first round may show it to be unadvisable to continue the suit; it may seem better to leave your own suit and lead your partner's, or to lead trumps, etc.

Lead Knave from King, Queen, Knave, and not less than two others (not including ten); from Knave, ten, nine, with or without others; from Knave and two others (forced lead), and from Knave one other (forced lead).

After leading Knave from King, Queen, Knave, etc., follow with King if you have two small ones, with Queen if you have more. After leading Knave from Knave, ten, nine, lead ten·if there is only one card below the nine, the nine if there are more. After leading Knave from Knave two others, whatever they may be, follow with highest.         •

Lead ten from King, Queen, Knave, ten, with or without others; from King, Knave, ten, with or without others ; from ten, nine, eight, seven; from ten two others, or ten one other (forced leads). After leading ten from King, Queen, Knave, ten, follow with King if you have no small card, otherwise with Knave. After ten from King, Knave, ten, play a small one if ten makes. After forced lead of ten play your highest.

Lead nine from King, Knave, ten, nine; and in case of forced lead, from nine two others.

Lead a small card from all suits not considered in the above synopsis. Lead the lowest from four cards, the lowest but one from five or more (the lowest but two from six or more, if you care to adopt Drayson's rule); the highest from three or two small cards.

Note that it can scarcely ever happen that playing the lowest but one or two for the purpose of indicating length can be mistaken by your partner for a forced lead from two or three small cards, or *vice versâ*.

We have already considered concisely, yet fully, the distinction between trump leads and leads from plain suits.

Observe that, short as the above synopsis seems, considering the multiplicity of Whist leads as usually presented, it would be very much shorter if it dealt only with original leads. For these one may say that all the beginner need learn is summed up in the following:

Lead Ace from Ace and four others, following with small one; and from Ace, Queen, Knave, with or without others, following with Queen, if you have not more than one small one, otherwise with Knave. Lead King from Ace, King and others, following with Ace; and from King, Queen, and others, following with small

one.  Lead Queen from Queen, Knave, ten, following with Knave, unless you have five or more, when play lowest of head sequence. Lead Knave from King, Queen, Knave, and two or more, from Knave, ten, nine, with or without small ones.  Lead ten from King, Queen, Knave, ten, and from King, Knave, ten, with or without others.  Lead nine from King, Knave, ten, nine.  In other cases lead a low one, the lowest if you have only four cards, the lowest but one if you have more.

Let the learner combine with this the general rule, that if he is obliged to lead from a weak suit, he always plays the best card of it, unless he has either Ace, King, or Queen, with two small ones. He now knows nearly all that he need know about leading from plain suits.  All that he need at first notice about leading from trumps, is, that he can more safely play a waiting game in that suit, as his good cards in it cannot be lost by trumping; also that he must consider the trump card.  The play in trumps is also apt to be modified by considerations depending on the state of the score, the position of the cards in other hands, and so forth.

# Chapter II.

## PLAY SECOND HAND.

### GENERAL REMARKS.

THERE are few points which distinguish more thoroughly the good from the inferior Whist-player than the play second hand. I am not, of course, referring to players so inexperienced as to know no other rule than "second hand play low;" nor are the rules for play second hand, at least in the opening rounds of a game, less definite than those for leading. But somehow it happens that many players who very seldom lead unwisely, who know well when to play highest and when to finesse third in hand, and when it is essential to success to win partner's trick fourth hand, are apt to trust, second hand, to chances which are demonstrably against them. Given, for instance, an original lead of a small card (plain suit), second player with Queen and a small one (and no special reason for risking something to get a lead), how often do we see the Queen played, though it is known that, in the greater number of cases, the card is thus thrown away. Of course, the play often steals a trick. Perhaps in two cases out of five it may do so, but it is bad, because in a greater number of cases it fails; and in every case it suggests for a while to partner that you held either the Queen alone, or King, Queen, and a small one. So in other cases which might be cited.

The rules for play second hand are in reality sufficiently simple, though here, as in the case of the lead, they seem multitudinous.

We note, first, that in general, a low card is to be played second hand; for, in the first place, the suit is presumably your adversaries', and it is well to keep the commanding cards of their suit; and, in the second place, your partner lies at an advantage over third player, who ordinarily must play his highest, lest the trick should fall an easy prey to your partner. By playing high second

hand you waste a good card, whether third hand takes the trick or your partner; you are rather worse off too, if, though you take the trick, partner could have won it had you left it to him; for when the suit is returned, the lead will be through your partner's strength to your hand, weakened by the loss of its best card in the suit. You only gain if it so chances that neither third hand nor your partner has a better card; and it is unwise to play for only one among several chances.

Yet, still supposing the suit your adversaries', and that you have originally not more than three cards, it may happen that a high card should be played. Thus, if you have Ace, King, one or more small ones ; King, Queen, and one or more small ones ; Queen, Knave, and *one* small one; Knave, ten, and *one* small one; or ten, nine, and *one* small one; play the lowest of the sequence. In the first case, you win the trick and still have the commanding card of the suit; in the other cases, if you do not win the trick, you avoid the risk of its being taken with a low card by third in hand, or your partner compelled to play a very high card.

Again, if a high card is led, and you hold a higher card and one or two small ones, it is generally best to cover. If third in hand take the trick, two good cards have fallen from the enemy to make one trick.

We must now, however, enter upon the discussion of the play second hand in detail. We shall endeavor (though the task is not so easy as in the case of the lead) to reduce the play to system, instead of presenting some forty or fifty rules, as has usually been done.

It is not easy to systematize the play second hand, like the leads. To begin with, the lead is always guided by one of two considerations : it is either from strength, or, when from weakness, it is played to help partner as much as may be. In most cases it is from strength, and there can then be no question as to the card to be played, and very little as to the meaning of a card which has been played. But the second player may have strength or weakness, or neither strength nor weakness, in the suit led, and his play thus depends on a greater possible variety of positions. Then, again, it depends on the lead; so that we cannot say, as we can in the case of the lead, such and such a card means such and such a suit, but must take into account the card led in the suit. It thus

becomes impossible to present anything like such simple rules, either for playing second hand, or for the interpretation of the play second hand, as in the case of the lead.

To proceed systematically, let us consider the leads as presented in the preceding chapter and the corresponding play of second hand. Fortunately we can dismiss a number of cases very quickly.

### PLAY SECOND HAND WHEN ACE, KING, OR QUEEN IS LED (PLAIN SUITS).

When Ace is led, of course, second hand has only to play his lowest, unless he wishes to signal, when he plays his lowest but one. When King is led, second player, if he holds Ace, puts it on (" covers," is the technical expression), otherwise plays his lowest, unless to signal—a case we shall not hereafter specially refer to. When Queen is led, we know that the leader does not hold Ace or Queen, and, unless the lead is from a weak suit (a forced lead), that he does hold both Knave and ten. If second hand holds both Ace and King, he would, of course, play the King. If, of these two cards, he holds Ace and others, whether long or short in the suit, he plays the Ace. If he holds King and others, his play will depend on his strength in the suit; if short in the suit, it is better to cover ; if long, to pass the Queen, playing, in fact, on the same principles which guide in leading from weakness on the one hand and from strength on the other. The play second hand, when Queen is led, depends on the consideration that, if Ace is held by third hand, it will not be played unless King is played second hand, when, of course, it will be played by third hand. Now, if third player holds Ace, and second player having King is short in the suit, he can gain nothing by failing to cover. Leader will know Ace lies with third player, and will lead again (the lowest of his head sequence) when the King, if again kept back, will be unguarded, so that a third round will cause the King to fall to the Ace. If, however, the suit is long, this danger does not exist, and there is a greater probability that Ace will fall or the suit be ruffed early. On the other hand, if fourth player has Ace, it is still second player's interest to keep back the King if he is long in the suit. His partner will take the trick with the Ace, and whether second round is led by original leader or his partner, the King will capture another card of the head sequence, with good chance that the last

will be played third round.   If, however, second player was short
in the suit, of course he gains nothing by thus clearing it: it is best
for him, therefore, to cover with King second round, even if his
partner holds the Ace.

When Queen is led and second player holds King, ten, and one
other, the question may arise whether it is not better to hold up the
King, on the chance that, partner taking trick with Ace, the return
of the suit (when the leader's partner gets the lead) may find second
player with the tenace.   It is, however, better, on the whole, to
cover in this case.   The lead is in all probability from Queen,
Knave, and one other; it is certainly a forced lead; and it is an
even chance that partner holds the Ace, and also an even chance
that he has numerical strength as against third hand.   It is about
three to one that one of these conditions holds, and in either case
playing King second hand is good.   If your partner holds the Ace,
you and he still have the command; and if he has length, you help
to clear his suit, by playing the King.   The state of the score may
occasionally justify departure from this rule, however.

It is scarcely likely that when Queen is led, second player should
hold King and Knave, with or without others, for this can only
happen when Queen has been led from Queen and a small one, a
lead only justified by the absolute impropriety (shewn by previous
play) of leading from long suit, and clear evidence that partner is
strong in the suit so led.   Of course, if this *should* happen, the
King is played.   In fact, almost invariably when second player
holds—with other card or cards—a fourchette for a high card led
(that is, King-Knave for a Queen; Queen-ten for a Knave; Knave-
nine for a ten; and so on) he should cover.

### PLAY SECOND HAND WHEN KNAVE IS LED.

Knave, as an original lead, is played only (see synopsis of leads,
pages 18, 19), (1) from King, Queen, Knave, and two or more small
ones; and (2) from Knave, ten, nine, with or without small ones;
except in the unusual case that original leader holds four trumps
and three three-card suits, when Knave may be led from Knave
and two small cards.   If then second player holds either King or
Queen, he knows the lead is not from (1); while, if he holds either
ten or nine, he knows it is not from (2); and, lastly, if he holds one
of the first set, as well as one of the second set, he knows that the

lead is a forced one, the leader having probably no four-card plain suit. Taking the two more common cases of a Knave lead, second player, if he holds King or Queen only, above the Knave, showing that the lead is from Knave, ten, nine, and others, should play a small one, unless with the Queen he holds the ten, when he should play the Queen. But this last case is little likely to occur, as it would imply that Knave had been led from Knave and one or two small ones. If second player holds both King and Queen, he should cover Knave with Queen. If he holds Ace and Queen with or without small ones, he should play the ace, knowing that leader does not hold the King, so that covering with Queen is useless, whether third player or partner hold the King. If, when Knave is led, second player has no card above it, he will, of course, play his lowest. If second player holds King, nine, or Queen, nine, the lead is probably a forced one—from Knave and two small ones; it is, therefore, useless to put on the higher card, unless circumstances render it very desirable to gain the lead. But usually the small card would be played, leaving partner to take the trick if he can.

### PLAY SECOND HAND WHEN TEN OR NINE IS LED.

Here the principles are much the same as in the previous case. Ten (see synopsis of leads) is only led from King, Queen, Knave, ten, and from King, Knave, ten, with or without others. Therefore, if second player holds the Queen, with nothing to show that the lead is forced (and ten is very unusual as a forced lead), he knows that the lead is from King, Knave, ten, and should play the Queen, or not, according as she is singly or doubly guarded. It is obviously useless to retain her if she is only singly guarded, for she must fall next round; and as obviously unwise to play her if she has two guards or more. If ten is led, and second player holds Knave and nine (a fourchette), of course Knave should be played. The lead, with these cards outside the leader's hand, is very unusual, being from ten and one or two small ones. Nine is only led from King, Knave, ten, nine, with or without others. If second player, then, holds Queen only singly guarded, he should play her; but if she is doubly or trebly guarded, he should play his lowest.

### PLAY SECOND HAND WHEN SMALL CARD IS LED.

The rules for play second hand when a small card is led are

nearly all included in the general instructions already given. When second player is long in the suit led, he plays somewhat as he would if the suit were his own, and he were leading: only that, first, in playing one of a sequence he always plays the lowest; and, second-ly, as his partner is in a more favorable position, being fourth player instead of third, he leaves more open to him. For instance, in leading from Ace and four small ones, Ace is played; but if second player holds these cards he plays a small one, unless the game is in a critical state, and either one trick or a lead is much needed; or if first player is one of those who affect the lead from a singleton. So when an honor is led and you hold a higher honor and are long in the suit, you pass the trick, except you have strong reason for desiring a lead (or wish to stop a trump lead, but that case belongs to play second hand in trumps). When, however, you hold Ace, Queen, and others second hand, a small card being led, your play is unlike that which you would adopt in leading from such a hand. Thus, with Ace, Queen, Knave, with or without others, Ace is always led; but with these cards second in hand, you play the Knave (or lowest of Queen Knave sequence). From Ace, Queen, ten, Queen is to be played; for if third player covers, you remain with the tenace, so that unless led through again, and Knave lies with third player, you are sure to make two tricks in the suit (apart from ruffing). From Ace, Queen, and one or two small ones, you play second hand a small one on a small card led. From Ace, Queen, and three small ones or more, you play Queen, if weak in trumps, smallest if strong. From King, Queen, and small ones (long suit) you play from the head sequence—but the Queen, in-stead of the King (as you would if leading).

When you are short in the suit led, you play second hand on somewhat the same principles as in the case of the forced lead *of a suit in which you have no reason to believe your partner strong.* You play, of course, the lowest instead of the highest of a sequence, and you leave more to your partner, as he is more favorably placed.

But if you hold only two cards in the suit led, you reverse, as second player, the rule which holds, almost without exception, in the unusual case of a forced lead from a two-card suit. Thus, if you hold King, or Queen, or Knave, and one small one, you play the small one—not the honor (in plain suits), unless you have some special reason for desiring to obtain the lead, in which case the

King may be played, second hand, from King one small one.
Many skilful players of their own hand maintain, with some ob-
stinacy, that Queen should be played, second hand, from Queen one
small one, because the chance of her falling is so great, greater
than that of King falling when you retain him second in hand.
The chance of a singly guarded Queen making is always much less
than that for a singly guarded King; but you do not increase it by
playing the Queen in such a case. You know certainly that either
King or Ace lies with third and fourth players. If third holds
either, your Queen falls. It may be, third player puts on King,
and your partner takes the trick with the Ace, in which case you
have the satisfaction of knowing that you have thrown away your
Queen. Of course, if your partner holds Ace, and third player
does not hold a King, you gain by putting on the Queen. But this
is practically the only case in your favor. The matter may be put
thus: One of the following arrangements *must* hold; as it is certain,
from the lead of a small one, that leader has not both Ace and King,

<div align="right">By playing Queen.</div>

3d holds Ace and King. . . . . . . . . . . You throw her away.
4th       "           "     . . . . . . . . . . . You gain a trick.
3d       "     4th holds King or not . . . You throw her away.
3d holds King, 4th holds Ace. . . . . . . . You lose a trick.
    "       "       "     not Ace. . . . . You throw her away.
3d weak, 4th holds Ace. . . . . . . . . . . You gain a trick.
    "       "       "   King. . . . . . . . . . You probably gain a trick.

There is, you observe, a balance in favor of the play of Queen sec-
ond hand turning out unfavorably.

Cavendish gives a reason for playing the small card, the force of
which some Whist-players seem not to recognize. He says that
playing the Queen unnecessarily exposes your weakness, and en-
ables the leader to finesse when the suit is returned. As the Queen
is the proper card to play if you hold King, Queen, and a small
one, you expose your weakness to the player who holds King. If
he is the leader, he can finesse the ten if he holds it or his partner
leads it, on the return of the suit, knowing you do not hold the
Knave. He may even finesse the nine if it suits him; a finesse
against only one card. If the third player holds the King, he puts
it on, and your weakness is exposed to both adversaries, who can

finesse under equally favorable conditions. Of course, if fourth player holds the King, you only disclose your weakness to him; but that is one favorable case to two unfavorable cases. Manifestly, the play of Queen second hand from Queen one small one is unsound.

### SYNOPSIS OF PLAY SECOND HAND (PLAIN SUITS).

We can now do, for play second hand, what we have already done for the lead, viz., reduce it to system by showing, not as heretofore, what card to play from particular hands, but under what conditions such and such cards should be played. This, as in the case of the lead, has a double advantage; it gives simpler rules, and it combines with the rules *for* play the inferences *from* play.

### ACE, SECOND HAND,

is played on King, Queen, or Knave, from Ace and small ones; on Knave from Ace, Queen, and small ones; and from Ace four small ones, on a small card led, if the game is in a critical state or there is reason to believe that the lead is from a singleton.

### KING, SECOND HAND,

is played on Queen or Knave, from Ace, King, with or without small ones, and from King not more than two small ones; on Queen from King, ten, etc.; on a small card, from Ace, King, with or without small ones; from Ace, King, Knave; from King one small one, only when second player has special reason for desiring a lead.

### QUEEN, SECOND HAND,

is played on Knave, from Queen and not more than two small ones, and from Queen, ten, and others; on ten, from Queen and one other; on a small card, from Ace, King, Queen, with or without others; from Ace, Queen, ten; from King, Queen, with or without others; from Ace, Queen, and three others, or more, only if weak in trumps; from Queen one small card, only when a trump lead is specially required.

### KNAVE, SECOND HAND,

is played from Queen, Knave, and not more than one small one; and from Ace, Queen, Knave; from Knave one small one, only if a trump lead is specially required.

is played from Knave, ten, and not more than one small one; from Ace, Queen, Knave, ten; and from King, Knave, ten; from ten one small one, if a trump lead is specially required.

### NINE, SECOND HAND,

is played from ten, nine, and not more than one small one; from King, Knave, ten, nine.

### LOWEST, SECOND HAND,

is played in all other cases, unless to signal, when the lowest but one is played.

### PLAY SECOND HAND IN TRUMPS.

The play second hand in trumps differs in several respects from the play in plain suits. This partly depends on the circumstance that the lead in trumps is somewhat different, as we have seen, from the lead in other suits; partly on the absence of risk from ruffing; and partly on the card turned up, and its position with respect to second player. Then, also, the critical nature of trump play has to be considered. When trumps are led, second player knows that there is at least sufficient strength, either in the leader's hand, or between the leader and his partner (if the latter has signalled), to justify the expectation that between them they may get out all the trumps held between second and fourth players, and bring in a long suit. A defensive, or at any rate a waiting game, has therefore generally to be played.

The principal differences in detail, between trump and plain-suit play, second hand, are these:

From Ace, King, and one or small cards in trumps, it is generally better to play a small card second hand, to give partner a chance of making first trick. A small card is played for a similar reason in trumps, from King, Queen, and more than one small one; if, however, you have the ten also, play it. From Ace, King, Queen, and a small one, Queen is played in Trumps, as well as in plain suits, because second player is so strong that he should play a forward game.

From Ace, Queen, ten, in trumps, ten is played, instead of Queen as in plain suits. This gives partner a chance of making the trick;

and should he fail and third hand make it, two tricks are certain on the return of the trump lead.

From Ace, Knave, ten, one or more small ones, the smallest is played in plain suits on a small card led, because the first player cannot hold both King and Queen. But in trumps he may hold both these cards, and it is therefore better to play the ten.

From an honor and one small card, you should only play the honor if it is very important to stop the trump lead. If your partner has turned up King or Ace, and you hold Queen and a small one, you play the small one.

### SECOND HAND SECOND ROUND.

In the second round of a suit it is nearly always best, if you hold the winning card, to play it, unless, of course, you know third hand to be very weak in the suit. When your adversaries' trumps are exhausted it is sometimes better to pass the second round of a long suit, if the third round is assured, and there is a fair chance of the suit being established third round. In trumps second round, it is often better to keep back the winning card if you have numerical strength in trumps and a good plain suit.

If, in second round, second hand holds second and third best cards, he should, of course, play the third best. If he hold third best, and have reason to believe his partner holds the best (and leader second best) he may often with advantage play the third best, and so save his partner's best. If, however, he is long in the suit, he very likely loses by this, for his partner's best card is probably single, and so falls on a trick already won.

### AN EXCEPTIONAL CASE.

Ace is usually played second hand on King ; but occasionally with Ace, Knave, and others, if you are strong in trumps, you may pass the King, on the chance of making the Knave. It is, however, very seldom good play to do this.

## PLAY THIRD HAND.

### GENERAL REMARKS.

MANY players seem to think the only rule necessary for third hand is to play the highest card, unless the suit is headed in the hand by a sequence, when, of course, they do not carry the rule to so absurd a length as to play the highest of the sequence. If to this rule they make one exception, in finessing the Queen with Ace, Queen, they suppose they know all that need be known about third-hand play.

In reality, however, play third hand requires considerable judgment, and a thorough knowledge of the leads and of play second hand. In two thirds, perhaps, of the cases that arise, it may suffice to know that third hand should play his highest, unless, of course, he cannot play higher than his partner, or only a card which is the next in sequence above his partner's, when he plays his lowest. If his suit is headed by a sequence, he plays the lowest of the sequence (with the same exception that, if his partner's card is higher, or belongs to the same sequence, he plays his lowest, unless he has such strength in the suit that he may with advantage take his partner's trick). But, in other cases, the player third hand has to consider the lead, the play second hand, and the score.

Suppose, for instance, your partner has led Queen, and that the lead is original, or at any rate that there is no reason to suppose it forced. Thus, the lead is presumably from Queen, Knave, ten, with probably one small card at least. Then, if you have the Ace and one or more others, third in hand, how should you play if second hand does not cover? In this case it is probable that second has not the King, and the first idea would be that, since fourth player probably holds the King, you should play the Ace. But in general this would be wrong. The state of the score might render

it advisable to take the trick lest second round should be ruffed. But usually it is best to let the trick go to the fourth player. By putting on Ace, you sacrifice Ace and Queen for one trick, and leave the best card in the adversaries' hands. Apart from ruffing—which, be it remembered, always means a trump drawn from the adversary—the King will make; that is, the adversaries will have one trick in the suit in any case, and it is far better for you that one trick should be in the first than in the second round. Consider the effect (1) of putting on the Ace and (2) of passing the Queen, apart from ruffing. In case (1) Ace makes first round, King makes second round, and another suit is immediately led—as likely as not the suit is not led again; in case (2) King makes first round, Ace takes the second trick, the suit is probably led a third time by holder of Ace, and in that case two more tricks are made in it, or trumps are forced from the enemy.

Again, suppose ten is led and passed by second player, you know (see account of the leads in Chapter I., or the synopsis of them on p. 18) that the lead is from King, Queen, Knave, ten, or from King, Knave, ten, with or without small ones. If, third in hand, you hold the Ace, when ten is led, you put it on, leaving your partner to finesse (if he holds King, Knave) on the return of the suit. If you hold Ace, Knave, you know that the ten is led as a strengthening card; you pass it, and even if the finesse fails, as is probable (for if King, Queen were both with second player the Queen would be put on), you remain with the tenace. If when ten is led, you having nothing above it but the Queen, you pass it: for whether it has been led (as is most probable) from King, Knave, ten, etc., or is a strengthening card, the play of the Queen would be bad: in the former case, obviously ; in the latter, because by playing the Queen you give up at once the command of the suit.

These illustrations suffice to show that the general rule, Third in hand play your highest, is as insufficient as we have already seen that the general rule is for second play, Second in hand play your lowest. We shall, therefore, proceed to consider the play third in hand—first on general principles, and then in detail, as we have already considered the play of the first and second hands.

### PLAY THIRD HAND (PLAIN SUITS).

The general principles which should guide the play third in

hand are—First, and chiefly, to help and strengthen your partner as much as possible in his own suit; secondly, to derive all possible advantage from any strengthening card he may play in your own suit; and, thirdly, to retain as long as possible such partial command as you may have in an opponent's suit. You can generally tell (from the lead, the play second hand, and your own hand) whether your partner has led from strength or to strengthen you, or from a weak suit in which he has no means of knowing your position. This will be obvious from what we have already said about interpretation of the lead and the play second hand. Your play will be guided accordingly.

Let us, then, consider the play third in hand in detail: the inferences to be drawn from the play of particular cards third in hand are too obvious to need special consideration.

If you hold Ace third in hand, and neither King nor Queen, you play it in plain suits, unless King or Queen has been led. The only exception to this is when ten has been led and you hold Ace, Knave, when it is best to pass the ten. With Ace, King, you put on King, as a rule. But with Ace, King, and more than one small one, a good hand, and four trumps, you should not put King on your partner's Knave, but pass the Knave: fourth in hand is sure to take the trick; but when trumps are out you are tolerably sure of getting in again, when you make two tricks at least, and probably three in the suit. On the other hand, with Ace, King, and small ones, but only three trumps, you should not pass the Knave. The principle here applied is general. With good strength in trumps you may usually finesse with advantage in a strong suit in which your partner has led a strengthening card; but when short in trumps such a finesse is unadvisable.

With Ace, Queen, alone or with others, you should finesse the Queen, or the lowest card in sequence with the Queen—unless a single trick will make or save the game, when, of course, such a finesse would be a Whist atrocity.

With King, Knave, etc., some players finesse the Knave. This is only right when you have such strength in the suit as to feel sure your partner has led a strengthening card from a short suit. It is nearly always wrong to finesse in your partner's suit. The finesse from Ace, Queen, etc., is almost the solitary exception to this rule. You should, therefore, in general play King, from King,

Knave, third hand. When nine is led, and you hold King, Knave, and others, you pass the nine, if strong in trumps, and the state of the game is not critical (supposing always that second player has not covered the nine). Otherwise, you may either finesse the Knave, or not, as you may deem best. Fourth player is as likely to hold Ace and no other honor as Queen and no other honor; if he holds both Ace and Queen, it is indifferent what you play; he will, in any case, remain with an honor over you.

When, third in hand, you hold Queen or Knave and others, and a small card has been led which second player does not cover with a card higher than your honor, you should in every case play the honor. But if ten is led, and not covered by Knave, you would not play the Queen, but pass the ten; for, as already explained, you gain nothing by playing the Queen if the lead is from King, Knave, ten, while, if the ten is a strengthening card, you lose all command of the suit if you cover. If you hold Knave, nine, and others, and eight is led, you may finesse the nine or pass the eight; eight can hardly be played as a strengthening card, nor from a three-card suit, containing both Ace, King, or King Queen, for from either of these combinations the proper lead is the King. If the eight is the lowest of a four-card suit, the suit can be no other than Ace, Queen, ten, eight. If the lead is from a three-card suit, the eight being the lowest, the other cards may be Ace Queen, Ace ten, King ten, or Queen ten. The ten can therefore only be to your left in the single case of the lead being from Ace, Queen, eight—which is an unlikely lead anyhow, though, of course, possible, since leader may hold, besides, four trumps, and two weak three-card suits. You are, therefore, in all probability, quite safe in finessing the nine or passing the eight, according as you may wish the lead to lie (supposing the trick to fall to the eight or nine).

When, third in hand, your best card is small, you play it, of course, if it is higher than the card played on your right, or higher than and not in sequence with the card led. If you cannot cover, and both the cards already played are small, remember that your card tells both your partner and your adversaries of extreme weakness, both in individual cards and numerically. In such cases the question may arise sometimes whether it may be better to deceive the enemy or not by playing a false card. For instance, if your

partner leads four, second hand plays six, and you hold three and five; if you play the five, it will be thought that you do not hold any other card in the suit. Cases may arise where it may be more important to cause the adversaries to suppose this erroneously than to leave them and your partner in doubt by playing the lower card. It is worth your while in every such case to consider which is likely to be the more advantageous course.

The play of third in hand, second round of a suit, depends generally on the fall of the cards. As a rule, you know pretty well how the cards lie at this round, whether the original lead were your partner's or your own. In the former case you have the indications from the original lead as already explained, those from the play second and fourth in hand, those from the renewed lead, and play second in hand second round, besides your own original hand. In the latter, as the suit is presumably your longest, you have rather more information in your own hand than in the other case, and rather less from the play; but if you have been watchful you have usually learned a good deal. Thus, suppose, having King and three other clubs (10, 4, 3), you lead the 3, and the cards fall thus,

| $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| C 3 | C 8 | C Q | C 6 |

you know that, apart from signalling for trumps, $B$ (your partner) must hold the two and five, $Y$ has nothing below the eight, $Z$ nothing below the six. Now, suppose that on the return of the suit your partner leads the two; then, as this is not the highest left in his hand, you know that besides the five he has one other, which is not the Ace, for if he had had the Ace he would have led it. Nor can it be the Knave, for if he had had Queen Knave, he would have played the lower of the sequence. You hold King and ten yourself, therefore his remaining card must be either the seven or the nine. You know this before $Z$ has played to second round. You know also that $Z$ has not the Ace, or he would not have allowed the Queen to take the first trick. Suppose, now, $Z$ plays the nine. Then the only card whose position remains doubtful is the Knave; it may be to your right or to your left. But you can play with as much confidence as if you knew where it was. For if it lies to your left along with the Ace, which certainly lies there, you lose nothing by finessing the ten; and if it lies to your right you gain a trick—apart from ruffing: you therefore play the ten.

Take again the following case—

Your hand being Q, Kn, 5, 2 of Hearts (trumps), the first round is—

| A | Y | B | Z |
|------|------|------|------|
| H 2 | H 9 | H K | H 6 |

Second round, to second in hand,

is, let us say—                              H 8         H 7

You know certainly that either four, or three, and ten lie with *Y*, and no more. For three and four are certainly not both with *B*, or he would have returned his lowest. Neither four nor three lies with *Z;* therefore, one of these cards lies with *B*, who has, therefore, led the best of two. You can thus place every card, assuming always that all are playing according to the customary rules for good play. *B* has either the three or four left. *Y* has ten, and either four or three. *Z* has the Ace, and is holding it back for some purpose connected with the strategy of his hand. You therefore play Knave, third in hand; whereas, had you not attended to the fall of the cards, you might have thought it a fair finesse—only ten and Ace being against you, and the Ace probably in fourth hand—to pass the eight, so as to make sure of taking the last round in trumps. As it is, you know that, after your Knave has taken the second round, your third lead of the five will draw both the Ace and ten, leaving you with the long trump.

## PLAY THIRD HAND (TRUMPS).

You can safely finesse in trumps when strong in them, sometimes even against two cards. Never play a *needlessly* high card third in hand. If you can win the trick or force out the King card with a ten or a nine, it is a Whist offence of the first magnitude to play the Knave.

## *PLAY FOURTH HAND.*

THE fourth player's duty is usually but to win the trick if he can, and as cheaply as he can. The exceptions usually belong to the cases in which the general conduct of the hand involves considerations overriding such rules of detail as we are for the present considering. Thus, the player fourth in hand may be unable to win a trick except by ruffing, and ruffing may mean giving up all chance of commanding the run of trumps and bringing in a long suit : in that case, he would pass the trick. Or it may happen that the card of the suit with which he could alone take the trick would obviously be likely to serve as a re-entering card, after trumps were exhausted : in such a case, if the chances were clearly in favor of that power of re-entry being obtainable in no other way, fourth hand should pass the trick. The consideration of such points belongs to Whist strategy rather than to Whist principles. We may simply note here that in all such cases a good general rule to bear in mind is, that a certain trick ought not to be passed, unless there is a great probability of making two by so doing. Always remember, however, that if the game can only be saved by making the two, the trick should be passed ; while, of course, if one trick saves or makes the game, it should be made.

A case often arises (it is often spoken of as if fourth hand alone were concerned, but it applies to second hand equally) where it is questionable whether a trick should be passed or taken. King is led in a suit of which you hold Ace, Knave, and others. Here many pass the trick, because, if the suit is continued, as it usually is, they hold the tenace, and, apart from ruffing, make two tricks instead of one in the suit. Holding up the Ace second hand in such cases, though not generally good, is occasionally advisable. But it is seldom safe to pass the trick when you hold Ace, Knave, and an-

other, fourth in hand. There is a considerable chance that either your partner or your right-hand adversary may have held originally but one of the suit; and, if so, either would trump. Your partner would trump, if he could, because he would believe the Ace to be with third hand. Third hand would, of course, trump if he could, a small card having been led. Where you hold up the Ace second hand you have a much better chance, for you run no risk of being trumped by your partner. Clay adds to these considerations, that you give up, for one round at least, the advantage of getting the lead ; that, however, may be an advantage, or the reverse, according to the nature of your hand. He adds: "The leader, either from suspecting your tenace, or because he has another strong suit to show his partner, changes his lead; and when it is next led it is probably by your right-hand adversary, who leads through your tenace, instead of to it." These considerations are less important, however, than the others; for usually no tenace would be suspected, covering with Ace being the usual custom, and it seldom happens that a player finds it well to show a second suit to his partner. The fall of the cards in the first suit may, of course, lead him to do so; but ordinarily he will keep to one suit. The case is rather different when his partner has already shown a suit. For then, the possibility of a held-up tenace (however slight), may lead him to prefer returning his partner's suit—who can afterwards lead the Ace if he has it, and then up to the Queen.

That playing a small card in such a case gives your partner a wrong idea of the contents of your hand is a valid argument against passing the trick, unless the indications are such that you are justified in attaching less importance to informing him than to strengthening your own position. If you are strong in trumps, there is a further reason for disregarding this point. For, should the leader be led to suspect that a tenace is held up, he will be apt to lead trumps, which can hardly fail to suit your hand.

Cases of two kinds have specially to be noticed in playing fourth in hand: first, those in which it is necessary to take a trick already won by partner; secondly, those in which it is necessary to pass a trick won by the adversaries. I am not going to consider all cases of the kind, for many depend on the previous fall of cards, and the strategy of the hand as a whole. But two simple general cases of either sort must be considered here.

First, when late in the game you have the King card and a small one, and the play shows that, though led by your left-hand adversary, the suit is your partner's, the remaining cards in your hands being all losing ones : If in this case you let your partner's card win, you are obliged to win the next trick in the suit and lead a losing card.   But if you take the trick with the King card and lead the small one, you are leading through strength up to weakness, and your partner may finesse deeply, and perhaps make all the tricks in the suit.   Usually the case occurs in the first round of the suit; but it may also happen in the second.  · Thus, suppose a suit originally led by your partner from Knave, nine, and three small ones: you, holding King, Queen, and one small one, play the Queen, and fourth in hand · takes the trick with Ace.   Later on (trumps being out) the latter—your adversary on the left—leads a small one (having held originally Ace, ten, eight, and a small one); your partner plays the seven, third hand a loose card : if you play the small one, and your partner leads the suit again, your King makes, but you have to lead a losing card, and the rest of the tricks probably go to the adversaries; but if you take the trick with your King and lead the small one, your partner makes three more tricks in the suit.

The second case is one in which you must let the adversaries take the trick.   When you hold the best, fourth best, and a small card of a suit, and a second best is led by your left-hand adversary, who also holds the third and fifth best, you must pass the trick.   If you win it you must lead through his tenace and lose the other two tricks; if you pass it, he must lead up to your tenace, and you win the other two tricks.

When, fourth in hand, you have won a trick very easily, it is often good to return your enemy's suit; for the original leader must then play as if third in hand, hoping for no support from his partner. In trumps this is not safe, however.   Even if third hand is really as weak as he seems, you play the enemy's game by continuing the suit.   But in trumps it is always possible that a winning card may be kept back to support more effectively, later, a strong game of the enemy's.

## Chapter V.

### *RETURNING PARTNER'S LEAD.*

THERE is scarcely any more obnoxious rule at Whist than that which many good players of their own hands insist upon, that partner's lead should almost always be at once returned. The player who always returns your lead at once is more annoying even than the one who, when the right time has come for returning it, insists on keeping to his own suit. I would even take exception to Cavendish's rule that "with only moderately strong suits, which you open to a disadvantage, you do better to return your partner's original suit, or to lead up to the weak suit of your right-hand adversary, or through the strong suit of your left-hand adversary," than to open your best suit—*unless* by the words, "which you open to a disadvantage," he means to qualify the expression, "moderately strong suits," and not (as it seems) to make a statement respecting such suits. It is clear that, with only weak three-card suits outside trumps, you do better to return your partner's suit than to lead one of your own. On the other hand, with a strong three-card suit, headed by a sequence, you do better to lead your own suit. With a four-card suit headed by anything below a Queen, you might return him his suit; but with such a suit as Queen, ten, eight, three, you ought, in my opinion, to show your own suit before returning his—especially if you have good cards in your short suits, so as to have a good chance of an opportunity to lead again to him. This is always to be considered; for if you have only a moderately good long suit, and weak cards in the other suits, you may have but one chance of returning his lead, while it may be of great importance that he should be led to, and not have to lead himself. Besides, he may have a strong suit, which may be established if he gets a return lead, and he may then lead trumps, and make a great game; whereas, if you lead your own moderately strong suit, you almost certainly throw the play into the adversaries' hands.

There are some cases, however, where, even when you have a strong suit, you should at once return your partner's lead. Thus, if after taking the trick you remain with the leading card in his suit (which the play shows to be strong), you should play out that card in order to clear his suit. Again, if you held originally only two in his suit, and are weak in trumps, you should return his lead, so that, if he can, he may lead the suit a third time for you to trump it ; for in this way you help him to clear his suit, while using a trump which otherwise would probably fall uselessly.

When the adversary to your left has shown great weakness in your partner's suit, as by failing to head a nine, ten, or Knave of your own at the first round, it is generally unsafe to return the lead ; for the strength must lie between your partner and the player to your right, so that you are probably leading up to strength. Your partner will, indeed, lead under not very favorable conditions, as you also have shown weakness, so that the player to your right will stand to your partner (leading) much as fourth player usually stands to third. But he will not be quite so badly off as when you lead to him ; for the card first played by you third in hand may be the lowest of a sequence, for aught the player to your right can generally know.

The most important rule, in returning partner's lead, and one of the most important general rules at Whist, is, *Return the highest of two remaining cards, the lowest of three or more.* The only exceptions to this rule are that (1) with the winning card and two others (left after first round), you lead the winning card ; (2) with second best and a small one you lead the small one ; and (3) with second and third best and another (after first round), you lead the second best, not the small one. With these exceptions (and an occasion or two, perhaps, where your partner is utterly weak, and you wish to deceive the enemy), this rule is imperative, and extends throughout the whole range of the suit. Thus, with 4, 3, left after first round, the return of the 3 would be a Whist blunder, as would be the play of the 4, if, besides the 4 and 3, you hold the 2 also. In these cases no strength is gained or lost by the lead of 4 or 3. Yet the rule had its origin in considerations of play. For with such cards as Queen and a small one, or Knave and a small one (after first round), the lead of Queen or Knave is manifestly good policy; for thereby you strengthen your partner: you are numerically weak in the suit, and most probably lose nothing yourself; whereas with Queen and two

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small ones, or Knave and two small ones (after first round), you do
well to keep back the Queen or Knave, being numerically strong,
and having a fair chance of not only making the honor, but remain-
ing with the best card in the suit after three rounds.

In trumps, this rule is even more important than in plain suits.
The whole strategy of the game may be ruined by your telling your
partner (as you do in returning his lead wrongly) that you held orig-
inally only three trumps when you really held four, or that you held
four when in reality you only held three.

Any one who neglects this general rule, of which, of course, no
Whist player is ignorant, must be regarded as a bad player. Scarce-
ly inferior is the player who, when this signal is given him, fails to
notice it, or who overlooks it when it occurs in the play of his ad-
versaries. Omitting to notice the signal for trumps either in part-
ner's or adversaries' play is in comparison a very small offence.

## GENERAL CONDUCT OF THE GAME.

WE have considered the various leads, both from strength and from weakness, and also so much of the sequent play of the suit led as serves to indicate the progress of the suit towards being established. This, of course, is the usual object of the play in each suit, whether the suit has first been led from strength or from weakness. Only, in one case the original leader and his partner seek to establish the suit, while in the other the suit may be (generally turns out to be) the adversaries', and *they* seek to establish it. We have now to consider the conduct of the game while the various plain suits are contesting, and afterwards, when, as the game proceeds, these suits, whether established or not, are worked by either side. We assume for the moment that the hands are so distributed that trumps are not led out very early on either side.

A suit is established when the holder of the strength in the suit has the best card or cards, with the certainty of drawing those intervening between it or them and lower ones. For instance, if in the first two rounds eight hearts have fallen, including the Ace, Queen, Knave, and nine, and I hold King, eight, and two, I know that two cards remain with the enemy; and if I know nothing more, my Hearts are not established, because, if I lead King, I am not sure that the ten will fall; for one of the adversaries may hold both ten and a small one, and, playing the latter to my King, will retain the command. But, if the first two rounds have shown that the ten is held single by one of the adversaries, I know it must fall to my King. I know this even if, besides the ten, two other cards, one of them the three, remain with the adversaries. My suit is therefore established, though I have but two cards left in it. The King will draw the ten and the three; the eight and two will win the last tricks in the suit.

The contest in plain suits manifestly turns on the acquisition of the command, in this way. So long as the enemy retains the command of my suit, in such sort that one of the tricks in the suit will go to them, any attempt to bring in the suit is of little avail. Suppose I get out all the trumps, and, having then the lead, play a small card of my own suit. The enemy take the trick, and bring in their suit. Nay, even if my partner has the commanding card of my suit—alone—my purpose is foiled; for he takes the trick, and cannot lead me my suit.

Thus we see that, in general, the final attempt to bring in a suit must not be made until the adversaries have been deprived of the command, or partner, if he has an obstructive command, has given it up. And, viewing the matter from all sides—as holder of a strong suit, as adversary of such holder, and as his partner—we deduce the rules:

1. Unless you have good cards of re-entry, as King-cards in the adversaries' suits, or good prospect of holding long trumps, do not try to bring in a suit of which you have not perfect command.

2. Keep the command of an adversary's suit.

3. Get rid of the command of a partner's suit.

When we consider the conduct of the hand, as a whole, we recognize the object of the various leads and returns and continuations of the opened suit; and we see how much those partners usually gain who play a combined game, and how much is lost, in the long run, by those who seek only to play their own hand.

Thus, between my partner's hand and mine there is probably one suit, at least, which may be established and brought in, with proper care, in the play of our hands. That one of us who has the first lead has usually no choice but to show his long suit, whether it is weak or not. The other, when his time to lead arrives, must decide whether he will show his own suit, or adopt his partner's. By showing his own he usually does what the first leader had not done—he indicates a certain degree of strength. By returning his partner's, he says: "I have no suit strong enough to justify me in showing it; probably the adversaries have more strength in it than you and I have; let us combine to establish and bring in your suit if we can." The player who returns his partner's suit in this way, before showing his own, should bear this in mind; for his partner's play will undoubtedly be guided by this supposed evidence of weakness in other suits.

It is for this reason, also, that the first discard is so carefully to be attended to. It helps to show your partner where your strength lies, by indicating where you are weakest—in the case we are dealing with at present (that strength in trumps has not been declared on either side), and also if strength has been declared in your favor. If your partner has shown his strong suit, and one of the enemies his, your declaration of your weakest suit may not necessarily show your partner in what suit you are strong; for your weakest suit may be his, or that of the adversary who has already declared his strength; your longest suit (your strength if you have a strong suit) may lie either in the third plain suit, or in trumps. But he learns, at any rate, that you are weak in one suit, and is saved from the bad effects which would have arisen had he looked for strength from you in that suit.

Every indication on the part of the enemy must be carefully watched, to show where strength lies, and where weakness.

In the early progress of the play indications may be afforded either on the one hand of sufficient strength in trumps, with a strong suit between you and your partner, to enable you at once to take a commanding position, or, on the other hand, of such broken forces that the best chance you have is to pick up whatever tricks may come in your way, without any thought of establishing a suit, and scarcely a hope of preventing the adversaries from doing so. Of the former case we do not speak now, because it will be considered fully in our chapter on Leading Trumps. In the latter case, play carefully to the score, finessing where it seems the only way to save the game, but refraining from even the most promising finesse where a single trick saves the game. Ruff at every opportunity if so weak in trumps that you cannot hope to disarm the enemy; but if you have three or four small trumps, and your partner early shows extreme weakness in trumps, you sometimes do well to keep your trumps to draw two for one, when you get the chance.

In ordinary cases, play a steady game, neither too boldly aiming at a great game with moderate force, nor too anxiously playing to save the game, when, with care, you may maintain an equal fight.

It is to gain full command of your own suit that you play the lowest of a long head-sequence, so that if partner has the winning card he may play it. The same principle holds as the suit is con-

tinued, and applies to shorter sequences. Thus, suppose that after at least one round of a suit you hold second and third best and one or more small ones, your partner having only two, one of which may be the best; if you play the second best, you draw the best from the enemy; but if your partner holds the best, he would not put it on your second best. Even if he knows you to hold the third best, he would infer from your playing the highest that you wished him to leave the trick to you. In fact, if he knew you to hold both second and third best, he would be apt to regard the lead of second best under the circumstances as involving a request to pass the trick. But the third round falling to him, you cannot have your suit returned to you. Therefore, in such a case, you should play the third best, which your partner will take, and, returning the small one, leave you free to continue the suit. When trumps are out, and your suit otherwise established (that is your partner's King-card only against you), neglect of this precaution is ruinous. In like manner you must constantly be on the watch to get rid of a winning card in your partner's suit which would be apt to obstruct it. Games XXII. and XXXII. are good illustrations of this point: if attention had not been paid to this rule, the game would not have been won.

Similar considerations lead to what is called *under-play*, which is usually adopted in order to gain command of a suit. For instance, if after one round of a suit has been played, you know that the second best card of the suit is held by your adversary on the left, while you hold best and fourth best, then, when trumps are out, or if the suit be trumps, you do well to lead a small card of the suit. Second hand will hold up the second best, believing the King-card to be on his left, and your partner, if he has it, will win with the third best. You then have the command, probably the full command, of the suit.

Another form of under-play, and one which is of such frequent occurrence as to require special notice, is the holding up of the winning card at the second round of a suit. In plain suits this is not usually advisable, unless either trumps are out or there is a good prospect of quickly getting them out. But in trumps or in plain suits after trumps are out, it is often well to let the second trick pass, that with the third trick you may get in. Not only is it much more important, as a rule, to win the third than the second round

of a suit, but by holding up the winning card you may give your partner a chance of making the third best. Thus, say that in the first round of your strong suit, Hearts, there have fallen, four (your lead), five, Queen, Ace, and you remain with King, seven, six, two. The suit is changed, and presently trumps are exhausted. Later your right-hand adversary leads three of Hearts, through your strength. If you now play the King, the third round will most probably go to the enemy; for your partner certainly has not the Knave. But if you play the two, there is a chance that you may find third hand weak, and that your partner may take with the ten. If this does not happen, and third hand wins, whether with ten or Knave, the probability is that in the third round, won by your King, the other cards above your seven will fall, in which case you make two more tricks in the suit.

So it is often well, when you hold the best, third best, and small cards of your suit after one round has been played, to play the third best on return of the suit by your partner—even with the certain knowledge that second best lies to your left. When next the suit is led, your King-card is likely to draw the remaining cards, when your small ones win; whereas, if you take the trick with your best, the third round falls to your left-hand adversary, and you have no use for your small cards.

Cavendish gives another case. Ten tricks have been played, and each player remains with three cards of the same suit, as yet not opened (one card discarded somewhere). Suppose now second player puts on the Queen, and you, as third player, hold the Ace. It is practically certain that second player holds King also. If, then, you win with the Ace, you have to lead up to King guarded, and probably both tricks will be against you. But if you play a small card the second player wins, and has to lead from King guarded. He leads the small one; you pass it, and your partner may make, your Ace winning the last trick. In one case the chances are that you lose two tricks, and win but one; in the other they favor your winning two and losing one only. In any case the Ace makes.

Again, suppose you hold the long trump, and either a long suit or a suit which is nearly established, but not quite, the King-card of the suit being in your hands. If the adversaries lead this suit, you do well to let them take a trick or two in it till it is established; then, if they lead it again, you come in, and your small cards in the

suit win. If they turn to another suit, your long trump brings you in, the winning card of the long suit is led, and the remaining cards falling, your small cards in the suit win.

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We have now to consider the important points—leading trumps and the play of trumps generally. It is here that science is chiefly shown in Whist, as we see from the saying of Cavendish, that his invention of the signal took away half the advantage he had derived from his scientific knowledge of the game. Yet we may doubt whether, after all, good players have not gained as much from the rash use which half-taught players make of the signal, as they have lost from the invention of a system by which the attentive player learns at once when his partner urgently wants trumps led.

## Chapter VII.

### *HOW TO PLAY TRUMPS.*

THE critical moment in almost every hand of Whist is that when one or the other side enters on the trump lead. This may occur early : perhaps at the very beginning, when one side or the other has a decided superiority in trumps; or in the middle of the game, when one side or the other, having established a suit, and being well protected in their adversaries' suits, sees that their trump strength, reinforced by their strength in plain suits, gives promise of wresting the command of the hand from the other side; or the strength in trumps and plain suits may be so disposed that neither side cares to lead trumps till towards the end of the hand; or both sides may find advantage in reserving trumps for ruffing ; or two partners may try to establish a cross-ruff, throwing the command of trumps, if they succeed, into their opponents' hands, but safely enough, because more tricks are usually gained by the cross-ruff than the opponents can afterwards make out of their suits, cut up by the ruffing game; and, lastly, a trump lead may be purely defensive, made simply to prevent ruffing, and especially a cross-ruff by the enemy.

The skill of a Whist-player is shown more, perhaps, by his aptitude in selecting the proper moment when trumps should be led, or the enemy's strength in trumps reduced by forcing, or their lead of trumps delayed by properly placing the lead, than by any other parts of Whist strategy. And I would at the outset carefully caution the learner against falling into the habit of regarding the use of trumps to be so pre-eminently that indicated by the book authorities that all other uses should be considered relatively unimportant. It may be true that the chief use of trumps is to extract the enemies' trumps so as to bring in a long suit; but this use, though more important than any other considered separately, is not more important than all the others put together, as many book-players seem to imagine.

It should be remembered, indeed, that in the majority of hands no long suit is brought in, the ending depending simply on the correct play or skilful finesse of the cards remaining in hand, which may be the fragments of suits never very long or strong, and broken up through discards enforced by the necessity of protecting other suits. To adopt as rules of play a system depending on what happens often enough indeed, but still only in a minority of all the games played, is unsafe; yet many follow the rules for trying to bring in a long suit as if this were the common end of every hand.

Let it be remembered that, though leading originally from the longest suit, discarding from the shortest (if trumps not declared against you), and other such rules, are good enough in the early stages of the play of a hand (because they bring the partners into alliance, so to speak), they must not be held to sanction the general principle of playing to bring in a long suit. This is in reality playing a forward game, and a great number of hands require backward, or defensive play, while the majority of hands do not justify forward play. You show your long suit and your partner shows his, or you learn his from the play of the enemy or from the discards, and you presently get an inkling as to the strength of the several suits in the different hands. But you must not run away with the idea that so soon as you know this the time has come to scheme for the bringing in of a long suit which you or your partner may possess. On the contrary, it is as likely that by this time you will have found that the measures good for bringing in your suit are as good for bringing in a suit of the enemies, and that the enemies' suit and not yours is the one which would most probably be brought in. And it is more likely than not that either your chance is thus unfavorable, or, though not bad in itself, it is yet not good enough to justify any attempt at a forward game.

At such a stage in the game, if you find reason to think that you and your partner between you can hold your own fairly against the enemy in trumps, and there is no chance of establishing a cross-ruff, it may be well to follow the rule not to force partner if weak in trumps. But if it has become clear that your partner as well as yourself is weak in trumps, you may fairly reason that, since it is the enemies' game to prevent your trumps and your partner's from being used in ruffing, it can hardly be bad policy to force your partner. For, though the chief object of leading trumps is undoubtedly

to draw out trumps and bring in a long suit, there is another very important object, viz., to draw out trumps lest they be used in ruffing. After all, you can do very little harm, even if your partner's strength is such that he prefers to pass the trick. He can discard (nearly always useful) if he prefers that course; but if, like yourself, he is weak, he can make a trick with a trump which would otherwise have simply fallen to the enemy. He may, perhaps, be found also with the King-card and another of one of the adversaries' suits, in which you may be short, and may play that suit (King-card first, of course), giving you the chance of forcing him again. If you can make two or three tricks thus with your weak trumps, you may be content to give up any attempt to face the enemy in trumps —especially as, when they do get in, they will hardly be able to avoid letting some of their trumps fall in pairs, to none from you and your partner.

But suppose that, numerically, you and your partner have slightly the advantage over your opponents in trumps—that one of you has four, the other three, the opponents each having three.

Trumps lying thus, with, perhaps, the best honors with the enemy, every round in trumps which you or your partner may take out, if there has been no ruffing, increases your relative strength in trumps, and the third leaves one of you with the long trump. But even if you knew from the beginning exactly how the strength in trumps lay, it by no means follows that your relative strength in the hand would be increased by a process thus leaving you with the command in trumps. On the contrary, if neither you nor your partner has a suit which you can establish, while the enemy, well protected in your suits, have—either of them—a long suit, of which between them they can get the entire command, your long trump, though it must make, will profit you little. It will be forced out, and a winning card in one of your suits (if you have two long suits) will bring the enemy in again, when their long suit will come in disastrously for you.

In such a case it is idle to attempt a forward game merely because you perhaps find after a few rounds that you have numerical superiority in trumps. You may play, if you see a fit opening, the same sort of game as if you were both weak in trumps—especially if each of the adversaries shows a long suit. Your long trump cannot do more than make one trick in this case; it cannot bring in a long

suit. You may then, without fear of loss, either ruff from a suit of four trumps when you get the chance, or force your partner, though holding three, and knowing or suspecting that he holds four. Should you succeed in establishing a cross-ruff, you gain by this policy, and even if you fail you lose nothing. Holding on to the hard-and-fast rule, Pass a doubtful card if numerically strong in trumps, is unwise in such a case as this—which is of frequent occurrence, be it noticed. Often enough the only chance of saving the game lies in ruffing freely while you can. The enemy—if they know what is good for them—will stop that game fast enough when they get the chance, showing clearly that it is your best policy, despite the book-rule so often quoted. Your chance comes while they are waiting till one or other has established his suit. This they will only do so long as your all-round weakness has not been disclosed; you must seize the opportunity, and make your tricks while you can.

Suppose, for instance, A holds Knave and three small Spades (the trump card being the Ace of Spades, Z the dealer), King and three small Hearts, three small Clubs, and two small Diamonds; while B holds Queen and three small Spades, Knave and a small Heart, two small Clubs, and four small Diamonds. A leads a small Heart, which Z takes with the Queen, leading Ace of Clubs and following with a small Club. His partner, winning this trick with the King, leads, let us say, Diamond three, which his partner takes with the Queen, returning the Ace, to which X drops a seven, showing that he had led from four only. Suppose now that Z continues with a small Diamond. Shall A, holding four small trumps, refrain from trumping? It is clear that X Z are protected in Hearts, and each had originally a five-card suit. B has not signalled, and neither of the enemy has led trumps. The chances are, then, that trumps are pretty equally divided; but, with the Ace in Z's hand, the odds are highly in favor of X Z holding the commanding cards. Under these circumstances the best policy seems to be not to try to fight against two strong suits with one long trump, and that not certain, but to trump the doubtful Diamond led by Z. This is probably giving up all chance of getting the command in trumps; but it is taking the best chance of what seems the best hope—a cross-ruff. After taking the trick thus by ruffing, A should lead a small Club, giving up his own suit, of which he knows that the enemy holds the

King-card (so that, getting in, they would probably lead trumps). This $B$ ruffs, and leads a Diamond, which $A$ would ruff, unless $Z$ at once stopped the cross-ruff by putting on his trump Ace, which he would not be apt to do over his partner's suit.  The remaining tricks would probably go to $X Z$, but three having been made by $A B$, the game—the score being supposed at " love all "—would be saved; whereas, if $A$ had refrained from ruffing and then forcing $B$, it must have been lost.

I have been careful to consider first the cases in which a backward game should be played with regard to trumps and the book-rule about passing doubtful cards neglected, because so many games are lost through a rigid adherence to a rule which is often misunderstood.  As a matter of fact, the rule is not properly stated. Strength in trumps is not a sufficient reason for refraining from ruffing, if such weakness in plain suits has been shown as to suggest a backward game.  The rule should rather run, So long as there is nothing to show that between trumps and plain suits you and your partner can hold your own against the adversaries, refrain from ruffing a doubtful card from a four-card trump suit;* and, equally, under the same conditions, refrain from forcing your partner if, being yourself weak in trumps, you have reason to think he may be fairly strong.

But, turning now to cases where there is no special reason to play either a backward or a forward game, we see the reason in these— which include the majority of cases—for the book-rule.  In every Whist hand in which the strength is fairly divided there may be said to be on the average sixteen tricks in the four suits, of which only thirteen can possibly be taken ; and thus, in every fairly matched Whist hand, there are two or three tricks which one or other side will make or lose, according to the skill or good-fortune with which the hand is played.  Of course, in the play of each suit there is room for skill and good-fortune to tell in the finesse and so forth; but we are considering, just now, the total number of tricks to be made, whether by finesse or otherwise, in the several suits, if each could "tell" to the last card in it.  Now, as a matter of fact, this, as a rule, is only the case with trumps, though it may happen

* If you have five trumps, ruff and (generally) wait; if you have six, ruff and lead trumps.

with any established suit after trumps are exhausted. In trumps there may be more than the natural number of tricks, because trumps may take tricks singly.

But a time comes in every well-matched hand of Whist when the question which side will make the most of its long plain suits (by which is to be understood every suit of more than three) depends on the manipulation of trumps and forcing cards. All may then turn on the possession of a trump more or less, on one side or the other. Forcing a hand which holds more than the average number of trumps thus very often means the gain or sacrifice of one trick (according as it is your partner or the adversary who is forced) for two or three tricks. This is so commonly the case in well-matched hands, or hands which have become well-matched so far as what remains of them is concerned, that we get almost as standing rules in such cases, Refrain from forcing your partner if you are weak in trumps and he probably strong; Pass a doubtful card if you hold more than the average number yourself ; and, Force the adverse strong trump hand.

But these rules do not apply to very weak hands, even though there is numerical length in trumps; nor, on the other hand, do they apply to very strong hands, which can often afford to ruff and wait, or even to ruff and lead trumps.

The determination of the proper time for leading trumps in the case of fairly-matched hands not justifying either a signal or an early lead of trumps, still remains among the most difficult points of Whist strategy. It may generally be taken for granted that a late lead of trumps, unless obviously forced, is to be respected by partner as much as an early lead, though not quite so scrupulously as the signal. Such a lead means that from the observed fall of the cards in the different suits, the trump leader sees a good prospect of bringing in one or other of the long suits which he or his partner possesses and has by this time probably established.

Again, it is to be noticed that in leading trumps late, backward play in that suit is usually advisable. For though forward play may secure the drawing of more rounds, it risks throwing the command in trumps into the adversaries' hand—who, in the case we are considering (of hands originally well matched) may need only this advantage to gain all the good from your lead of trumps which you had hoped to secure for yourself and your partner. Thus, we see

the reason of the difference already indicated between the various leads in trumps and in plain suits. The leads in plain suits aim as much at making the good cards held in the suit as at finally establishing it; the leads in trumps aim chiefly at winning the closing rounds in trumps, or remaining at least with a long trump or a winning card in the enemy's suit, to bring in an established suit. For similar reasons, you may finesse more deeply in trumps than in plain suits; but not in the *first* round to your partner's lead.

Great judgment, then, is required, where hands are well matched, in deciding whether, or when, to lead trumps, and in managing trumps after they are led.

It is hardly necessary to say that in the return of the trump lead most careful attention should be given to the rule for returning from long or short suits. It is bad enough to mislead a partner in plain suits by returning the lowest of a short suit, or other than the lowest of a long suit (though *this* mistake is not often made); but in trumps it is a fatal error. He counts one more trump in your hand than you really have, and therefore one less in the enemies' hands, or *vice versá;* he miscounts the other suits also; and his whole strategy is disarranged.

As to the play third in hand to your partner's lead, that has been already considered.

It remains that I should consider the lead of trumps from great strength—first in trumps only, secondly all round.

Great strength in trumps may consist either in length only, as when you have five or six trumps, no honors ; or in combined length and strength, as when you have four trumps, two honors, or when you have five trumps (or more), one honor.

When you have five trumps, says the book rule, " it is always right to lead them;" yet experience at once suggests an exception to this rule—for when you want only the odd trick to save or win the game, you do not lead trumps from five. The rule should rather be that it is almost always well to lead trumps from five. With the original lead, perhaps the only exception is the one just mentioned. But when the preceding play shows that your partner has no good suit, while your own hand contains none outside trumps, leading trumps from five would be bad play; and, as such cases are common, the exception is rather an important one to notice. Suppose, for instance, your hand is weak outside trumps, of which you

hold five, and that your opponent on the right leads King of a plain suit, taking the trick; and then a small one, which his partner takes with the Ace; and that then the Queen of another suit is led out, on which your partner puts the Ace, and third player a small one: you know now that your opponent on the right has the King-card and probably command of his own suit and the King-card of his partner's, who holds second and third best. If now your partner leads a small card of the remaining plain suit and you take the trick with the Queen, it would be unwise to lead a trump from five small ones, for your opponents on either side have one suit certainly, and another probably, established, while either the King or the Ace of your partner's suit is on your right. The best use you can make of your trumps is to keep them to ruff your opponents' suits or your partner's (when player to your right puts on his best card in that suit), according to the way your plain suits are distributed. And so in a number of cases where you learn from the play that the probabilities are *not*—as when you lead originally from five trumps and a weak hand—in favor of your partner having at least one strong suit.

But when you are original leader holding five trumps, not more than one honor, and all your plain suits weak, you have good reason for expecting that your partner has one good suit which by means of your trumps you can help him to establish and bring in. Further, the chances are two to one that opening any other suit will be playing the adversaries' game, as you have no means of guessing which is your partner's suit. So that, alike for offensive as for defensive considerations, your proper lead is your penultimate trump. (Always excepting the case where you want the odd trick either to save or win the game.)

With good plain cards and five trumps you need never hesitate to lead trumps, unless you want the odd trick only—in which case you should always play the safer game of aiming to obtain the odd trick surely; for, what good will three or four tricks made from a long suit do you, in such a case, to compensate the risk of failing to get the odd trick?

With a good plain suit, the short suits well protected, and four trumps (two honors), the original lead being with you, you may safely lead trumps, except when playing for the odd trick only. At love with such a lead, you take the best chance of making game

if your partner has an honor.    But this forward play should be re-garded as tentative only, and to be dropped *at once* if your partner shows great weakness in trumps; for then there is reason to fear that one or other of the adversaries may have superior strength to you in trumps.

When you have such a hand, but not the original lead, the ques-tion of leading trumps or not will depend on what you infer from the tricks already played.

Strength in trumps sufficient to justify leading them is not suffi-cient to justify signalling for trumps.    When you lead trumps, you nearly always suggest to your partner that it will be well for him to follow your lead; but when you signal, you practically direct him to do so.    A really commanding hand is required to justify such a course.    Clay indicated, as his own rule, never to signal with fewer than four trumps two honors, or five trumps one honor; but he added that he by no means intended to imply that with such trumps you should always signal.    As a matter of fact, you should have good cards in plain suits to justify a signal from the minimum trump hands indicated by Clay.

It is an *almost* constant rule to return your partner's trumps when he has led from strength; but it should be a constant rule to obey the signal, when made by a partner who understands Whist.    It is a good rule, however, to disregard the signalling of any player who has ever misled you by signalling without due cause — unless, at least, he candidly admits that he repents him of his error, and prom-ises amendment.

5

## Chapter VIII.

### *DISCARDING.*

Few points of Whist play are more important (and, it might be added, few are more neglected) than the discard. An original discard is like an original lead in its significance; a forced discard has a meaning akin to that of a forced lead; it is as important to distinguish a forced from an original discard as to avoid mistaking a lead from weakness for a lead from strength; and, finally, to discard properly at the close of a hand often requires as much skill as the art of rightly placing the lead at that stage of the game.

When you have to discard to the first suit led, that suit being plain, and no indication having been given of trump strength anywhere, your course is simple. If the plain suit is your partner's, you discard from your shortest suit, unless in so doing you have to unguard a King or Queen, when — unless you are very strong in trumps—it is better to discard from the suit which needs least protection: though, of course, you would unguard a King or Queen unhesitatingly rather than injure a long and strong suit of your own. If the suit (plain) which you first fail in is your adversary's, you equally discard from your shortest suit, in general; but to the exceptions just noted may be added (i.) the case where you have to leave an Ace single, and (ii.) the case of your shortest suit being a singleton. For when an adversary's suit has been exhausted, your weakest suit is likely to be your partner's best, and it may be a matter of great importance later to give him a lead in it. But if your own suit is strong as well as long, and you are fairly strong in trumps, you may more safely uncover an Ace or discard a singleton, for the close of the hand is more likely to be under *your* control than under your partner's. You must weigh the chances, and take your chance, just as you have to do when forced to lead from a weak suit without knowledge how your partner stands in it.

When trump strength has been disclosed, either by the signal or

by a lead, before the occasion comes for a discard, or when you have to discard trumps, the general rule is, discard from your weakest suit if trump strength lies, or appears to lie, with you and your partner ; from your longest and best - protected suit when trump strength lies, or appears to lie, with the adversaries. (But so long as there is a chance of bringing in your long suit, you should not discard from it.) While doubt remains as to the position of trump strength, avoid unguarding King or Queen, uncovering an Ace, or discarding a singleton; but when it is certain that your partner has commanding strength in trumps you need be less careful on these points, for there is little fear but that your partner will get the lead when he wants it. Albeit, cases sometimes arise where your long suit is worthless, and so much manifestly depends on your giving your partner a lead, or keeping guarded a strong card in his suit, that you must discard (even originally) from your long suit. Common-sense must guide you in such cases. Remember, however, as a general rule for learners, that your original discard indicates your shortest suit if trump strength is not declared against you, your longest suit if it is. Subsequent discards have no such significance. One of the most important points in Whist training is to learn to notice the original discard of each player as carefully as you should notice his lead. Until you do this you cannot properly be said to play Whist at all.

In the later rounds of a hand the question of the discard assumes an entirely different aspect, just as does the question of the lead. You have to consider what suit the enemy threaten to bring in, so that if you have command in that suit you may retain it religiously (for the effect of the reverse course, see Game XXXVIII.); and to note what suit, if any, your partner may bring in; so that if you have the command in that suit, in such sort as to be likely to obstruct him, you may give it up by discarding your commanding card. (See Games XXXII. and XXXIII.)

Discard the best from a suit of which you have entire command, the second best only when you hold it single.

# Chapter IX.

## SIGNALLING.

### THE SIGNAL FOR TRUMPS.

The signal for trumps consists in playing an unnecessarily high card (as five when you hold four or three), and is completed when the lower card is played. It is now so constantly in use that we must set aside all discussion as to whether Whist has been improved or impaired by its invention. All that has to be considered is when and how to signal.

Signalling from five trumps, one honor, or four trumps, two honors, the rest of the hand being weak, must be regarded as unsound play. From such hands you may properly lead trumps, but not signal.

Some few players hold that you may signal when, having the lead, you would not lead trumps—as, by winning third hand with King when you hold Queen, or with Ace when you hold King, or by leading Ace before King from Ace, King, and others, to indicate the wish for a trump lead from partner. But it is a good rule to follow—more nearly a constant rule than almost any that can be named—to regard no hand from which one would not lead trumps, no matter what the trump card, as one from which it is right to signal. A trick may occasionally be made by waiting, in such cases, for a lead from partner, but in the long run more is lost.

In signalling second in hand, one must be especially careful to play an unnecessarily high card, and not a card which may be mistaken for an attempt to take the trick; at least, this should be done where it is possible. Playing ten or Knave second hand, and in the second round a small one, is not necessarily a signal, unless the Knave or Queen (respectively) should fall, so as to show you were not playing the customary lowest from Queen, Knave, or Knave, ten, and a small one. To signal effectively from Queen, Knave, and a small one, the Queen must be played and then the Knave, not the

Knave and then the small one. Similarly, from Knave, ten, and a small one.

One may signal, of course, as readily by a discard as when following suit.

In passing, I may note that it may be either unwise or unfair to *hesitate* when the chance of signalling comes. Repeatedly it happens that second player shows—to his loss, or it may be to his gain, according to circumstances—that he is strong in trumps, but not quite strong enough to signal, by hesitating before playing a small card such as he would have been sure to play without hesitation, but for doubts as to signalling. Thus, I lead Ace; the player on my left, after hesitating and perhaps drawing out another card, plays Deuce; I know, and every one else at the table knows, that he had thought of signalling, but concluded to refrain. He is therefore certainly strong in trumps, but not quite strong enough to signal. It is unfair to show this to a partner who may be, perhaps, himself so strong in trumps as to be sure it is safe to lead them after what he has learned; on the other hand, it is not wise to show this strength to the enemy, who may have good strength, too, and may take advantage of what they have learned to force you, or otherwise spoil your plans. The risk may compensate the advantage; but, in any case, it is not Whist to show anything about your hand by your way of handling your cards—whether through design or carelessness.

### THE ECHO OF THE SIGNAL.

When trumps have been signalled by your partner, and you have yourself length in trumps, it is most desirable to let him know as much, that he may not, by continuing to lead trumps, extract two for one or for none from the adversaries. It often happens that you are not able to indicate length in trumps, under these circumstances, by a return lead ; or the lead of trumps may be delayed, and you may wish to indicate your trump strength at once. Under such circumstances you should "echo" the signal, if you have an opportunity of so doing; that is, you should play an unnecessarily high card before a low one, in any suit, trumps or plain, in which you may be able thus to indicate the possession of four trumps at least.

This "echo" signal has, like the signal for trumps, its negative as well as its positive aspect. Just as not signalling for trumps when you have the opportunity means that you have not more than a cer-

tain degree of strength in trumps and plain suits combined, so, *not*
to echo the signal, if you have the chance, means that you have not
more than three trumps. Viewed in this aspect, the echo of the sig-
nal is of as frequent use as the signal itself; for, in the great majority
of cases where trumps are led or signalled, your partner has an op-
portunity of showing either that he *has* or that he has *not* four (or
more).

You cannot readily echo, as you can signal, by the discard, for
when your partner has signalled, and the opponents lead a suit which
you can ruff, you would not discard from a plain suit, but take the
trick, whether you held more or fewer than four trumps, in order
that you may lead trumps in response to the signal.

It is well to notice, in regard both to the *signal* and to the *echo*,
that failing to observe either form of signal on the adversaries' part,
or the absence of either when there has been an opportunity for its
display, is as mischievous as failing to notice such signals, or their
absence, in your partner's play. Thus, suppose one of the adversaries
leads trumps, really in response to his partner's signal, but as you
suppose (not having noticed the signal) from his own strength; if
the chance of forcing him arrives, you seize it, thereby playing his
game; or when you should force the hand of the partner who sig-
nalled, you omit to do so, supposing him to be weak in trumps. In
fact, failing to notice the play of the adversaries with regard to the
signal is apt to prove a more dangerous error than failing to notice
your partner's signal; for, in the former case, your play, in conse-
quence of your carelessness, is weak and incorrect in presence of
trump strength of the adversaries, the consequence of which can
hardly fail to be disastrous; in the other case you fail properly to
support your partner, but his trump strength is there all the time,
and will probably save you at least from irremediable disaster. In
the latter case, you may probably fail to make a game which might
have been won; and despite the saying that the cards never forgive,
you may retrieve the error in half the number of events. But, in
the former case, you are very likely to lose a game which might have
been saved, and there is no way of restoring a game which has been
lost.

It is hardly necessary to observe that whether a player approves
or not of the general principle of signalling, wherever required, at
Whist, he must play at a disadvantage if he fails to adopt the sys-
tem against players who studiously employ it. But if your part-

ner is habitually careless with regard to the signal, while your op-
ponents are observant, it is well to avoid signals of all sorts, since
they inform the adversaries and tell your partner nothing.

### LATE SIGNALS.

It is well remarked by both Cavendish and Clay that if a player
fails to signal at the first opportunity, his partner need not regard a
signal given later as having the same authoritative character which
an original signal possesses. An original signal means more than a
trump lead. It means, or should mean (only some players are too
ready to signal), that the signaller is not only very strong in trumps,
but has such strength in other suits that (1) he can answer for the
absolute safety of a trump lead, and (2) can give good promise of a
great game. A signal after the first chance for signalling has passed,
means much the same as a trump lead; and whatever rule to the
contrary may be set up, a trump lead does not involve the return of
trumps by partner as necessary or even always proper. Sometimes
a trump lead is tentative, and in not a few cases where it is so, the
return of trumps would be bad play. So, a late signal means little
more, usually, than that a lead of trumps is likely to be advantageous.

But it occasionally happens that a late signal points to the only
way of making the game, and should be answered at once. In fact,
after the middle of a hand, a signal—when possible, which is not
often—may have a very pointed meaning. Take a case such as oc-
cured to myself recently. I call myself $B$, my partner $A$, and players
to right and left of $B$, $Y$ and $Z$, as in the games. Seven rounds re-
mained to be played, and one round of trumps (Diamonds) had been
already taken out, in such sort as to leave the best, 3d, and 5th best
trumps with $B$, the 2d and 4th with $Y$, and three trumps between
$Z$ and $A$, their positions unknown, but one certainly with $A$. One
trump had been forced from $Y$, the original trump leader. The best
and third best hearts lay with $Y$, and three small Hearts were with
$A$, command in Clubs being with $Z$. $B$, who has not had a lead,
holds, besides his three trumps, Queen, Knave, three, and two of
Spades. As it chanced, every trick was wanted to make the game.
At this juncture $A$ led Spade King, Spades having been as yet un-
played, but (from the play) being $Z$'s suit. Here $B$'s course to a won
game (with $A$'s concurrence) is plain and obvious, while it is equally
clear that any other course must lead to the loss of one trick at least
by $A$, $B$. The only way of making the game is by signalling. There-

fore $B$ dropped the three and two of Spades in that order to the King and Ace; $A$ responded to the signal by a trump lead; and every trick went to $A, B$. On the contrary, if $B$ had not signalled, or $A$ had failed to respond, $A$ would have led a small Heart, which $Y$ would have covered with the third best, and $B$ would have been forced to ruff; for, if he passed the trick, $Y$ would have simply repeated the force. Then $B$ could have done nothing with his command in Spades but force the enemy, uncertain whether he were forcing $Z$ or $Y$; if $Z$, then the lead of a winning Club would again force $B$, and three tricks in all would be made by $Y, Z$; if luckily $Y$, then but one trick would be made by $Y, Z$, but still their game would be saved.

# CHAPTER X.

## *THE LAST TRICKS.*

SKILL at Whist is chiefly shown as the last few tricks are made. The steady conduct of the hand according to sound principles, and with careful attention to the fall of the cards, leads to a satisfactory (or the best available) position at the close, and the attentive player can usually tell precisely what that position is. But to take advantage of good points in the position, or to avoid threatened loss, requires other qualities than (as a rule) have been sufficient for the earlier conduct of the hand. The play is now like that of a double-dummy game. Only a trick or so may perhaps depend on correct strategy at this stage; but a game or a rubber may depend on that trick.

The chief points arising at the close of a game are these: (1) The right choice of cards to throw away to winning cards either of the enemy or of your partner; (2) placing the lead; and (3) what may be regarded as a combination of both points, the recognition of the necessity which sometimes arises for throwing away a winning card or an extra trump—playing what is called (after Deschapelles) the *grand coup*.

Necessity for care in choosing the right card or cards to throw away to tricks won by partner or the adversaries may arise in several ways, and a case of this kind may be simple or difficult according to circumstances. Thus, you have a card which would be a certain winning card if you had to lead it, which yet is of no value to you because the suit is certain not to be led. In this case you throw it away without hesitation. Again you may have to choose between throwing away a trump (to a suit already trumped higher by the enemy) or a certain or possible winning card in a plain suit; yet, though this seems like the *grand coup*, the question may be one of extreme simplicity, from the considera-

tion that the trump will certainly be of no use to you (being at once drawn by the enemy if retained) while the good plain-suit card may take a trick. Again the choice between two good cards to throw away may be a little more difficult, because you may be in doubt which of the two suits will be eventually led; or of two second-best cards, you may doubt which to throw, because, while you are certain that one or other of the best cards to those suits must be discarded by the enemy, you cannot tell which it will be. Or, lastly, the question may be of discarding guarding cards, and you may be in doubt which of two suits must be most carefully guarded.

It is impossible to lay down rules here, since each case must be dealt with as it arises, and the number of cases is legion. Nothing but great care and attention can save you from losing tricks at the end of several of the hands played in the course of an evening, by discarding from the wrong suit. But when, by carefully following the fall of the cards, you know where the command in each suit lies, and also where small cards which will have to be led are situate, you generally have a tolerably easy problem towards the end of the game, in selecting which cards to throw away and which to retain.

Skill in throwing the lead is akin to Whist memory, in that it comes to be instinctive with practice. A good player feels, when he holds a major tenace, for example, that he must throw the lead so that the holder of second best guarded should have to play before him; while when the major tenace is against him he feels, without any occasion for thinking about it, that the holder of that tenace must, if possible, be made to play before him.

There are often simple cases of throwing the lead, in which, nevertheless, the average player frequently blunders, if not on every occasion which arises. Thus, leader holds the major tenace and a small card against the minor tenace and a small card, in trumps or in a plain suit after trumps are extracted. In nine cases out of ten the average player, even though he has seen enough to know how the matter stands, leads, nevertheless, the best card, transferring the adversary's minor tenace into major tenace, through which he has to lead, losing, therefore, both the remaining tricks. It is so obvious that in such a position the small card should be led, that it seems hardly worth while to notice the point; yet we see tricks lost in this way repeatedly; of course, by leading a small card, even though the trick may be made by the adversary's small one, yet as he has to lead from his minor tenace you make two tricks.

One sometimes hears a weak player explain that he could not lead a particular card because he knew an adversary would take the trick, though this may be just what he should have done to save the game. You know, suppose, that the player to your left has the winning Spade, the second best and two small Clubs, you holding a small Heart, the major tenace in Clubs, and a small Spade (trumps all out); you know, further, that your partner has the best Heart and three small Clubs, the adversary to your right having only small cards, so that he can get no lead. You want three tricks to save or to win the game. Under these circumstances if you lead a Heart, your partner makes a trick in Hearts, and must then lead Club through your tenace; you make a trick in Clubs, and the remaining two tricks go to the enemy. But now suppose that you had led a Spade. Your adversary to the left takes the trick, by which you lose nothing, as he must have taken it anyhow But now he has to lead a Club; and, however he leads, you make two tricks in Clubs, lead your small Heart, and give a third trick to your partner.

### THE GRAND COUP.

The *grand coup* consists in throwing away a trump or a winning card in order that you may escape a lead, where leading would lose you a trick. Take, for instance, the following case:

<div align="center">

*B* holds

*Diam.*—3.   Clubs—5, 4, 2.   Hearts—Q.

</div>

| | |
|---|---|
| *Y* { Clubs—Kn, 8, 7, 3. | *Z* { *Diam.*—Kn. |
| holds { Spades—Q. | holds { Clubs—6. |
| | { Hearts—6, 3. |
| | { Spades—9. |

<div align="center">

*A* holds

*Diam.*—Q.   Clubs—Q, 9.   Hearts—4.   Spades—8.

</div>

You are *Y;* Diamonds are trumps. *A* leads Diamond Queen; and you know how the above cards lie. How shall you play? If you discard Club three, *A* leads his small Spade, you make the trick, and make no more. If, on the contrary, you discard the winning Spade, then, however A plays, your Club Knave will eventually make; and as A holds the smaller Spade of the two left, you gain a trick (since *A* cannot escape leading his Spade).

If you have the major tenace and a small card in trumps, and a losing card, while your right-hand adversary has the minor tenace

only, or the second best guarded in trumps, the possession of that small trump may force you to lead from your major tenace, in which case, of course, the adversary will make a trick in trumps. But if you can part with that small trump, by under-trumping your partner, or by trumping a trick he has already won (leading then your losing card) your tenace will be led up to, and every trick in trumps be made.

FORTY ILLUSTRATIVE GAMES

## GAME I.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Diamonds*—Q, 9, 7, 2.      Hearts—Q, 6.
      Spades—Q, Kn, 10, 3.      Clubs—K, 6, 4.

$Y$ {
*Diamonds*—Kn, 10, 8, 6, 4.
Spades—8, 7, 4.
Hearts—K, 2.
Clubs—10, 5, 3.

**B**

*Tr. DKg.*

**Y**           **Z**

**A** leads.

*Diamonds*—A, K.
Spades—9, 5, 2.
Hearts—Kn, 10, 9, 8, 4.
Clubs—Q, 9, 7.
} $Z$

$A$ { *Diamonds*—5, 3.       Spades—A, K, 6.
     Hearts—A, 7, 5, 3.      Clubs—A, Kn, 8, 2.

*Score :*—$A\,B$, 1 ;   $Y\,Z$, 3.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C2 | C5 | _CKg_ | C7 |
| 2. | _SKg_ | S7 | SQ | S2 |
| 3. | _SA_ | S4 | S3 | S5 |
| 4. | S6 | S8 | _S10_ | S9 |
| 5. | _CA_ | C3 | C6 | C9 |
| 6. | H3 | H2 | _HQ_ | H4 |
| 7. | _HA_ | HKg | H6 | H8 |
| 8. | H5 | D4 | _D7_ | H9 |
| 9. | C8 | C10 | SKn | _DKg_ |
| 10. | D3 | D6 | D2 | _DA_ |
| 11. | H7 | _D10_ | C4 | HKn |
| 12. | D5 | D8 | _D9_ | H10 |
| 13. | CKn | DKn | _DQ_ | CQ |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

#### A's INFERENCES.

1. Either 3 C and 4 C are both with *B*, or else *Y* or *Z* is signalling for trumps. *B* has not the Queen.

NOTE TO TRICK 1. — Having five trumps, one honor, and his partner having an honor, *Y* would be justified in signalling for trumps were the score low, but not as the score stands.

2. *B* has Kn S, 10 S, and probably one or more small Spades. *Z* is not signalling for trumps, and therefore has neither 3 C nor 4 C.

NOTE TO TRICK 2. — *A* does well to take the trick and return the Ace, thus leaving *B* the command of the suit.

3. *Y* has signalled, and therefore has either 4 C or 3 C; the

other being with *B*.  As *Z* turned an honor, *Y* and *Z* are probably two by honors, in which case *A B* must make four by tricks to save the game.

4. The last Spade is with *B* (the Knave).

5. *B* has 4 C, but no more Clubs.

NOTE TO TRICK 5.—*B* returns the highest of two cards.

6. *Z* has not the King of Hearts; *B* has not the Knave (Hearts must be *Z*'s best suit, trumps being *Y*'s).

NOTE TO TRICK 6.—Under the circumstances *Y* should have played the King.  It is his best chance of getting a lead.

7. *Z* has the Knave of Hearts.  The only chance of saving the game lies in the probability (*A* having four Hearts, and *Z* a long suit of Hearts) that *B* may be able to ruff Hearts next round.

8. If *Y* has played properly, all his remaining cards should be trumps, and the game is lost.

NOTE TO TRICK 8.—If *Y* trumps at all he should play his highest. His small trump is useless.  He should know that the best Heart is with *Z*.

9. *Z* has the Ace of trumps (Kn S being a thirteenth card).

NOTE TO TRICK 9.—*Z*'s play here is bad.  He knows his partner has an honor, with a strong hand in trumps, and two tricks only are wanted to win the game, besides the two certain tricks *Z* holds in his hands.

10. If *B* has not Queen and ten or nine of trumps, the game is lost, for the remaining cards in *Y*'s hand must be trumps (one honor at least).

11. *Z* should have led the Queen of Clubs.  The Knave of Hearts is equally a winning card of its suit; but the play should have shown *Z* that *B* has a small Club, and that therefore *Y* can win trick 11 with his smallest trump.  As it is, *Y* has to play highest third hand. *B* does rightly in not overtrumping.  If he did, the remaining two tricks would be *Y*'s, but by letting trick 11 pass, *B* remaining with the tenace in trumps (and knowing *Z* to be without trumps) has the two last tricks sure.

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Game I. shows the inferences which can be drawn from the play by one of the players (the leader).  We have added notes also on the play as it proceeds.  The inferences are all of the simplest kind, supposing the game to be conducted according to the accepted principles for sound play.

## GAME II.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{Spades—Kn, 10, 3.} \\ \text{Hearts—6, 2.}\end{array}\right.$ 
  Clubs—Q, 7, 5, 2.
  Diamonds—A, 8, 4, 3.

$Y$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{Spades—Q, 6, 5, 2.} \\ \text{Hearts—A, Kn, 8.} \\ \text{Clubs—10, 9, 8.} \\ \text{Diamonds—10, 6, 2.}\end{array}\right.$

|       | B            |
|-------|--------------|
|       |              |
| Y     |       T. S4  |
|       |          Z   |
|       | A leads.     |

$\left.\begin{array}{l}\text{Spades—K, 9, 4.} \\ \text{Hearts—10, 9, 7, 3.} \\ \text{Clubs—6, 4, 3.} \\ \text{Diamonds—Q, Kn,} \\ \qquad\text{7.}\end{array}\right\}$ $Z$

$A$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{Spades—A, 8, 7.} \\ \text{Hearts—K, Q, 5, 4.}\end{array}\right.$
  Clubs—A, K, Kn.
  Diamonds—K, 9, 5.

*Score :—A B,* 0 ; *Y Z,* 0.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|------|------|------|------|
| 1. | HKg | HA | H2 | H3 |
| 2. | CKn | C10 | C2 | C3 |
| 3. | S7 | S2 | S10 | SKg |
| 4. | CKg | C8 | C5 | C4 |
| 5. | S8 | S5 | SKn | S4 |
| 6. | SA | S6 | S3 | S9 |
| 7. | CA | C9 | C7 | C6 |
| 8. | HQ | H8 | H6 | H7 |
| 9. | H4 | HKn | D3 | H9 |
| 10. | D5 | D10 | DA | D7 |
| 11. | D9 | SQ | CQ | H10 |
| 12. | DKg | D6 | D4 | DKn |
| 13. | H5 | D2 | D8 | DQ |

## NOTES AND INFERENCES.

### B'S INFERENCES.

1. *A* has Queen of Hearts and probably two other Hearts; neither *A* nor *Z* (who has not signalled) is very strong in trumps.

2. *Y* has led from 10 C and two small ones, probably from 10, 9, 8; *Y*'s hand must be very weak, but in all probability he has four trumps. *A* has Ace of Clubs and King of Clubs.

NOTE TO TRICK 2. — With such a hand *Y* should have led a trump.

3. *A* has strength enough in trumps, with command in other suits to justify a trump lead. (This is *B*'s inference, and also our comment.)

4. *Z*, if he has played rightly, has no more Clubs. 4 C was the lowest Club in hand, and *Z* can-

not have two more, for $B$ can place four of the remaining five, viz., 9 C with $Y$, Ace with $A$, and two in his own hand.    But $B$ knows that 6 C cannot be with $Y$, and if with $A$, then $A$ would have originally led Clubs unless holding at least three Hearts besides Ace and King.    $B$ is for the moment liable to be misled by $Z$'s false card.

NOTE TO TRICK 4.—$Z$ plays badly in returning his partner's lead when honors in the suit are declared against them.    Leading Clubs at all, he should have led 6 C, if only for the sake of uniformity.

5. The Ace of trumps lies with $A$, the Queen with $Y$.

NOTE TO TRICK 5.—$Y$ might well have played his Queen of Spades.    The Ace certainly does not lie with $B$, and is far more probably with $A$ than with $Z$.    Even if with $Z$, there is the chance of $Z$ having also a small trump.

6. The long trump is with $Y$.

7. $Z$ played a false card, or at least incorrectly, in trick 4.

8. $A$ holds 4 and 5 of Hearts, *see* Trick 1.

9. H 10 is probably with $Z$.

10. $B$ knows that $Y$ has led from a weak suit, not from King, Knave, 10, for otherwise $Y$ would not originally have led a Club. He knows also that $Z$ cannot be strong in Diamonds, or he would not have returned Clubs, in which his partner showed weakness. The King of Diamonds probably lies with $A$, as $A$ led trumps from so weak a suit as Ace to three.    $B$ therefore boldly plays his Ace of Diamonds, and with the long Club forces out the long trump.

11. It matters not how $Z$ discards.    If he discards a Diamond $A$ discards 5 H, and wins the remaining tricks, as in the actual game.

$A B$ make three by cards.    Had $Y$ led trumps at trick 2, or played his Queen of Spades at trick 5, $A B$ could have made but two tricks.    But the game would have gone better yet for $Y$ and $Z$ if, $Y$ having led as he actually did, $Z$ had led 7 H (bad as returning an opponent's lead usually is) at trick 4.

This game is taken from the *Westminster Papers* for 1877.    Mr. F. H. Lewis, one of the finest Whist-players (if not the very finest) living, was $A$.    We give $B$'s inferences, with notes on the play.    The game shows how the fall of the cards may lead a good player to lead trumps early from three only.

Hearts

## GAME III.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Hearts*—Kn, 9, 3.  
    *Spades*—A, 10.  

Diamonds—K, Kn, 9, 5, 4, 2.  
Clubs—7, 5.

```
                    ┌─────────────┐
                    │      B      │
                    │             │
  Hearts—8, 6, 2.   │         Tr. H4    Hearts—A, 10, 5, 4.
  Spades—8, 6, 5.   │   Y     Z   │     Spades—4, 2.
Y Diamonds—10, 8, 3.│             │  Z  Diamonds—7, 6.
  Clubs—Kn, 10, 9, 3│             │     Clubs—A, K, Q, 8,
                    │   A leads.  │              2.
                    └─────────────┘
```

$Y$ { *Hearts*—8, 6, 2.  
    *Spades*—8, 6, 5.  
    *Diamonds*—10, 8, 3.  
    *Clubs*—Kn, 10, 9, 3.  

$Z$ { Hearts—A, 10, 5, 4.  
    Spades—4, 2.  
    Diamonds—7, 6.  
    Clubs—A, K, Q, 8, 2.  

Tr. H4

$A$ { *Hearts*—K, Q, 7.  
    *Spades*—K, Q, Kn, 9, 7, 3.  

Diamonds—A, Q.  
Clubs—6, 4.

*Score :—A B,* 4; *Y Z,* 4.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | SKn | S5 | SA | S2 |
| 2. | DQ | D3 | D5 | D6 |
| 3. | DA | D8 | D2 | D7 |
| 4. | SQ | S6 | S10 | S4 |
| 5. | H7 | H2 | HKn | H5 |
| 6. | HQ | H6 | H9 | H4 |
| 7. | SKg | S8 | C5 | H10 |
| 8. | HKg | H8 | H3 | HA |
| 9. | C4 | C9 | C7 | CQ |
| 10. | C6 | C10 | D4 | CKg |
| 11. | S3 | CKn | D9 | CA |
| 12. | S7 | C3 | DKn | C8 |
| 13. | S9 | D10 | DKg | C2 |

*Y Z* win the odd trick and the game.

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A* may have led from Knave, ten, nine, so far as *Y* or *Z* can tell. *B*, holding the ten, knows the lead is from King, Queen, Knave. He puts on Ace to give his partner command of the suit. If he played ten, *A* would continue with Queen, and Ace would take it, whereas by playing ten, on returning the suit, *B* leaves his partner the option of taking the trick, or letting the ten take it. As the cards lie, *B* does not get the chance of returning his partner's lead, after showing his own strong suit.

2. *B* leads the ante-penultimate, Drayson's plan for showing six of a suit.

3. Seeing that four of Dia-

monds cannot lie with $Y$ or $Z$ (from their play), $A$ should place it with $B$, and credit $B$ with all the remaining Diamonds but one.

4. $A$ has all the remaining Spades but one, which may lie either with $Y$ or $Z$.

5. $A$ does not continue his established suit, fearing to force his partner ($Y$ trumping first). But he had two chances in his favor if he had led spades. First, he would as probably be forcing an adverse strong trump hand as one held by $B$; secondly, $Z$ may have the remaining Spade, in which case $B$ would lie over $Y$ in ruffing, and still only trump for trump be drawn. $A$'s fault, here, loses the game, though it requires keen play by $Y$ and $Z$ to win it with such a wretched hand as $Y$ has. $Z$ does not win the trick, knowing that his only chance lies in taking the last round of trumps. He plays five (four being the trump card), to show his partner one more card. (Notwithstanding opponent's trump lead, $Z$ has length in trumps, and plays correctly in showing this to $Y$.)

6. $B$ leads the highest of two cards left; the fall of the cards shows $A$ that $B$ must have the three, and therefore no other. Yet with such cards as he knows to remain in his hands and $B$'s, with reasonable probability that at least one good club lies with $B$, $A$ need not yet despair. He knows, however, that Ace must lie with the enemy, and the way it is kept back is ominous of trouble.

7. $A$ resumes his long suit when the mischief is done. If he had drawn a trump from $Z$, he might himself, holding King and Queen, have played the waiting game. $Z$ trumps, disregarding the probability that $A$ held originally four trumps—for this simple reason, that, as the score stands, $Y$ and $Z$ must make every other trick.

8. Even now a single trick will save and win $A$ $B$'s game, and nothing but very careful play can win $Y$ $Z$'s.

9. $Z$ leads the Queen, in order that his partner may get out of his way, if he hold Knave and either ten or nine. If $Y$ holds all three the lead of the Queen is the only one which would show him he must clear the way, accordingly $Y$ throws away the remaining high cards.

———

The above game illustrates the importance of playing a waiting game in trumps when a long suit has to be brought in.

## GAME IV.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { Clubs—Kn.
Hearts—Kn.

Spades—A, Q, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4.
Diamonds—5, 4, 3, 2.

$Y$ { Clubs—A, 6, 4, 3, 2.
Hearts—Q.
Spades—K.
Diamonds — A, K,
Q, Kn, 8, 6.

| | B | |
|---|---|---|
| Y | | Tr. CQ. Z |
| | A leads. | |

Clubs—Q, 7, 5.
Hearts—8, 7, 6, 5, 3.
Spades—Kn, 9.
Diamonds—10, 9, 7. } $Z$

$A$ { Clubs—K, 10, 9, 8.
Hearts—A, K, 10, 9, 4, 2.

Spades—10, 3, 2.
Diamonds—none.

*Score :*—Love all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | HKg | HQ | HKn | H3 |
| 2. | HA | CA | D2 | H5 |
| 3. | CKg | C2 | CKn | CQ |
| 4. | C10 | C3 | D3 | C5 |
| 5. | C9 | C4 | D4 | C7 |
| 6. | C8 | C6 | D5 | H6 |
| 7. | H10 | D6 | S4 | H7 |
| 8. | H9 | D8 | S5 | H8 |
| 9. | H4 | DA | S6 | D7 |
| 10. | H2 | DKn | S7 | D9 |
| 11. | S10 | SKg | SA | S9 |
| 12. | S2 | DQ | SQ | SKn |
| 13. | S3 | DKg | S8 | D10 |

*A B* make six by tricks.

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $Y$ knows that $B$ is not playing a false card in his ($B$'s) partner's suit, so that $B$ will be able (probably) to overtrump second round.

2. $A$, of course, continues his suit. If he did not know that $B$ can trump the suit, he would not force the adversary, being himself strong in trumps. This play should suggest to $Y$ that $A$ is strong in trumps, and he should give up any idea of playing a forward game. He cannot help yielding to the force; if he declines, he will be forced again next round, and must either yield then under less favorable con-

ditions, or let $Z$ ruff, who must be weak in trumps.  It is better to throw the lead at once into $Z$'s hand.  If he had done this, $Z$ would have made the second trick with trump, have played the Ace of Spades, and then forced $Y$ with the Queen.  $Y$ might then have led Diamonds, in order to force $A$ (which, as it happens, would come off in the first round), leaving $A$ either to lead trumps under unfavorable conditions, or to force $Y$, which $Y$ could accept, being able to force back with his Diamonds, when $Z$ would be left with length in trumps.  As it is, $Y$, after throwing away the commanding card in trumps, is absolutely powerless.

3. The rest of the hand plays itself.   $Y$'s discard of the Diamond Ace, at Trick 9, is intended to show his partner that $Y$ has entire command of the Diamond suit, but $Y$ gets no chance of leading Diamonds or any other suit.

———

Game IV. illustrates the danger of continuing a forward game when the necessity for defensive measures is clearly shown.  It has been made up to illustrate the following passage: "I dealt," says Clay, "and turned up a Queen, along with which I held two small trumps.  My partner — nor was he a bad player — held the Ace and four of the smallest trumps, and, so to speak, the whole of another suit.  With this strength, assisted by my Queen, he promised himself, reasonably enough, a great score, if not the whole game. But the first two tricks showed him that he would be overtrumped. He should have submitted to this, and, as it happened, he could have made a good score, but he was unable to dismiss the idea of a strong attack.  He trumped the second trick with his Ace, led a trump— and we made no other trick.   Thus, with Ace, Queen, eight trumps, five of which were in one hand, between us, we lost twelve tricks out of the thirteen."

## GAME V.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { Clubs—Kn, 10, 9, 8.
Hearts—A, Q, 9, 6.

Spades—A, 5, 4.
Diamonds—K, 4.

$Y$ { Clubs—7, 6, 5.
Hearts—10, 7.
Spades—10, 7, 6
Diamonds — A, Q,
    Kn, 5, 3.

```
           B
      Tr. CKg.
  Y         Z
  A leads.
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
Clubs—A, K, Q.
Hearts—8, 5.
Spades—K, Q, 9, 2. } $Z$
Diamonds—10, 9, 7,
    2.

$A$ { Clubs—4, 3, 2.
Hearts—K, Kn, 4, 3, 2.

Spades—Kn, 8, 3.
Diamonds—8, 6.

*Score :*—Three all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | H3 | H7 | HQ | H5 |
| 2. | C2 | C5 | CKn | CQ |
| 3. | S3 | S6 | SA | SKg |
| 4. | C3 | C6 | C8 | CKg |
| 5. | S8 | S7 | S4 | SQ |
| 6. | SKn | S10 | S5 | S2 |
| 7. | C4 | C7 | C9 | CA |
| 8. | D6 | D3 | C10 | S9 |
| 9. | H2 | H10 | HA | H8 |
| 10. | HKn | D5 | H9 | D2 |
| 11. | HKg | DKn | H6 | D7 |
| 12. | H4 | DQ | D4 | D9 |
| 13. | D8 | DA | DKg | D10 |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $A$ leads the lowest but one. $B$ wins with the Queen, and observes that the two does not fall in the trick. Either one of the players is calling for trumps, or $A$ is leading from five or more. If from more than five, the suit will be trumped next round. Having a sequence, he leads the head of it.

2. $B$ knows now that the adversaries are two by honors. $Z$, having turned up the King, properly heads the trick with the Queen.

3. $Z$ plays his best suit. $B$, winning the trick, continues the trump lead. He knows that he must make two by cards to save and win the game. He properly leads the eight to show his partner the strength of his sequence.

4. $Z$ continues his suit.

5. *Z* plays another Spade in the hope of finding the Knave with *Y*.

6. *A* knows now that the Ace will fall, and that *B* will, probably, remain with the last trump. Of course, there is a chance of *Z* having the seven.

7. *Z* is now in a difficulty. He knows he can force the remaining trump, but he knows also that *B* has led trump upon the Heart suit. *Y* may, however, have an honor in Hearts, and it is better in any event, as far as the Diamonds are concerned, that *Y* should be fourth player. *Y* discards a Diamond to the thirteenth Spade, though not of much use now, as the only trump is forced from *B*. The rest of the game plays itself; but, if the young player will play the game over, and suppose *B* to have led three rounds of Hearts before leading trump, he will find that *Y* and *Z* will make six tricks and win by their honors. If the two had been led instead of the three, *B*, although he might nevertheless have led trumps, would have had no means of judging that the entire suit was between him and *A*.

The above game, with its notes, was supplied by Mr. F. H. Lewis, who added the following remarks on the penultimate (illustrated by this game):

"Playing the penultimate is leading the lowest but one in suits of more than four cards, which are not headed by the Ace, or do not contain two commanding honors or strong sequences, etc. This mode of play is, practically, the invention of Cavendish, and is the logical extension of the lead of the lowest but one, in suits containing intermediate sequences. I look upon the invention as little inferior, in its means of conveying information (and its consequent influence upon the game), to the convention which requires a player to return his lowest in suits of four cards, or his highest in a suit of three. In point of fact, in some cases it conveys more rapid information, for the lead from five cards may be, and often is, declared in the second round of the suit. And where the dealer, being happily possessed of five trumps, is forced before trumps are led, and trumps with the penultimate, the information of a minimum of five trumps is conveyed at once. I ought, perhaps, to state that, unless there are special reasons to the contrary, the lowest but one should still be led in the trump suit, notwithstanding that it might be headed by Ace, King, or Queen, with small cards. It is true that, occasionally, a weak lead simulates a lead from five or more; for a player, unknown to his partner, may have his strong suit attacked by the adversaries. In such cases, where the lead is not an original lead, a partner must draw his inferences with more caution."

## GAME VI.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Spades*—A.
    *Diamonds*—A, K, 10, 3.          Clubs—K, 9, 7, 2.
                                      Hearts—Kn, 7, 6, 3.

$Y$ { *Spades*—Q, 8, 7, 3.
      *Diamonds*—Q, Kn.
      Clubs—A, Kn, 6, 5, 4.
      Hearts—5, 2.

|          | **B**        |                              |
|----------|--------------|------------------------------|
| **Y**    | *Tr. SKg.*   |                              |
|          | **Z**        |                              |
|          | **A** leads. |                              |

*Spades*—K, 10, 9.
*Diamonds*—9, 8, 7, 6, 2.
Clubs—10.
Hearts—K, 9, 8, 4.            } $Z$

$A$ { *Spades*—Kn, 6, 5, 4, 2.
      *Diamonds*—5, 4.              Clubs—Q, 8, 3.
                                    Hearts—A, Q, 10.

*Score :*—$A B$, 4;  $Y Z$, 4.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|------|------|------|------|
| 1. | D5 | DKn | DKg | D2 |
| 2. | CQ | CA | C2 | C10 |
| 3. | C3 | C4 | CKg | S9 |
| 4. | D4 | DQ | DA | D6 |
| 5. | S2 | S3 | SA | S10 |
| 6. | C8 | S7 | D10 | D7 |
| 7. | H10 | C5 | C7 | SKg |
| 8. | S4 | S8 | D3 | D9 |
| 9. | S5 | SQ | H3 | H4 |
| 10. | S6 | CKn | C9 | H8 |
| 11. | SKn | C6 | H6 | D8 |
| 12. | HA | H2 | H7 | H9 |
| 13. | HQ | H5 | HKn | HKg |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $A$, with five trumps, one honor, leads from his shortest suit, hoping to play a ruffing game. His hopes, it will be seen, are not fulfilled by the event.

2. $Y$ having five Clubs, and seeing lowest Club led, which shows that $B$ is not leading from short suit, can pretty safely infer that $Z$ has played his only Club. Being strong in trumps himself, he returns his opponent's lead (which is from his own long suit), forcing $Z$.

3. $Z$, being short in trumps, would ruff even if the trick were a doubtful one.

4. *Z*, like *Y*, returns his opponent's lead. Having five Diamonds, and noting that neither the three nor the four fell to trick 1, he can infer, with some degree of probability, that *A* has led from a short suit, in which (from his play) *Y* is also short. Trick 4 shows exactly how the case lies, and *Z* can place every Diamond. *Y* also sees how the Diamonds lie.

5. *B*, having the winning Diamond, takes out a round of trumps before leading it, knowing his partner's play, and that, *Y* lying over him, *A*'s plan is not likely to prove very successful.

6. *B* should have led a Heart. *Y* ruffs, of course, though holding four trumps, and

7. Leads his lowest Club to draw his partner's trump card. He can count the Clubs, knowing that *B* must originally have held four, and he knows, therefore, that, if he leads the best, *A* will trump. By playing the lowest, he causes his partner's King to fall separately. The odd trick and the game are won *at this point*.

8. *Z* leads the best Diamond, knowing his partner to lie over *A*. It matters not how *A* plays as the cards lie, but, "for the sake of uniformity" (*Y* having already renounced), *A* should have played his best trump or none.

10. *Y*, finding all trumps left with *A*, throws the lead into his hand, knowing that he must lead a Heart either after or before last trump, and that the trick wanting to win the game must in that way be secured, unless *A* and *B* between them have entire command of Hearts, in which case the game is gone anyhow.

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Game VI., from the *Westminster Papers* for August, 1874, is selected as illustrating the weakness of lead from short suit—even when the odd trick only has to be made to win, and the idea is not to bring in long suit, but to use long trump suit to ruff. Our correspondent, Mr. Lewis, was *Y*. His lead at trick 7 is worth noticing.

## GAME VII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}—10, 9, 4. \\ \textit{Hearts}—K, Q, 10, 4. \end{cases}$     Clubs—K, Kn, 9.
Diamonds—7, 6, 3.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}—A, Kn, 5. \\ \textit{Hearts}—A, 3. \\ \textit{Clubs}—3. \\ \textit{Diamonds} — A, K, \\ \quad 10, 8, 5, 4, 2. \end{cases}$

B

Y    *Tr. S8.*    Z

A leads.

$\begin{array}{l} \textit{Spades}—K, 8, 7, 6. \\ \textit{Hearts}—Kn, 7, 6. \\ \textit{Clubs}—8, 6, 5, 2. \\ \textit{Diamonds}—Q, 9. \end{array}$ $\Bigg\} Z$

$A$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}—Q, 3, 2. \\ \textit{Hearts}—9, 8, 5, 2. \end{cases}$     Clubs—A, Q, 10, 7, 4.
Diamonds—Kn.

*Score :—A B,* 4; *Y Z,* 0.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | DKn | <u>DKg</u> | D3 | D9 | 1. $A$ leads our old friend, the singleton. The score being at 4, he hopes to get a trick or two by ruffing, and to secure the odd trick and the game. $Y$, from his own hand, and from his familiarity with $A$'s way (who, however, apart from his weakness for a singleton lead, is a strong player) knows that $A$ has not led from strength, he therefore, though with only three trumps, |
| 2. | S2 | S5 | S9 | <u>SKg</u> | |
| 3. | S3 | <u>SKn</u> | S4 | S6 | |
| 4. | SQ | <u>SA</u> | S10 | S7 | |
| 5. | H2 | <u>DA</u> | D6 | DQ | |
| 6. | H5 | <u>D10</u> | D7 | C2 | |
| 7. | H8 | <u>D8</u> | C9 | C5 | |
| 8. | C4 | <u>D5</u> | H4 | C6 | |
| 9. | C7 | <u>D4</u> | H10 | C8 | |
| 10. | H9 | <u>D2</u> | HQ | H6 | 2. Leads a trump. $B$ probably holds ten and a small one ($A$ being presumably weak in trumps). |
| 11. | C10 | <u>HA</u> | HKg | H7 | |
| 12. | CQ | H3 | CKg | <u>HKn</u> | 3. The finesse here is perfectly sound. $Z$ has returned the six |
| 13. | CA | C3 | CKn | <u>S8</u> | |

of Spades, eight being the trump card; therefore he held four originally. It is very unlikely that $B$ holds Queen. With Queen, ten, nine, and small one, he would not have played nine to trick 2.

5. Having cleared out trumps, except his partner's turn-up card, $Y$ proceeds with his long suit.

7, 8, 9, and 10, $B$'s discards, are bad. $A$, having discarded Hearts, can be strong only in Clubs (for there has been no such overwhelming trump strength against $A$ and $B$ as to justify $A$ in discarding from his best suit). $B$ therefore should have retained his Hearts; he certainly should not have unguarded his King. It would have made no difference so far as the game was concerned; but as it is, $Y Z$ *make every trick.* Had $A$ originally led Ace of Clubs, $Y Z$ would have made no more than the odd trick.

————

Game VII. illustrates the weakness of the lead from a singleton.

## GAME VIII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Clubs}\text{—A, Kn.}\\ \text{Spades—Q, 9.}\end{array}\right.$   Hearts—Kn, 10, 9, 8, 7.
Diamonds—7, 6, 4, 3.

$Y$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Clubs}\text{—Q, 4, 3.}\\ \text{Spades—Kn, 8, 5.}\\ \text{Hearts—A, 5, 2.}\\ \text{Diamonds — A, Q,}\\ \qquad\qquad\text{10, 2.}\end{array}\right.$

**B**

$Y$       $\begin{array}{c}\textit{Tr. C5.}\\ \textbf{Z}\end{array}$

**A** leads.

$\left.\begin{array}{l}\textit{Clubs}\text{—5.}\\ \text{Spades—A, 10, 7, 6,}\\ \qquad\qquad\text{4, 3, 2.}\\ \text{Hearts—Q, 6, 3.}\\ \text{Diamonds—8, 5.}\end{array}\right\}$ $Z$

$A$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Clubs}\text{—K, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 2.}\\ \text{Spades—K.}\end{array}\right.$   Hearts—K, 4.
Diamonds—K, Kn, 9.

*Score :—A B,* 3; *Y Z,* 4.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C6 | C3 | <u>CA</u> | C5 |
| 2. | <u>CKg</u> | C4 | CKn | S2 |
| 3. | C2 | <u>CQ</u> | D3 | S3 |
| 4. | SKg | SKn | SQ | <u>SA</u> |
| 5. | D9 | <u>D10</u> | D4 | D8 |
| 6. | <u>C7</u> | S8 | S9 | S10 |
| 7. | HKg | <u>HA</u> | H7 | H3 |
| 8. | <u>C8</u> | S5 | D6 | S6 |
| 9. | H4 | H2 | H8 | <u>HQ</u> |
| 10. | <u>C9</u> | H5 | HKn | S7 |
| 11. | <u>C10</u> | D2 | D7 | S4 |
| 12. | DKn | <u>DQ</u> | H9 | D5 |
| 13. | DKg | <u>DA</u> | H10 | H6 |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $A$ leads the penultimate (the ante-penultimate is not *de rigueur* with a six-card suit; but here would have been very suitable).

2. $B$ returns the best of two left. $Z$ discards from his longest suit, the opponents having shown superior strength in trumps.

3. $A$ leads a trump, though thus two fall for one, to show his partner his strength, and that one trick from $B$ will win the game. This $Y$ and $Z$ equally perceive. $Z$ sees that nothing can save the game unless $Y$ is strong in Diamonds ($B$'s discard

showing that $B$'s suit must be hearts. $Z$ discards another Spade, as he must retain the power of leading his partner's suit more than once.

4. $Y$ leads his partner's suit. Luckily the honors fall in a single round.

5. $Y$ finesses deeply, knowing that, if either King or Knave is with $B$, the game is lost anyhow, and

6. Leads his best Spade.

7. $A$ leads his King, from King one small one ; see Leads.

10. $B$ discards his best Heart to show he has entire command of the suit.

————

Game VIII. is from Cavendish. There can be no doubt, I think, that on both sides the hand is played as good players would be sure to play it. "Cavendish," who considers $A$'s play sound throughout, remarks that $A$'s lead at trick 3 is unlucky, as it puts the adversaries on the only tack for saving the game. But $Y$ can count the trumps as it is. He knows $B$ cannot have more than one left after second round; and that, if $B$ had none, $A$ would simply put down the six remaining trumps and claim game. If $A$ had not led a trump at trick 3 (which was certainly his proper course), he would have led the small Diamond, on which $Y$ would have put his ten as the only chance of saving the game. The result would have been the same.

## GAME IX.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}—\text{A, K, 6.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{K, Kn, 2, 4.} \end{cases}$     Clubs—5, 2.
Diamonds—K, Kn, 3, 2.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}—\text{8, 7.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{9, 7, 6.} \\ \textit{Clubs} — \text{A, K, Kn,} \\ \text{10.} \\ \textit{Diamonds}—\text{10, 7, 6,} \\ \text{5,} \end{cases}$

| | **B** | |
|---|---|---|
| **Y** | *Tr. S5.* **Z** | |
| | **A leads.** | |

$\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}—\text{9, 5.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{A, Q, 10, 8.} \\ \textit{Clubs}—\text{7, 6, 4.} \\ \textit{Diamonds} — \text{A, Q,} \\ \text{8, 4.} \end{cases}$ $Z$

$A$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}—\text{Q, Kn, 10, 4, 3, 2.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{5, 3.} \end{cases}$     Clubs—Q, 9, 8, 3.
Diamonds—9.

*Score :—A B,* 0 ; *Y Z,* 4.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | SQ | S7 | S6 | S5 |
| 2. | SKn | S8 | SKg | S9 |
| 3. | S2 | D5 | SA | C4 |
| 4. | D9 | D10 | D2 | D4 |
| 5. | H3 | H9 | H2 | H8 |
| 6. | H5 | H7 | H4 | H10 |
| 7. | C3 | C10 | C2 | C7 |
| 8. | S3 | H6 | HKn | HQ |
| 9. | C8 | CKn | C5 | C6 |
| 10. | C9 | CKg | D3 | D8 |
| 11. | CQ | CA | DKn | DQ |
| 12. | S10 | D6 | DKg | DA |
| 13. | S4 | D7 | HKg | HA |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A*, of course, leads Queen of trumps (see Leads). *Y*, *B*, and *Z* can all place Knave and ten in *A*'s hand, also two, three, and four of Spades from the play.

2. All the players should know where the remaining trumps lie.

3. *B*, not having noticed the fall of trumps, only counting them, leads Ace to draw another round, though *Y* and *Z* have none, and he ought to know it. The discards are as Clay gives them. *Z*'s is made on the old-fashioned principle of discarding from shortest suits, *Y* sees, how-

ever, that it is better for him to retain the power of leading (as often as there may be occasion) to his partner. It was from such considerations that the modern principle of discarding from the longest suit, when strength in trumps is declared against you, took its origin.

4. *B* leads from what he takes to be *Y*'s weakest suit, Hearts and Diamonds being equally strong in his own hand.

5. If *Y* leads Clubs—in which suit his partner is weak—the game is obviously lost, for *A* has three more tricks in trumps. If *Z* is not strong in Hearts the game is lost; therefore *Y* plays as if he knew *Z* to be strong in Hearts. *Z* finesses deeply.

6. *Y* continues the Heart lead.

7. *Z* leads a Club, and *Y* finesses the ten.

8. *Y* continues the Hearts, forcing *A*, who can only lead Clubs, in which suit *Y* is secure, and the game is won for *Y Z*, *Y* making three tricks in Clubs.

————

Game IX. is from Clay. The young Whist-player will carefully note that the line on which *Y* and *Z* play in order to save and win the game is not that which should be followed if the score were "Love all," and honors not all with *A B*. For the position of the cards which causes *Y Z* to save the game by departing from rule, and leading from weak suits, is antecedently improbable. *Y Z* play as they do because it is their only chance. Had the Knave of trumps been either with *Y* or *Z*, falling first or second round to a higher honor, *Y*'s proper course would have been to play out his King and Ace of Clubs, then the Knave, which *A*'s Queen would have taken; then, whatever *A* led, the game would be saved by *Y Z*. We note also that the play of the hands is given here in accordance with Clay's suggestions; according to the present system of discarding (to which Clay later gave in his adherence), *Z*, instead of discarding a Club at round 3, would have discarded a Heart, thereby showing *Y* that Hearts were his best suit.

## GAME X.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l} \textit{Clubs}—8,\ 7,\ 6. \\ \textit{Diamonds}—K,\ 6. \end{array}\right.$  Spades—K, Q, 10, 3.
Hearts—Kn, 7, 4, 2.

$Y$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l} \textit{Clubs}—A,\ Kn,\ 9,\ 3. \\ \textit{Diamonds}—8,\ 4,\ 3, \\ \qquad\qquad 2. \\ \textit{Spades}—A,\ Kn,\ 9, \\ \qquad\qquad 4,\ 2. \\ \textit{Hearts}—none. \end{array}\right.$

```
        ┌─────────────┐
        │      B      │
        │ Tr. CKg.    │
    Y   │          Z  │
        │             │
        │   A leads.  │
        └─────────────┘
```

$\left.\begin{array}{l} \textit{Clubs}—K,\ 4,\ 2. \\ \textit{Diamonds}—9,\ 7. \\ \textit{Spades}—7,\ 6. \\ \textit{Hearts}—A,\ Q,\ 9,\ 8, \\ \qquad\qquad 6,\ 5. \end{array}\right\}$ $Z$

$A$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l} \textit{Clubs}—Q,\ 10,\ 5. \\ \textit{Diamonds}—A,\ Q,\ Kn,\ 10,\ 5. \end{array}\right.$  Spades—8, 5.
Hearts—K, 10, 3.

*Score :—A B*, 4; *Y Z*, 3.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | DA | D3 | D6 | D7 |
| 2. | D10 | D2 | DKg | D9 |
| 3. | S5 | SA | SKg | S6 |
| 4. | C5 | C3 | C6 | CKg |
| 5. | C10 | CKn | C7 | C4 |
| 6. | CQ | CA | C8 | C2 |
| 7. | S8 | S2 | S3 | S7 |
| 8. | DQ | D4 | H2 | H5 |
| 9. | DKn | D8 | H4 | H6 |
| 10. | D5 | C9 | H7 | H8 |
| 11. | H3 | S4 | S10 | H9 |
| 12. | H10 | S9 | SQ | HQ |
| 13. | HKg | SKn | HKn | HA |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A* leads correctly from suit, headed by Ace, Queen, Knave, etc.; see Leads. *Y* begins to signal, having four trumps, two honors, and a good suit, his partner also having turned up the King. *A* alone knows, so far, that some one is signalling for trumps (*Y* acts most unwisely in signalling with so weak a hand outside trumps).

2. *A* shows that he has led from Ace, Queen, Knave, ten, and at least one small one (or he would have followed with Queen). *Y* completes the signal. *Y* knows that neither *B* nor *Z* has any more Diamonds. *A* and *B* know that *Z* has no more.

3. *B* knows that *Y* holds two

and four of Spades. *A*, *Y*, and *Z* know that *B* holds the Queen and at least two others, unless, which is unlikely, *B* has led from a three-card suit.

4. *Y* knows that *Z* holds two of Clubs.

5. *Z* returns the highest of two Clubs left, and *Y*, knowing that two is with *Z*, at once places the remaining four Clubs with *A* and *B*. It is more probable that they are equally than unequally divided, and, as *A* plays the ten, the chances are in favor of the Queen being with *A*. But, at any rate, the finesse of Knave would be correct.

6. *Y* is now, of course, sure of drawing two trumps, remaining with the long trump.

7. *Y*'s purpose, of course, is to draw *B*'s Queen of Spades, remaining with the tenace in that suit, and entire command, should *B* keep to his suit. But *B* sees that, whether he finesses the ten (successfully) or takes the trick with the Queen, *Y* and *Z* must win, if, besides the two and four of Spades already placed in his hand, *Y* holds Knave and another. For *Y* has two Diamonds left, and, if he held originally five Spades, can have no Hearts. So that, if *B* takes two tricks in Spades, *Y* will make two tricks in that suit, whatever *B* may lead, besides his long trump. Or, at the score, *Y Z* would win (two by tricks). Therefore, *B* plays for the only chance left, viz., that *A* may lie over *Z* in Spades, and bring in his Diamonds. This comes off.

8 and 9. *A* makes two tricks in Diamonds, and

10. *Y* should have left him to make yet another. Yielding to the force, *Y* is compelled

11. To lead through *B*'s tenace.

*A B* win the odd trick and the game, tricks counting before honors. If *Y* had refused to be forced at trick 10, *Y Z* must have won. *A* would have been obliged to lead a Heart through *B*'s singleton in the suit, and *Y Z* would have made two tricks in Hearts, and a third with *Y*'s long trump. *Y* played badly throughout.

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Game X. illustrates the way in which inferences are made, and shows how they affect the play. They seem to require much care and attention, but are all in reality perfectly simple, and such as the Whist-player, with sufficient practice, will make at once.

## GAME XI.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { Hearts—K, 8, 6, 4, 2.
Spades—6, 2.

Diamonds—9, 6, 3, 2.
Clubs—A, 7.

$Y$ { Hearts—A, Q, Kn.
Spades—8, 7, 5.
Diamonds—A, 10.
Clubs — Q, Kn, 10, 5, 3.

**B**

**Y**    *Tr. H9.*    **Z**

**A leads.**

Hearts—9, 5, 3.
Spades—Q, Kn.
Diamonds — K, Q, Kn, 8, 7.
Clubs—9, 4, 2. } $Z$

$A$ { Hearts—10, 7.
Spades—A, K, 10, 9, 4, 3.

Diamonds—5, 4.
Clubs—K, 8, 6.

*Score* (probably) :—*A B*, 0; *Y Z*, 0.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

|     | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---|
| 1. | SKg | S5 | S6 | SKn | |
| 2. | SA | S7 | S2 | SQ | |
| 3. | H10 | HKn | HKg | H3 | |
| 4. | H7 | HQ | H2 | H5 | |
| 5. | C6 | CQ | CA | C2 | |
| 6. | D4 | HA | H4 | H9 | |
| 7. | CKg | CKn | C7 | C4 | |
| 8. | S10 | S8 | D2 | D7 | |
| 9. | S9 | C3 | D3 | D8 | |
| 10. | S4 | D10 | D6 | DKn | |
| 11. | S3 | C5 | D9 | C9 | |
| 12. | D5 | DA | H8 | DQ | |
| 13. | C8 | C10 | H6 | DKg | |

**NOTES AND INFERENCES.**

1. *A* leads correctly (see Leads). The two not falling, he knows some one is signalling. *B* commences the signal. At the assumed score, *B* plays very badly in signalling, though if the lead had been with him he would have been right in leading trumps. When a player leads trumps, he says to partner, "I am strong enough to play a forward game if you have strength;" but when he signals, he says, "I am strong enough to play a forward game even without your support, if you only bring in trumps." *B*, in this case, has only three probable tricks in trumps and one in Diamonds.

2. *B* completes the signal; *A*'s suit is established. *Z* has no more Spades.

3. *A* rightly leads his best trump. *Y*, from his own hand, knows that *B*, in all probability, has the King; for if *A* had the King he would not have led the ten, and if *Z* had the King, besides the trump card, *B* would only have had small trumps, headed by eight, from

which he would hardly have signalled. *Y* should therefore have put on the Ace. He gains nothing by this tenace being led up to, for if he had played the Ace, he would still have been sure of the third round of trumps as eventually played. Meantime he could have forced his partner in Spades.

5. Here *Y* plays very badly. It is useless to lead from a long suit at this stage of a game, in which strength in trumps has been declared against you. *Z* is not likely to attribute strength to *Y* in any other suit but Clubs, even if any harm could come, at this critical part of the game, from such a mistake. Leading Ace of Diamonds to save the game would have been sound play enough, though this might suggest length in Diamonds—unless *Z* himself is very strong in that suit, as *Y* knows to be probable. But the force is the correct play to save the game. Of course *Y* knows that *Z* can trump, the trump card not having been played.

7. Even now, leading the Diamond Ace would save the game. (As a matter of fact, it would do much more, as *B* holds four Diamonds ; but of this *Y* cannot be assured. All he knows about Diamonds is that *A*, who has discarded one, is short in that suit ; so that *B* is almost certain to have one at least.) But *Y* blunders on with his long suit, on the chance that *Z* holds the King, and that *B* cannot ruff. *B* is much more likely, so far as *Y* can judge, to be able to ruff Diamonds than Clubs, for *Y* has two Diamonds and *A* is short in them, leaving at least eight between *B* and *Z* ; whereas *Y* holds five Clubs, *A* from his discard certainly had at least three Clubs originally, while *B* and *Z* have already played one each, leaving only three to be accounted for between *B* and *Z*. Besides this, it is an even chance that *A* holds the King, not *Z*.

8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. Of course nothing can now be done. *A* and *B* make five by tricks, against *Y Z*'s two by honors.

If at trick 5 *Y* had played properly, the game would have proceeded thus :

| | *A* | *Y* | *B* | *Z* | | *A* | *Y* | *B* | *Z* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5. | S 10* | S 8 | C 7 | H 9 | 10. | S 9 | H A | H 4 | D 7 |
| 6. | D 4 | D A | D 2 | D Kg | 11. | C 6 | C Q | C A | C 2 |
| 7. | D 5 | D 10 | D 3 | D Q | 12. | C 8 | C 10 | H 8 | C 4 |
| 8. | S 3 | C 3 | D 6 | D Kn | 13. | C Kg | C Kn | H 6 | C 9 |
| 9. | S 4 | C 5 | D 9 | D 8 | | | | | |

\* *A B* only making the odd trick.

Game XI. is given by Professor Pole. The score, on which in reality the play would greatly depend, is not given. We assume that it is "Love All ;" but, if it were *A B* love, *Y Z* three, *B*'s play would be better justified than it is under the assumed actual conditions, because then *nothing could save A B* (if honors against them) *but the possession of such cards, or at any rate such a long suit* by *A*, as *B* ought, under ordinary conditions, to hold himself—to justify his signalling from five trumps one honor. On the other hand, if the score were *A B* four, *Y Z* three, *B*'s play would be about the best he could follow to *lose* the game. The play of *Y Z* also would depend much on the score.

## GAME XII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} Diamonds—8. \\ Spades—10, 5, 4, 2. \end{cases}$      Hearts—A, Q, Kn, 9, 6, 2.
Clubs—A, 6.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} Diamonds—K, 7. \\ Spades—Kn, 7. \\ Hearts—10, 7, 5, 4, \\ \quad\quad\quad\quad 3. \\ Clubs—K, Q, 8, 4. \end{cases}$

| | B | |
|---|---|---|
| Y | Tr. DA. | Z |
| | A leads. | |

$Z$ $\begin{cases} Diamonds—A, Kn, \\ \quad\quad 10, 9, 2. \\ Spades—A, K, Q, \\ Hearts—8. \quad [9, 3. \\ Clubs—9, 7. \end{cases}$

$A$ $\begin{cases} Diamonds—Q, 6, 5, 4, 3. \\ Spades—8, 6. \end{cases}$      Hearts—K.
Clubs—Kn, 10, 5, 3, 2.

Score :—A B, 4;  Y Z, 4.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C3 | CQ | <u>CA</u> | C9 | |
| 2. | HKg | H3 | <u>HA</u> | H8 | |
| 3. | S6 | H4 | HQ | <u>D9</u> | |
| 4. | D4 | <u>DKg</u> | D8 | D2 | |
| 5. | D3 | D7 | H2 | <u>DA</u> | |
| 6. | S8 | S7 | S2 | <u>SKg</u> | |
| 7. | <u>D5</u> | SKn | S4 | SQ | |
| 8. | <u>CKn</u> | C4 | C6 | C7 | |
| 9. | <u>DQ</u> | H5 | H6 | D10 | |
| 10. | D6 | C8 | H9 | <u>DKn</u> | |
| 11. | C2 | H7 | S5 | <u>SA</u> | |
| 12. | C5 | H10 | <u>S10</u> | S9 | |
| 13. | C10 | CKg | <u>HKn</u> | S3 | |

1. With five trumps, and five comparatively small cards, $A$ properly leads from his plain suit [playing the penultimate, though, if the score were different, a trump lead would be permissible, and, according to Pole, advisable; but the rule, "always lead a trump from five," is open to question]. The fall of the nine from $Z$ shows $A$ that $Z$ either has no more Clubs or is signalling [unless, which is less likely, $Y$ held Queen only; in which case $Z$ may have the King, and $B$ have four Clubs left].

2. $B$ opens his strong suit.

3. $B$, although he has six Hearts, continues with the Queen, rather than with the

Knave (see Leads, etc.) in order that $A$, having dropped the King, may not be in doubt.    $A$ refuses to overtrump $Z$, because it is clear to him that $Z$'s hand consists of Spades and trumps: he therefore discards a Spade.

4. $Z$ sees his Spades in danger, and apparently from the weak hand.    He plays, therefore, to find the King in his partner's hand, or finesse on the return.    [$A$ plays the penultimate trump, showing his partner (next round) that he held five originally.]

5. $Z$ is obliged to play the Ace, so as to get the first force on $A$ before he establishes his Club suit.    [The care with which $Z$ attends to this little matter will seem strange to those who think it a Whist offence of the first magnitude to give the enemy a chance of ruffing— they never call it "forcing," by the way—or to fail to give one's partner such a chance.    It may be worth their while, if such there be among our readers, for these unwise players to try the effect of $Z$'s omitting to force.]

8. $Y$ passes, in the expectation that $A$ will continue the Club, in which he maintains the tenace.    He thinks if he takes it he must force $Z$ at the risk of his being overtrumped.    But he did not take into account that $Z$'s trumps must be Knave, ten, for if $A$ had had the two best, he would probably have drawn the trumps.    $Y$'s play was to win the Club, force $Z$ with the Heart, thus keeping the second best Club when $A$ was forced in return with the Club, so winning the game.    $Z$ completes his signal.

9 and 10. [Well played $A$!]    The play of $Y$ in the last trick lets $A$ into the whole of his hand.    It is clear to him that $Y$ is keeping up the tenace, and that he has not the best Heart.    $A$'s play is then very pretty.    By playing the Queen of Trumps he throws, in the next trick, the lead into $Z$'s hand, taking the chance of finding $B$ with a winning Spade.    The rest of the hand plays itself.

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The above game was sent to *Knowledge* by Mr. Lewis, who also supplied the notes, except those within brackets.    The play is good throughout, except the mistake on $Y$'s part, to which Mr. Lewis calls attention in his remarks; but $Y$'s intention was excellent, and it was only $A$'s deeper play which foiled it.    $Y$ had to take several things into account, and he took all points carefully into account except one: viz., that the lead could be thrown into $Z$'s hand.    The abundant signalling in the game is worth noticing, as also the way in which $B$ omits the usual signal for length in suit headed by Ace, Queen, Knave.

## GAME XIII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Spades}\text{—K, Q, Kn, 10, 9, 8.}\\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—A, K.}\end{array}\right.$      Clubs—A, Q.
                                                      Diamonds—8, 5, 2.

$Y$ $\left[\begin{array}{l}\textit{Spades}\text{—7, 6, 5, 3.}\\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—none.}\\ \textit{Clubs}\text{—Kn, 9, 8, 6, 4.}\\ \textit{Diamonds}\text{— K, Q,}\\ \qquad\qquad\text{10, 6.}\end{array}\right.$

| | B | |
|---|---|---|
| Y | *Tr. S2.* | |
| | Z | |
| | A leads. | |

$Z$ $\left.\begin{array}{l}\textit{Spades}\text{—A, 2.}\\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—Q, Kn, 10,}\\ \qquad\text{9, 8, 6, 3.}\\ \textit{Clubs}\text{—K.}\\ \textit{Diamonds}\text{—A, 9, 4.}\end{array}\right\}Z$

$A$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Spades}\text{—4.}\\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—7, 5, 4, 2.}\end{array}\right.$      Clubs—10, 7, 5, 3, 2.
                                                      Diamonds—Kn, 7, 3.

*Score :—A B,* 3; *Y Z,* 3.

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NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | *A* | *Y* | *B* | *Z* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C3 | C4 | CQ | CKg |
| 2. | H2 | S3 | HA | HQ |
| 3. | D3 | DKg | D8 | D4 |
| 4. | D7 | D6 | D2 | DA |
| 5. | H4 | S5 | HKg | H3 |
| 6. | DKn | DQ | D5 | D9 |
| 7. | C2 | C6 | CA | S2 |
| 8. | H5 | D10 | S8 | HKn |
| 9. | S4 | S6 | SKg | SA |
| 10. | C5 | S7 | S9 | H10 |
| 11. | C7 | C8 | SQ | H6 |
| 12. | H7 | C9 | SKn | H8 |
| 13. | C10 | CKn | S10 | H9 |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A* properly leads the penultimate card of his long suit. *B*, finessing according to rule, and overlooking the fact that the case belongs to the exceptions, deliberately throws away the game.

2. *Z* leads Queen, from Queen, Knave, ten, etc. *Y* trumps, following Clay's rule not to pass a certain trick unless you see your way to making three by refraining. *B* begins to signal, now that he has thrown away the game.

3 and 4. *Y* and *Z* begin to take their tricks in Diamonds, *B* signalling violently in a new suit.

5. *Z* properly forces his part-

ner instead of leading a Diamond.  *B* completes his signal in Hearts, naturally.

6 and 7.  *Y*, having made his Diamond Queen, leads a Club, as very likely to give *Z* a ruff.  For *Y* had five Clubs originally, and *A*, having led, has four at least.  With trick 7 the game is won, whatever honors *B* may hold, for the Ace of trumps will make the necessary eighth trick.  For the sake of symmetry we give the remaining rounds as they would probably have been played did the rules of Whist require that all thirteen rounds should be played.

This game illustrates forcibly the necessity of playing to the score. Had *B* played his Ace of Clubs first round, of course the game was won, as he held two by honors in his own hand, and five more tricks certain.

--------

Game XIII. is so far artificial that only *B*'s hand was actually left on record, with the score, *A*'s first lead, and the result.  At the score of "Three all," *B* must have felt absolutely sure of success; but why, being sure, did he not keep so, by playing the sure game?  The case illustrates well the necessity of playing always to the score. The wild signalling of *B* after his mistake, his despairing appeals to his partner to do what *A* never has the chance of doing, are, of course, little touches thrown in to make the lesson more impressive.

## GAME XIV.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Hearts*—K, 8, 5.
      *Clubs*—Q, 10, 4.

Diamonds—A, 10, 2.
Spades—Q, Kn, 9, 3.

$Y$ { *Hearts*—A, Kn, 4.
      *Clubs*—K, Kn, 7, 3.
      *Diamonds*—Q, 6, 5.
      *Spades*—7, 6, 4.

B

*Tr. H*9.

Y                                 Z

A leads.

*Hearts*—Q, 10, 9, 2.
*Clubs*—A, 9, 5, 2.
*Diamonds*—Kn, 9,
*Spades*—8, 2.   [7.   } $Z$

$A$ { *Hearts*—7, 6, 3.
      *Clubs*—8, 6.

Diamonds—K, 8, 4, 3.
Spades—A, K, 10, 5.

*Score :—A B*, 4;  *Y Z*, 4.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | SKg | S4 | S3 | S2 |
| 2. | SA | S6 | S9 | S8 |
| 3. | S5 | S7 | SKn | H2 |
| 4. | C6 | CKg | C4 | C2 |
| 5. | C8 | C3 | C10 | CA |
| 6. | D3 | C7 | CQ | C5 |
| 7. | DKg | D5 | D2 | D7 |
| 8. | D8 | D6 | DA | D9 |
| 9. | D4 | DQ | D10 | DKn |
| 10. | H3 | H4 | H5 | HQ |
| 11. | H6 | HKn | HKg | H10 |
| 12. | H7 | HA | H8 | H9 |
| 13. | S10 | CKn | SQ | C9 |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1 and 2. $A$ leads from his best and longest suit.

3. It is unfortunate for $Z$, with four trumps, to have to ruff; but of course he is wise in doing so at the score, and indeed if the score had been different.

4. $Y$ does not hold the Queen.

5. As $Y$ returns the lowest Club, he holds two more at least. He cannot have played his only remaining Club, for $Z$ holds probably two more, certainly not more than two, and $B$, having played the ten, cannot have any cards left but the Knave or Queen, or both; even in the latter case, a Club would be with $Y$, and if there is one there must be another, or $Y$, holding two only after first round, would have

returned the highest. *Y* notes that *B* has not the nine of Clubs (see notes on trick 11).

6. Thus, as *Z* does not lead the Queen, *A* places the Queen in *B*'s hand, and discards from his originally weaker suit of the two plain suits remaining.

7. *B* does rightly—at the score—in leading from the suit from which his partner has discarded; it is the best chance of giving *A* a trick by ruffing. *A* does not hold the Queen.

8. It is clear *A* holds the four, the winning card being with *Y* or *Z*.

9. *B* has very little choice. Leading Spade Queen would be manifestly bad, as *A*, original leader of the suit, holds the only remaining card in it, so that either *Y* or *Z* can ruff, the other making a convenient discard. A trump lead is not likely to do any good, the trumps being probably pretty equally divided, and the game sure, unless *Y* and *Z* hold both Ace and Queen, and make them separately. As the score and play stand, it is better that either *Y* or *Z* should lead trumps than *A* or *B*.

11. From the lead of the ten, *Y* knows that *Z* does not hold the King, for if he held it he would have played it, unless, besides the ten, he had held another. But in this case his trumps would have been originally King, Queen, ten, two, another, in which case (even after being forced) he could certainly have led trumps earlier. Now, the King being with the enemy, who hold the remaining Spades, *Y Z* are bound to lose if *Y* takes trick 11. For then, if he leads the Knave of trumps, the King will take it, and a trick in Spades go to *A B;* while, if he leads the Knave of Clubs, it will be ruffed (for *A* has already renounced, and *B* does not hold the other Club), and the King of trumps will make the odd trick. *Y* takes the only course to win. Whether the finesse succeed or fail as a finesse (it fails, be it noticed), *A B* must lose both the remaining tricks. This is obvious enough when the cards held by the four players after the tenth round are placed on the table; but how many a game has been lost in such a position by taking a trick at the wrong time?

––––––

Game XIV. appeared some eight years ago in the *Westminster Papers*, Mr. F. H. Lewis playing hand *Y*. The play is singularly regular in the first ten rounds, the inferences plain and obvious, so that the remaining cards in plain suits could all be placed by all four players. Thus *A* knows that *Y* cannot have the Queen of Spades (or he would have played it at trick 3), so that, *Z* having renounced in Spades, it must lie with *B*. He knows that *Y* and *Z* must hold each a Club—it matters not which has the winning Club. *B* knows in like manner that *A* holds the remaining Spade, *Y Z* a Club each. *Y* knows his partner holds the remaining Club, and that *A* and *B* hold each a Spade; and *Z* knows the same about *Y*.

## GAME XV.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { Clubs—A, 10, 8, 5, 4.  
Hearts—K, 5, 2.

Spades—2.  
Diamonds—10, 9, 7, 4.

$Y$ { Clubs—Q, Kn, 7, 2.  
Hearts—4, 3.  
Spades—A, K, Kn,  
6, 5.  
Diamonds—A, K.

| | B | |
|---|---|---|
| Y | Tr. C9. | Z |
| | A leads. | |

Clubs—9, 6.  
Hearts—10, 7.  
Spades—10, 9, 8, 4.  
Diamonds—Q, Kn,  
8, 6, 3.

} $Z$

$A$ { Clubs—K, 3.  
Hearts—A, Q, Kn, 9, 8, 6.

Spades—Q, 7, 3.  
Diamonds—5, 2.

*Score:—A B, 0; Y Z, 0.*

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | HA | H4 | H5 | H7 |
| 2. | HKn | H3 | HKg | H10 |
| 3. | CKg | C2 | C5 | C6 |
| 4. | C3 | CKn | CA | C9 |
| 5. | D2 | CQ | C10 | S4 |
| 6. | S3 | SKg | S2 | S8 |
| 7. | S7 | SA | C4 | S9 |
| 8. | D5 | C7 | C8 | D6 |
| 9. | HQ | S5 | H2 | D3 |
| 10. | H9 | S6 | D4 | D8 |
| 11. | H8 | SKn | D7 | DKn |
| 12. | H6 | DKg | D9 | DQ |
| 13. | SQ | DA | D10 | S10 |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. Both $Y$ and $B$ begin at signal, but $B$ without good reason. $Y$ has better, for he not only has four trumps, two honors, but an excellent hand outside trumps.

2. $A$ has led from Ace, Queen, Knave, and two at least. $Y$'s signal is completed; but $B$ sees his opportunity, takes the trick (leaving his partner with the suit established), and leads the penultimate trump. A bad partner would have saved his King (knowing the Queen with $A$), and lost the chance of making a great game.

4. $B$, having five trumps, and

knowing $Y$ cannot have less than four trumps two honors ($Y$ being one who never signals without good cause), knows that $A$'s Club 3 cannot be the lowest of three left in hand; but it is the lowest Club; therefore $A$ can have no more.  For if he had had two he would have played the higher.  The inference happens to be of no subsequent use to $A$, but it is well to note it, as inexperienced players often lose by failing to notice just such points as these.  $Y$ makes a similar inference, being sure that $B$ would not have led trumps, after opponent's signal, from less than five trumps, one honor.  $Y$ should have played the seven, on the chance that ten may lie with $Z$.  As the cards lie, it would have made no difference in the result.

5. Having second and third best trumps left, $B$ leads the second best and draws $Y$'s Queen.  $Y$ does well to take the trick, having nothing to gain from getting out more trumps.

6. $Y$, of course, resorts to his long suit; but unfortunately

7. $B$ has but one card of the suit, and, trumping the second round,

8. Draws out the last of $Y$'s trumps.  $Z$ discards penultimate Diamond, to show five in suit, but it is rather late for such refinements.

9. $B$ brings in his partner's long suit, and

10, 11, 12, 13, $A$ $B$ make five by tricks,

————

The above game illustrates the importance of clearing your partner's suit when it is established, and you hold the best card and but one small one.  With two small ones, $B$, second round, would not have been justified in taking his partner's trick.

## GAME XVI.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Hearts}\text{—K, Kn, 4.} \\ \text{Clubs—A, 7.} \end{cases}$  Diamonds—Kn, 10, 7, 4.
Spades—Kn, 9, 6, 4.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Hearts}\text{—Q, 7, 2.} \\ \text{Clubs—Q, 8.} \\ \text{Diamonds—6, 5, 2.} \\ \text{Spades—10, 8, 7, 5,} \\ \qquad\qquad\quad 3. \end{cases}$

|   |   |   |
|---|---|---|
|   | **B** |   |
| **Y** | Tr. H8. **Z** |   |
|   | **A** leads. |   |

$\begin{rcases} \textit{Hearts}\text{—10, 9, 8, 6,} \\ \qquad\qquad\qquad 5. \\ \text{Clubs—Kn, 2.} \\ \text{Diamonds — K, Q,} \\ \qquad\qquad\quad 9, 8. \\ \text{Spades—Q, 2.} \end{rcases}$ $Z$

$A$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Hearts}\text{—A, 3.} \\ \text{Clubs—K, 10, 9, 6, 5, 4, 3.} \end{cases}$  Diamonds—A, 3.
Spades—A, K.

*Score :—A B,* 0; *Y Z,* 4.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C5 | C8 | <u>CA</u> | C2 |
| 2. | <u>CKg</u> | CQ | C7 | CKn |
| 3. | <u>HA</u> | H2 | H4 | H5 |
| 4. | H3 | H7 | <u>HKn</u> | H6 |
| 5. | D3 | HQ | <u>HKg</u> | H8 |
| 6. | <u>SKg</u> | S3 | S4 | S2 |
| 7. | C10 | D2 | S6 | <u>H9</u> |
| 8. | <u>DA</u> | D5 | D4 | DKg |
| 9. | C9 | S5 | D7 | <u>H10</u> |
| 10. | C6 | D6 | D10 | <u>DQ</u> |
| 11. | C3 | S7 | <u>DKn</u> | D9 |
| 12. | <u>SA</u> | S8 | S9 | SQ |
| 13. | <u>C4</u> | S10 | SKn | D8 |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A*, having seven Clubs, leads the ante-penultimate.

2. *B*, having no very good suit, returns his partner's lead; from the fall of the cards he sees that all the remaining Clubs are with *A*.

3. Although with only two trumps, *A*, having five winning Clubs, two winning Spades, and Diamond Ace, leads trumps, hoping by forcing to get out trumps and bring in his long suit. He leads Ace to insure two rounds of trumps at least.

4. *B* knows from *A*'s play that *A* has not led from a long suit

of trumps. For if *A* had had five trumps, headed by the Ace, he would have led trumps first round. *B* should have helped *A* in getting out as many trumps as possible, by playing his King and leading the Knave. The finesse succeeds, as it happens, but it was not good play.

5. Remaining trumps are with *Z*.

6. *B* leads Spades in response to *A*'s discard of a Diamond.

7. *A* forces *Z*, of course. *Y* discards from his weakest suit; *B* likewise.

9. *A* again forces *Z*.

The rest of the game plays itself.

———

Game XVI. illustrates early lead from a short suit of trumps when the long suit is established, and there are good re-entering cards.

## GAME XVII.

### THE HANDS.

$B \begin{cases} Clubs\text{—}9, 8. \\ Diamonds\text{—}Kn, 8, 3. \end{cases}$      Spades—8, 7, 2.
Hearts—10, 8, 7, 4, 3.

$Y \begin{cases} Clubs\text{—}10, 5, 2. \\ Diamonds\text{—}K, 6. \\ Spades\text{—}Kn, 10, 4, 3. \\ Hearts\text{—}Kn, 9, 6, 5. \end{cases}$

**B**

Tr. CKn.

**Y**          **Z**

**A** leads.

$\begin{cases} Clubs\text{—}A, K, Kn. \\ Diamonds\text{—}10, 9. \\ Spades\text{—}A, K, Q, \\ \qquad\qquad 6, 5. \\ Hearts\text{—}K, Q, 2. \end{cases} Z$

$A \begin{cases} Clubs\text{—}Q, 7, 6, 4, 3. \\ Diamonds\text{—}A, Q, 7, 5, 4, 2. \end{cases}$      Spades—9.
Hearts—A.

*Score :—A B*, 2; *Y Z*, 3.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C4 | C2 | C8 | CKn |
| 2. | S9 | S3 | S2 | SKg |
| 3. | C3 | S4 | S7 | SA |
| 4. | C6 | C10 | C9 | CKg |
| 5. | C7 | C5 | S8 | CA |
| 6. | HA | H5 | H3 | HKg |
| 7. | D4 | D6 | DKn | D9 |
| 8. | DA | DKg | D8 | D10 |
| 9. | DQ | H6 | D3 | S5 |
| 10. | D7 | H9 | H4 | H2 |
| 11. | D5 | S10 | H7 | S6 |
| 12. | D2 | SKn | H8 | HQ |
| 13. | CQ | HKn | H10 | SQ |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A* properly leads a trump, though an honor turned, having five, one honor. He leads the penultimate.

2. *B* does not hold four trumps, or he would "echo" to his partner's lead of trumps.

3. The penultimate signal is completed. *Z*, of course, should have led his Queen of Spades.

4. *Z* should see that *B* holds no more trumps. *Y* plays the ten to help his partner, *B* having shown weakness in the first round of trumps.

5. *Z* does his best to help his adversaries. He not only gives

up the command in trumps utterly, but draws two cards for one. He should have forced *A* with his Spade Queen.

6. Even now the lead of Spade Queen would have been the correct thing, though, as the cards lie, it would have done no good.

7. It is necessary, to save game, to make every other trick, for *Y Z* are two by honors. Now, either the King is with *B* or not; if *B* holds it, whether guarded or unguarded, *A B* must win, for *A* holds the long trump with which to re-enter, if *B* is unable to return trumps. If the enemy hold King guarded, the lead of Diamond Ace must lose the game for *A B*, whereas there is a chance that *Y* holding the King guarded, *B* may hold the Knave. *A*, therefore, plays on the line which gives the best chance of winning.

8, etc. The rest of the game plays itself. *Y Z* have nothing more to do with it.

———

Game XVII. illustrates the folly of playing the enemy's game by leading out winning cards of his suit—especially when the suit is trumps.

## GAME XVIII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Diamonds*—A, 10, 8, 2.    Hearts—Q, Kn, 10, 9, 6.
Clubs—A, Q, 9.    Spades—A.

$Y$ {
*Diamonds*—Q, Kn.
Clubs—10, 5.
Hearts—8, 7, 5, 3.
Spades—K, Kn, 10,
7, 2.

```
          B
        Tr. D7.
 Y         Z

     A leads.
```

*Diamonds*—7, 5, 3.
Clubs—K, 3, 2.
Hearts—K, 4, 2.
Spades—Q, 9, 8, 5.
} $Z$

$A$ { *Diamonds*—K, 9, 6, 4.    Hearts—A.
Clubs—Kn, 8, 7, 6, 4.    Spades—6, 4, 3.

*Score :*—Love all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C6 | C5 | CQ | CKg |
| 2. | S3 | SKg | SA | S5 |
| 3. | HA | H3 | HQ | HKg |
| 4. | C4 | C10 | CA | C2 |
| 5. | DKg | DKn | D2 | D3 |
| 6. | D4 | DQ | DA | D5 |
| 7. | D6 | H5 | D10 | D7 |
| 8. | D9 | H7 | D8 | C3 |
| 9. | CKn | H8 | C9 | H2 |
| 10. | C8 | S2 | H6 | H4 |
| 11. | C7 | S7 | H9 | S8 |
| 12. | S4 | S10 | H10 | SQ |
| 13. | S6 | SKn | HKn | S9 |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $A$ rightly opens his long suit, leading the penultimate. Unless some one is signalling, $B$ perceives that $Z$ must hold either two out of the three cards below the six, or all three if $A$ has not led from a five-card suit. He finesses the Queen as a matter of course.

2. $Z$'s suit is shown.

3. $B$ properly opens his long suit, and is fortunate enough to see it established in the first round.

4. $A$ completes the penultimate signal. $Z$ must hold the three; $Y$ has no more; therefore, $A$'s Clubs are established.

5. *B* properly leads trumps, his own suit and his partner's being both established.

6. *A* rightly returns the lowest.

7. *B* should now be certain that the enemy's trumps are exhausted; but, whether they were exhausted or not, his proper lead would now have been from his established Heart suit. This would have forced out the last hostile trump, however the Hearts lay; and then, the long trumps bringing in the lead again, *A* would have made all the remaining tricks with his Clubs. Putting aside *A*'s showing, in tricks six and seven, that he held originally four trumps (or he would have returned the six), the case illustrates well the use of the force. For we see that even if the best trump had remained with *Z*, it could have been forced out, and the game won by cards.

8. Through this erroneous lead

9–13. *A B* fail to win as they would have done.

———

Game XVIII. illustrates the importance of noting the card returned. *Z* threw away the game by sheer carelessness in the above case, as he knew the rule well enough.

8

## GAME XIX.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { Clubs—Kn, 5.
Diamonds—A, K, Q.

Spades—K, Kn, 9, 8, 7.
Hearts—10, 4, 3.

$Y$ { Clubs—8, 4, 3.
Diamonds—8, 6.
Spades—6, 5, 4, 2.
Hearts—A, Q, 9, 5.

|   | **B** |   |
|---|---|---|
| **Y** | Tr. C10. | **Z** |
|   | **Z** |   |
|   | **A** leads. |   |

$Z$ } Clubs—K, 10, 7, 6.
Diamonds—Kn, 10, 9, 3, 2.
Spades—A, 10.
Hearts—K, 8.

$A$ { Clubs—A, Q, 9, 2.
Diamonds—7, 5, 4.

Spades—Q, 3.
Hearts—Kn, 7, 6, 2.

Score :—A B, 1; Y Z, 0.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | H2 | H5 | H10 | HKg | 1. A leads from his longest suit. |
| 2. | D4 | D6 | DQ | DKn | |
| 3. | CA | C3 | CKn | CKg | 3. B, trusting to his partner to protect the Heart suit, and being strong in both the other plain suits, leads a trump. Z having turned the ten, properly heads the Knave. |
| 4. | H6 | H9 | H3 | H8 | |
| 5. | H7 | HQ | H4 | S10 | |
| 6. | D5 | D8 | DKg | D2 | |
| 7. | C9 | C4 | C5 | C6 | 4. A, having the finesse in trumps, waits for another lead from B, but he should not have continued the Heart lead. B cannot be strong in trumps, and A knows that he can have no strength in Hearts. A's proper lead here was the Spade Queen. |
| 8. | CQ | C8 | SKn | C7 | |
| 9. | SQ | S2 | S7 | SA | |
| 10. | D7 | S4 | DA | D10 | |
| 11. | S3 | S5 | S8 | C10 | |
| 12. | C2 | S6 | S9 | D9 | |
| 13. | HKn | HA | SKg | D3 | 5. Y, having no rentrée card, gives Z a discard. He properly |

abstains from continuing with Heart Ace.   The discard of the Spade ten shows $Y$ that his partner had great numerical strength in Diamonds.   It was open to $Z$ to discard a Diamond, as the lead of trumps was from the adversary; but, having four trumps originally, he had hopes of utilizing one of them.

7. $B$ is in a difficulty.   He knows Heart Ace to be with $Y$, but he knows also that he can have but one more Diamond, if any.   As $A$ continued the Heart suit, he probably wants the finesse in trumps. $B$, therefore, plays a trump.

8. As $Z$ discarded Spade ten, $B$ discards Spade Knave, to show that his lowest Spade is equal to the ten.

9. Acting upon this hint, $A$ plays Spade Queen.

10. $Z$ can count $B$'s hand.   If he leads the winning trump, and draws the Club two from $A$, he can then lead only Diamonds, and $B$ will bring in his Spades.

11. $B$ here properly plays Spade eight.   If $Z$ passes it, $B$ continues the suit, and $A$, getting the discard of the Heart, $Z$ loses the game.   $Z$ is not to be trapped.   He knows he can save the game by forcing $A$, who has the losing Heart.

———

Game XIX. was supplied by Mr. Lewis (with the notes).   It illustrates the importance of care in determining whether to lead the winning trump or not.   Game XX. illustrates the same point.

## GAME XX.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Spades}—\text{Kn, 4, 3.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{Q, 10, 8, 7.} \end{array} \right.$     Clubs—8, 5, 4.
                                    Diamonds—Q, 10, 4.

$Y$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Spades}—\text{10.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{K, 9, 5, 4,} \\ \qquad\qquad\quad\text{3.} \\ \textit{Clubs}—\text{10, 9, 6, 2.} \\ \textit{Diamonds}—\text{9, 8, 2.} \end{array} \right.$

| B |
|---|
| Y    Tr. S9.    Z |
| A leads. |

$\left. \begin{array}{l} \textit{Spades} — \text{A, K, Q,} \\ \qquad\qquad\quad\text{9, 7.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{A, 6, 2.} \\ \textit{Clubs} — \text{K, Q, Kn,} \\ \qquad\qquad\quad\text{3.} \\ \textit{Diamonds}—\text{7.} \end{array} \right\}$ $Z$

$A$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \textit{Spades}—\text{8, 6, 5, 2.} \\ \textit{Hearts}—\text{Kn.} \end{array} \right.$     Clubs—A, 7.     [3.
                                    Diamonds—A, K, Kn, 6, 5,

*Score :*—*A B*, 0 ; *Y Z*, 1.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | <u>DKg</u> | D2 | D4 | D7 | 1. *A* has no other lead. |
| 2. | DA | D8 | D10 | <u>S7</u> | 2. In this position *Z* should not trump with the penúltimate. |
| 3. | S2 | S10 | S3 | <u>SQ</u> | The latter is the turn-up card; and as *Z* is about to play out his |
| 4. | S5 | D9 | S4 | <u>SKg</u> | tierce major, it is better if the trumps fall that *Y* should be left |
| 5. | S6 | C2 | SKn | <u>SA</u> | in no doubt. As, however, the |
| 6. | S8 | C6 | DQ | <u>S9</u> | eight and the turn-up remain in after the play of the three rounds, |
| 7. | <u>CA</u> | C9 | C4 | CKg | *A* may be credited with the eight, for if *Z* had had the eight, he |
| 8. | <u>DKn</u> | H3 | C5 | H2 | ought to have trumped with it. |
| 9. | <u>D6</u> | H4 | C8 | H6 | The fall of the Diamonds at trick 2 leaves *Z* in doubt as to wheth- |
| 10. | <u>D5</u> | H5 | H7 | C3 | er *Y* or *B* has the Queen, but |
| 11. | <u>D3</u> | C10 | H8 | CKn | when at trick 4 *Y* discards Dia- |
| 12. | HKn | H9 | H10 | <u>HA</u> | mond nine, he cannot have the |
| 13. | C7 | HKg | HQ | <u>CQ</u> | |

Queen, as by discarding the nine he would be giving up the tenace.

5. Z continues the trump to draw two for one.

6. At this point Z should have cleared the Club suit. He must make two by cards, even if B has Knave and Queen of Diamonds, by refusing to trump, and discarding the two small Hearts. By drawing the last trump before clearing the Clubs, he enables B to take advantage of the information Y gave him when he discarded the nine of Diamonds. B, therefore, properly discards Diamond Queen, thus leaving A, if he has a *rentrée* card, in full possession of the suit.

7. Behold the result! A is left with four good Diamonds, and, making six tricks, saves the game. If at trick 6, instead of drawing the trump, Z had played Club King, A and B could have made but three tricks, Club King, Diamond King, and Diamond Queen; of course Z would not have trumped the Diamond Queen. The drawing of the last trump was the more blamable because Y, at the fourth trick, had practically told Z he could not depend upon him for a trick in the Diamond suit.

———

Game XX. was sent to us and annotated by Mr. F. H. Lewis. It shows the importance of refraining from leading the winning trump when the enemy still has the King-card of one's long suit. It is specially instructive in showing the advantage of carefully playing bad hands. Both Y and B have poor hands, and as the game proceeds it becomes clear to both players that all they can do is to play with careful reference to the indications as to their partner's hands. This they do. Y does all in his power to save his partner from the mistake into which, nevertheless, Z falls. As it happens, the enemy gains more than Y Z, but that is not Y's fault. B carefully clears his partner's suit by throwing away the winning Diamond left alone in his hand.

## GAME XXI.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}\text{—Kn, 9, 3.} \\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—6.} \end{cases}$ 　　　Clubs—10, 7, 5, 4, 2.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Diamonds—K, 9, 5, 4.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}\text{—6, 5, 4.} \\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—Kn, 10, 9.} \\ \textit{Clubs}\text{—Q, Kn, 8.} \\ \textit{Diamonds}\text{—Q, 8, 7,} \\ \text{6.} \end{cases}$

**B**

**Y**　　　　*Tr. S8.*　**Z**

**A leads.**

$\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}\text{—Q, 10, 8, 2.} \\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—A, K, 8, 3,} \\ \text{2.} \\ \textit{Clubs}\text{—9, 6.} \\ \textit{Diamonds}\text{—Kn, 3.} \end{cases}$ $Z$

$A$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Spades}\text{—A, K, 7.} \\ \textit{Hearts}\text{—Q, 7, 5, 4.} \end{cases}$ 　　　Clubs—A, K, 3.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Diamonds—A, 10, 2.

*Score :—A B,* 1; *Y Z,* 0.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | S7 | S4 | SKn | <u>SQ</u> |
| 2. | H4 | H9 | H6 | <u>HKg</u> |
| 3. | H5 | H10 | <u>S3</u> | HA |
| 4. | <u>SKg</u> | S5 | S9 | S10 |
| 5. | <u>SA</u> | S6 | D4 | S2 |
| 6. | <u>CKg</u> | C8 | C2 | C6 |
| 7. | <u>CA</u> | CKn | C4 | C9 |
| 8. | C3 | <u>CQ</u> | C5 | D3 |
| 9. | H7 | <u>HKn</u> | C7 | H2 |
| 10. | <u>DA</u> | D6 | D5 | DKn |
| 11. | D10 | D7 | D9 | <u>S8</u> |
| 12. | <u>HQ</u> | D8 | C10 | H3 |
| 13. | D2 | DQ | <u>DKg</u> | H8 |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. With such all - round strength, the trump is the proper lead. It is true that where the lead is not from numerical strength in trumps the leader declares general strength, and gives the adversaries the opportunity of finessing against him in plain suits. But with such a hand it is worth while running the risk. If the trump had not been led, *A* must have opened the Heart suit, in which only his partner's weakness (which might have been defeated) could have helped him.

2. *Z* opens a suit of five, headed by Ace, King. Some players,

acting upon the analogy of a suit of five headed by the Ace, lead the Ace first. But I do not approve of this play. If the Ace is trumped, the position of the King is unknown. If the King on the second round is trumped, it simulates the lead of the Ace, King, only.

4. Although void of Hearts, *B* properly returns the trump. *Z* heads the nine, as the eight was turned.

5. *A* continues trump, satisfied to make his Heart Queen later on. *B* is in a difficulty what to discard. As his partner led from three trumps only, he is uncertain of his suit. He keeps his numerical strength in Clubs.

9. *A* properly refuses to win the trick. With the long trump in *Z*'s hand, he would be freeing his other Hearts.

12. The success of holding back the Queen is now apparent. *A* and *B* win the game.

———

Game XXI. shows the importance of retaining the command of the enemy's plain suit. The game was supplied—like the two last— by Mr. Lewis.

## GAME XXII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Hearts*—Kn, 6, 2.
      *Spades*—9, 8.

Diamonds—Q, Kn, 2.
Clubs—K, Q, Kn, 9, 7.

$Y$ { *Hearts*—A, 5.
      *Spades*—A, Q, Kn,
              6, 4.
      *Diamonds*—9, 8, 7.
      *Clubs*—10, 5, 3.

|   | B |   |
|---|---|---|
| Y | *Tr. H*8. | Z |
|   | — |   |
|   | A leads. |   |

*Hearts*—K, 10, 8, 4,
        3.
Spades—7, 5, 3, 2.       } $Z$
Diamonds—K, 6, 5.
Clubs—A.

$A$ { *Hearts*—Q, 9, 7.
      *Spades*—K, 10.

Diamonds—A, 10, 4, 3.
Clubs—8, 6, 4, 2.

*Score :*—A B, 0; Y Z, 0.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | D3 | D7 | DKn | DKg | 1. A leads from his best suit. |
| 2. | H7 | HA | H2 | H4 | 2. Having five trumps, Z leads the penultimate. |
| 3. | H9 | H5 | H6 | HKg | |
| 4. | HQ | C3 | HKn | H3 | 4. The third round is fortunate for Y Z. Y discarding a Club, and A having led Diamonds, Z knows that his partner's suit must be Spades. |
| 5. | DA | D8 | D2 | D5 | |
| 6. | C2 | C5 | CKn | CA | |
| 7. | S10 | SKn | S8 | S2 | 6. A knows this also, and therefore leads Clubs. It would have been better, as it turned out, if he had kept to his own suit. |
| 8. | SKg | SA | S9 | S3 | |
| 9. | C4 | SQ | C7 | S7 | |
| 10. | C6 | S6 | C9 | S5 | |
| 11. | D4 | S4 | CQ | D6 | 7. Z, having four cards of his partner's suit, leads the lowest. Y finesses the Knave, of course. |
| 12. | C8 | C10 | CKg | H8 | |
| 13. | D10 | D9 | DQ | H10 | |

8. *Z*, noting the fall of the cards, perceives that his seven will be in his partner's way. For neither *A* nor *B* have any more (*B* certainly not holding the Queen, or he would not have let *Y*'s Knave make at trick 7). Thus, if *Y* leads Queen at trick 9, and *Z* throws his five, he will have to take the fourth trick in Spades, and a trick in Diamonds will go to the enemy.

9. *Z*, therefore, throws his seven to *Y*'s lead of the Queen. But *Y* should not have led the Queen. He can count the Spades as well as *Z*, and knowing the second best and a small one were with *Z*, he should have led the four, to make his partner's play as simple as possible. *Never leave to partner a point of strategy to which you can attend yourself.*

10, 11, 12, 13. The rest of the game plays itself.

———

Game XXII. illustrates the necessity of giving up the command in your partner's suit. It also shows the importance of care in noting the fall of the small cards.

## GAME XXIII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { Hearts—K, 10, 6, 4.      Diamonds—K, Q, 10, 4.
     Spades—2.      Clubs—A, 8, 6, 5.

$Y$ {
Hearts—3.
Spades — A, K, 10, 9, 7, 6, 4.
Diamonds—3, 2.
Clubs—7, 4, 3.

|  | **B** |  |
|---|---|---|
| **Y** | Tr. H2. | **Z** |
|  | **A** leads. |  |

$Z$ }
Hearts—A, 8, 5, 2.
Spades—8, 3.
Diamonds—A, 9, 8, 7, 6.
Clubs—K, 2.

$A$ { Hearts—Q, Kn, 9, 7.      Diamonds—Kn, 5.
     Spades—Q, Kn, 5.      Clubs—Q, Kn, 10, 9.

*Score :*—$A B$, 3; $Y Z$, 2.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | H7 | H3 | HKg | H2 |
| 2. | HKn | S6 | H4 | H5 |
| 3. | CQ | C3 | C5 | CKg |
| 4. | H9 | C4 | H6 | H8 |
| 5. | C9 | C7 | CA | C2 |
| 6. | D5 | D2 | DKg | DA |
| 7. | HQ | D3 | H10 | HA |
| 8. | S5 | S9 | S2 | S8 |
| 9. | SKn | SKg | C6 | S3 |
| 10. | SQ | SA | D4 | D6 |
| 11. | DKn | S10 | C8 | D7 |
| 12. | C10 | S7 | D10 | D8 |
| 13. | CKn | S4 | DQ | D9 |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $A$ plays as if at the score "Love all." If his partner has an honor (and the odds are in favor of $B$'s having one honor at least), $A B$ only want five tricks to win. A defensive rather than a forward game is therefore indicated.

2. $B$ cannot tell whether $A$ has led from strength or length in Hearts. But $Z$'s play of the five shows $A$ had not led from five Hearts. The presumption, as $Y$ renounces, is that $A$ had four Hearts, two honors. $Y$, regarding strength in trumps as declared against his side, discards the penultimate of his long suit.

3. *A* is wise, but not in time.

4. *Z* draws two for one, keeping up the Ace, as he has only one other card of re-entry, and *A* is presumably strong in plain suits. The Queen, ten, and nine of trumps being all unplayed, *Z* knows he can gain nothing by leading Ace. *Y*, seeing *Z* is not without trump strength, and noting, too, that their case is almost hopeless unless he can bring in his Spades, discards now from *A*'s suit—not from Diamonds, as he cannot tell whether he may not have to lead them to *A* more than once.

5. *A B* make their fourth trick; *Y Z* must now make all the rest to save game.

6. *B* throws away the game through sheer inattention (to the score and play both). He knows *A* has the winning Clubs, and that *Z* has but one trump left: for *A* could not have led trump seven from Queen, Knave, seven, only.

7. *Z*, of course, draws the remaining trumps, and leads his best card in his partner's suit. *Y* makes a deep finesse; not so deep as it looks though, for *A*, having shown no strength in Diamonds, is almost certain, since he led trumps, to hold Queen and Knave in Spades. Apart from this, it would be a question of probability—viz., whether it is more likely that *B* holds Knave or Queen, in which case *A B* win, or whether, if *Y* plays King, the Ace will draw both Queen and Knave, and unless this happen *A B* win equally. The finesse comes off, and

10, 11, 12, 13. *Y Z* make the remaining tricks, and win.

————

Game XXIII. illustrates the importance of playing to the score.

## GAME XXIV.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Hearts*—A, Q, 10, 6.        Diamonds—A, 3.
   { Spades—Q, 10, 8.            Clubs—A, K, Kn, 8.

$Y$ { *Hearts*—5, 4.
   { Spades—A, Kn, 6.
   { Diamonds—Q, Kn,
   {           9, 8, 5.
   { Clubs—4, 3, 2.

|   | B |   |
|---|---|---|
| Y | *Tr. H8.* | Z |
|   | A leads. |   |

*Hearts* — K, Kn, 8,
              3, 2.         }
Spades—K, 3, 2.          } $Z$
Diamonds—K.              }
Clubs—10, 9, 7, 5.       }

$A$ { *Hearts*—9, 7.            Diamonds—10, 7, 6, 4, 2.
   { Spades—9, 7, 5, 4.       Clubs—Q, 6.

*Score :*—Four all.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | D4 | D5 | **DA** | DKg | 1. *A* leads penultimate of his long suit. Queen lies with *Y*, three with *B*, unless *Y* is signalling (*A* alone knows this). *Z* has probably no more. |
| 2. | **H7** | H4 | H6 | H2 | |
| 3. | H9 | H5 | **HA** | H3 | |
| 4. | C6 | C2 | **CKg** | C5 | 2. *B* knows that probably *Z* has no more Diamonds, while the two has not appeared. But there is a strong probability that *A* has led from a five-card suit (since ten Diamonds lie between *A* and *Y*). It is, therefore, not likely that *Y* has begun a signal. Of course, *Z* may be signalling from King, Queen, but this is unlikely. |
| 5. | CQ | C3 | **CA** | C7 | |
| 6. | S4 | C4 | **CKn** | C9 | |
| 7. | D10 | **DKn** | D3 | S2 | |
| 8. | D2 | **DQ** | C8 | SKg | |
| 9. | D6 | D9 | S8 | **H8** | |
| 10. | S5 | **SA** | S10 | S3 | 3. We doubt whether *A* should have returned his partner's lead of trumps. Strength in trumps is manifestly divided between *B* and *Z*: and very great strength, for nine trumps lie in these two hands. *A* |
| 11. | D7 | **D8** | SQ | C10 | |
| 12. | S7 | SKn | H10 | **HKn** | |
| 13. | S9 | S6 | HQ | **HKg** | |

knows, therefore, that though *B* may have been strong enough to lead trumps, *Z* may be stronger. *A* puts *B* in a bad position by returning trumps. He would have done better to lead Club Queen, in the hope that *B* may be strong in Clubs.* This would have won: though that proves nothing. Two tricks were already made. Three more would have been made in Clubs. *A* would have made the sixth trick by ruffing Clubs; and the Ace of trumps would have won the odd trick and the game. After trick 3, as played, *B* knows that *Y* has no more trumps, nor *A* (note the trump card). *Z* knows, also, that neither *A* nor *Y* have any more trumps.]

4. *B* wisely gives up trumps.

5. After this *B* knows the fourth round in Clubs must go to the enemy.

6. *A* and *B* now want only one trick to win, and it looks as if they must get it.

7. *B* leads *A*'s suit.

8. Why should not *Z* ruff, leading Spade King, and then a small one? Or he might have discarded Club ten. [The second best trump lies with *B*, so that if *Z* has to lead trumps, *Y Z must* lose. The King of Spades is absolutely useless to *Z*; for if he takes a trick with it the enemy must make a trick in trumps and the game. If *A B* have the Ace, the game is gone any way. If *Y* has the Ace and wins the King with it, *Y Z* may still win; but how apt *Y* would be *not* to win his partner's King! Therefore, to simplify his partner's play as much as possible, to "leave no point of strategy to partner to which he can attend himself," *Z* throws away his useless King.]

9. *Z* should have discarded a Club. *Y* would have gone on with Diamonds. If *Y* had not held the best Diamond after trick 9, *Z*'s play here would have lost the game. [But now another danger lurks in store for *Z* and his partner. *Z* has got rid of one winning card too many, but he still has another, his third trump. If *Y* makes the ninth trick, *Z* must win the tenth or eleventh trick (it matters not which) and lose the game. Therefore, *Z* plays the *grand coup :* he trumps his partner's winning Diamond.]

10. *Z* leads losing Spade, and thus enables his partner, after winning trick 11—

12. To lead up to *Z*'s tenace, giving *Y Z* the odd trick and the game.

———

Game XXIV. is from Cavendish. It illustrates the *grand coup ;* but there were simpler ways of winning the game, as shown. Cavendish's reasoning is presented in the bracketed notes. "Mogul" pointed out the incorrectness of the play at tricks 8 and 9,

## GAME XXV.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Hearts*—Kn, 9, 8, 6, 3, 2.       Diamonds—4, 3.
   *Clubs*—Q, Kn, 6, 5.           Spades—5.

$Y$ {
*Hearts*—none.
*Clubs*—A, 10, 9, 7, 4, 3, 2.
*Diamonds*—Q, Kn, 9, 7.
*Spades*—A, Q.

|  | B |  |
|---|---|---|
|  | Tr. H5. |  |
| Y | Z |  |
|  | A leads. |  |

$Z$ {
*Hearts* — K, Q, 10, 7, 5, 4.
*Clubs*—K.
*Diamonds*—K, 2.
*Spades*—Kn, 8, 7, 4.

$A$ { *Hearts*—A.                  Diamonds—A, 10, 8, 6, 5.
   *Clubs*—8.               Spades—K, 10, 9, 6, 3, 2.

*Score :*—Three all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | S6 | SQ | S5 | S7 | 1. *A* leads the antepenulti- |
| 2. | C8 | CA | C6 | CKg | mate. *Z* begins a signal. |
| 3. | DA | D7 | D4 | DKg | 2. *Y* properly leads the Ace |
| 4. | S2 | SA | H3 | S4 | of his long suit. *B* begins a signal. |
| 5. | HA | C2 | H2 | H7 | 3. *Y* changes his suit. To |
| 6. | SKg | C3 | D3 | S8 | force his partner by continuing |
| 7. | D5 | DKn | H6 | D2 | Clubs would be contrary to an important Whist principle, and |
| 8. | D6 | C4 | CQ | H4 | manifestly dangerous. *B* begins |
| 9. | S3 | C7 | H8 | HKg | to signal in diamonds, |
| 10. | D8 | C9 | H9 | HQ | 4. *Z* completes his signal, but |
| 11. | S9 | D9 | HKn | H5 | 5. *B* properly leads trumps, |
| 12. | D10 | C10 | CKn | H10 | despite the signal, having held six originally. The chances are |
| 13. | S10 | DQ | C5 | SKn | against *Z* holding more than five, |

and *B* is leading through his strength. *Z* signals in trumps after opponent's lead, and plays the antepenultimate. He, as it were, *shouts* his strength in trumps.

6. *A*'s not returning trumps *may* not, after *Z*'s play at trick 5, mean that he has none left. But to all the others it should be clear that the chances are he has none. *Y* rightly discards a Club, as *B* holds both the best. *Z* knows *Y*'s suit.

7. If *A* leads a spade here, forcing his partner, and *B* then unwisely resumes the trump lead, *Y Z* will make two by tricks (for *Z* can safely finesse trump 10). But if *B*, being so forced, force in return with Club Queen, *Y Z* will only make the odd trick. *A* rightly leads a diamond, not only to avoid (if possible) forcing his partner, but because he leads through *Y*'s strength.

8. *B* properly refrains from leading trumps again.

The rest of the game plays itself; *Y Z* cannot prevent *A B* from making one more trick.

————

Game **XXV.** illustrates the antepenultimate.

## GAME XXVI.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Spades*—Kn, 10, 5.        Clubs—10, 4.
    *Hearts*—A, Q, 8, 5.        Diamonds—A, 10, 8, 4.

$Y$ { *Spades*—K, 2.
     *Hearts*—Kn, 10, 4,
                       2.
     *Clubs*—Q, Kn, 6, 5.
     *Diamonds*—K, 6, 5.

```
        ┌─────────────────┐
        │        B        │
        │            Tr. S 3. │
        │  Y          Z   │
        │        A leads.  │
        └─────────────────┘
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
$Z$ { *Spades*—9, 6, 4, 3.
     *Hearts*—7, 6.
     *Clubs*—A, K, 2.
     *Diamonds*—Kn, 9,
                       7, 2.

$A$ { *Spades*—A, Q, 8, 7.        Clubs—9, 8, 7, 3.
    *Hearts*—K, 9, 3.          Diamonds—Q, 3.

*Score :*—Love all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C9 | C5 | C4 | <u>CKg</u> |
| 2. | D3 | DKg | <u>DA</u> | D2 |
| 3. | C3 | C6 | C10 | <u>CA</u> |
| 4. | H3 | H10 | <u>HQ</u> | H7 |
| 5. | S7 | <u>SKg</u> | SKn | S3 |
| 6. | C7 | CQ | <u>S10</u> | C2 |
| 7. | <u>SQ</u> | S2 | S5 | S4 |
| 8. | <u>SA</u> | D5 | D4 | S6 |
| 9. | <u>HKg</u> | H2 | H5 | H6 |
| 10. | S8 | D6 | D8 | <u>S9</u> |
| 11. | <u>DQ</u> | H4 | D10 | D7 |
| 12. | H9 | HKn | <u>HA</u> | D9 |
| 13. | C8 | <u>CKn</u> | H8 | DKn |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. The score being at love, $A$ would have been justified, we think, in leading a trump, notwithstanding the weakness of his hand outside trumps. Still there are valid reasons for opening his longest suit; and on the whole it was, perhaps, the safer course. With $A$'s card in Clubs, too, it was not unlikely that the suit would be established at the third round. $A$ knows that the two is with $Z$, unless $Y$ or $B$ is signalling.

2. $Z$ opens his long suit. $Y$ does not hold the Queen.

3. $B$ should have led his own suit, notwithstanding the major tenace. He knows from his partner's lead, himself holding Club ten, that his Hearts are stronger than his partner's Clubs ; and, apart from that, the suit is intrinsically so strong that it was

his duty to show it. But there are players who never will lead from a suit headed by Ace, Queen. The Club two is seen now to be with *Z*, eight and seven with *A*, Queen and Knave with *Y*.

4. *Z* (Mr. J. Clay) has been blamed for discontinuing here his own suit. But there were good reasons; although the event turned out unfavorably. He knew that the Diamond Queen was held by either *A* or *B*. If by *A*, then a Club lead from *A* would give *B* a ruff, likely enough to suit him, as *Z* holds four trumps himself. If *B* holds the Queen, it is likely that, having no Clubs, he holds one or two more Diamonds, and that *A* holds no more. In this case there is danger of a cross-ruff. On the other hand, as *A* led from a weak suit of Clubs, and *B* did not lead Hearts, it looked more than likely that both were weaker still in Hearts, and therefore that *Y* held great strength in that suit. On the whole, though the question is one of probabilities only, Mr. Clay seems to us to have shown his usual judgment in leading what he thought would have been his partner's suit.

5. Having made his tenace, *B* might *now*, at least, have enlightened his partner as to the constitution of his hand. If he had led Ace of Hearts, *Z*, playing the six, would have shown he had no more. Another lead of Hearts would either have forced *Z*, or if, as is probable, *Z* had refrained from ruffing, *A*'s King would have made. Then a Club lead from *A* would have given *B* a ruff; and a final Heart lead from *B* would have given *A* a ruff. A small trump lead from *A* would have given *B* a trick; the next trick would have been made by *A*'s Ace, drawing the King; then the Queen would have made; and the game would have been won. And though it is not sufficient to point thus to results, we think there can be little room for doubt that the game should have been continued thus. But, like many other players, *B*, who would not lead from a long suit headed by major tenace, would not play from a suit led by an opponent, though it was clear the opponent had led from weakness.

6. *B* should have ruffed with the five, Club two being certainly with *Z*.

7. From this point to the end the play is very pretty. *A* can now place almost every card. He knows that *Z* has the winning trump and three Diamonds, probably headed by Knave. He knows that *B* holds the Heart Ace, *Y* the Heart Knave (for *Z* can have no more), and trick 4 shows the Knave is not with *B*. The Knave of Clubs is with *Y*.

10. Leading the losing trump is the only way to win. It compels *Z* to lead Diamonds, while the command is with the enemy;

11. And thus, while *Z* cannot bring in his Diamonds, unless *B* and *A* make a double mistake (*B* discarding a Heart at trick 11, and *A* leading a Heart at trick 12), *Y* is forced either to discard a Heart, leaving *B* the full command, or his winning trump, leaving *A* to make his Club eight.

12 and 13. *A* and *B* make three by tricks, and the game.

———

The above game is from the *Westminster Papers*, and is interesting as one of the latest in which Mr. James Clay took part.

## GAME XXVII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Hearts*—8, 7.
Spades—Q, 9.

Diamonds—K, 8, 6, 4, 3.
Clubs—Kn, 9, 6, 4.

$Y$ { *Hearts*—10, 5.
Spades—K, 10, 5.
Diamonds—Kn, 10,
9, 5.
Clubs—8, 7, 5, 2.

```
        B
Y    Tr. HKn.    Z
              Z
      A leads.
```

*Hearts* — A, K, Q,
Kn.
Spades—Kn, 7, 4.
Diamonds—A, Q.
Clubs—K, Q, 10, 3.

} $Z$

$A$ { *Hearts*—9, 6, 4, 3, 2.
Spades—A, 8, 6, 3, 2.

Diamonds—7, 2.
Clubs—A.

*Score :*—*A B*, 3; *Y Z*, 2.

Note.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | S3 | S5 | SQ | S7 | |
| 2. | SA | S10 | S9 | S4 | |
| 3. | S2 | SKg | H7 | SKn | |
| 4. | H3 | H5 | H8 | HKn | |
| 5. | CA | C2 | C4 | CKg | |
| 6. | H2 | H10 | C6 | HQ | |
| 7. | H4 | C5 | C9 | CQ | |
| 8. | S8 | C7 | D3 | C3 | |
| 9. | S6 | C8 | D4 | C10 | |
| 10. | H6 | D5 | D6 | HKg | |
| 11. | H9 | D9 | CKn | HA | |
| 12. | D2 | D10 | D8 | DA | |
| 13. | D7 | DKn | DKg | DQ | |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A* treats the suit as if it were not headed by the Ace, and leads the penultimate. *Z*, with his grand hand, commences a signal.

2. *B*, who can open nothing to advantage, returns the suit in the hope of making a small trump. *Z* completes his signal.

3. *A* develops the penultimate upon the third round, leaving his partner to draw the proper inference.

4. The lead through the signal is here forced. *A* must have numerical strength in trumps to play as he did. *A* knows by the play of the eight that *B* has no other trump. *A* echoes, notwithstanding the weak lead of trumps and the signal.

5. *Z* clears his suit before continuing trumps. The game seems to him a certainty.

6. *A* leads a trump to draw two for one. *B* is in some difficulty about the discard, as *Z* has declared strength in

trumps, but prefers to discard a Club, as *A* must have also numerical strength in trumps. *Z*, by the fall of the cards, can count three trumps and two Spades in *A*'s hand.

7. Trifling with the game. He should here have led the two best trumps, and leaving *A* with the long trump, then have played Club Queen, in which event he must have won the game.

8. *A* cannot risk playing another trump. If the trumps are both in *Z*'s hand, *A* can never get the lead again. He therefore proceeds with his Spade suit. *Y* discards a Club to inform his partner he has not the Knave. *Z* takes advantage of this information and refuses to trump, trying, though in vain, to recover his position.

9. *A* continues with the last Spade, and as *Y* discards another Club, *Z* knows the position of the Knave, and Discards Club ten, hoping to tempt *A* to lead a Diamond.

10. *A*, of course, plays the losing trump, and throws the lead into *Z*'s hand, and *B* makes his Diamond King. *A* and *B* make two by cards and the game, a result which would have been absolutely impossible if either one or other of the conventional leads had been adopted. The game is another instance of what so frequently occurs at Whist—that a player endeavors to make more tricks than are necessary to win the game.

———

Game XXVII. was sent me, with the notes, by Mr. F. H. Lewis. He added the following valuable remarks :

"Some months ago there was a very able discussion in the *Field* upon the policy of leading Ace, originally, from Ace to four. There was, of course, the objection that such a lead simulated the lead of Ace from five or more. On the other hand, some writers gave their experience that by leading a small card, from Ace to four, they had frequently not made a trick in the suit, the first trick having been won by the adversaries, and the Ace trumped upon the second round. I took no part in the discussion, but I may say, *en passant*, that I am in favor of leading a small card from Ace to four originally, and also in the course of the hand, unless, in the latter case, the play of the previous suits has shown an irregular division of the cards, in which event the Ace might be in danger. I am in favor of leading a small card as above, because I am in favor of uniformity at Whist. I lay no stress whatever upon the argument that uniformity gives information to the adversaries as well as to the partner.

"Success at Whist depends upon the faculty of combination, and the rapidity and accuracy with which correct inferences can be drawn from the fall of the cards; and if information is to be withheld because the adversaries may make use of it for the purposes of their strategy, the whole science of the game is gone. But there may be, and frequently is, what I call an abuse of uniformity; where, in order that his hand may be counted or his cards known, a player will, under all conditions and without reference to the score, play according to conventional rule. Good players will, however, frequently deviate from recognized play, and indulge in what I hope I may be permitted to call the common-sense of Whist.

"To illustrate the last observation, I send you a game in which I played *A*. It will be observed that I had Ace to five and did not lead the Ace, and that I had five trumps and did not lead one. Both conditions were combined in my hand which might have induced one set of players to lead a trump, notwithstanding the Knave turned, and another set to lead the Ace of the suit. In my judgment, either play, although in the direction of uniformity, would have been bad Whist—taking the score into consideration."

## GAME XXVIII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Spades*—A, K, 9, 7, 4.        Clubs—8, 5, 2.
{ *Hearts*—5, 2.                Diamonds—4, 3, 2.

$Y$ {
*Spades*—Q, 10, 6.
*Hearts*—K, Q, Kn, 10.
*Clubs*—7, 4.
*Diamonds*—K, 9, 7, 6.

**B**

*Tr. SKn.*

**Y**                    **Z**

**A** leads.

*Spades*—Kn, 8, 5.
*Hearts*—9, 8, 7, 6.
*Clubs*—A, 3.
*Diamonds*—Q, Kn, 10, 5.
} $Z$

$A$ { *Spades*—3, 2.                Clubs—K, Q, Kn, 10, 9, 6.
{ *Hearts*—A, 4, 3.            Diamonds—A, 8.

*Score :*—Love all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C9 | C4 | C8 | CA |
| 2. | DA | D6 | D4 | DQ |
| 3. | CKg | C7 | C2 | C3 |
| 4. | S3 | S6 | SKg | S5 |
| 5. | S2 | S10 | SA | S8 |
| 6. | H3 | SQ | S4 | SKn |
| 7. | HA | HKg | H2 | H6 |
| 8. | CQ | D7 | C5 | H7 |
| 9. | CKn | D9 | H5 | H8 |
| 10. | C10 | H10 | D2 | D5 |
| 11. | C6 | HKn | D3 | H9 |
| 12. | D8 | DKg | S7 | D10 |
| 13. | H4 | HQ | S9 | DKn |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $A$ leads from the lowest of his long head sequence, that $B$ may play the Ace if he has it, and so get out of the way. $B$ begins a signal. It is true, he has no strength outside trumps, but $A$'s lead implies great strength in Clubs. As original leader, $A$ would not lead the best of a short suit, and whether the nine is the lowest of four-card suit, or the penultimate, $A$'s Club suit must be very strong. $Z$ has nothing between eight and Ace.

2. $B$ again begins a signal.

3. The signal is completed. $B$

having, for reasons not obvious, signalled with the eight instead of the five, *A* might infer that *Z* holds the five, and that therefore he cannot be led to in Clubs by his partner. *Y* would form the same inference, for it is clear to all that *A* led from a quint to King, and the six of Clubs ought not to be with *B*.

6. The two remaining trumps are with *B*. Theoretically, *A* should have discarded a Diamond; but it is not a matter of much importance. For if *A* gets a lead, he must make all his Clubs, and *B* the remaining tricks with trumps.

7. *Y* falls into a fatal error. A single trick will save the game, and a single trick in Diamonds is almost certain, while probably two may be made. On the contrary, if *A* hold the Ace of Hearts, *A* and *B* are bound to win.

8 to 13. *A* makes all his Clubs, *B* the two remaining tricks with his trumps, and *A B* make five by tricks.

NOTE ON *Y*'s PLAY AT TRICK 7.— *Y* knows that four winning Clubs are with *A ;* two long trumps with *B* ; Knave, ten, and another Diamond (at least) with *Z*. He has reason to think that *B* has no Club, and that (from his discard) *A* either has two Diamonds or none; also, perhaps, that Heart Ace is with *B*, unless *B* signalled with absolutely no strength outside trumps. In any case, if *B* holds but one Diamond, leading Diamond King saves the game; whereas, if *A* holds Heart Ace, leading a Heart is the one (apparently) sole way of losing it. Had *B* no Club, it would still have been wrong to lead Hearts.

––––––

The above game, taken from an old number of the *Westminster Papers*, illustrates the important principle that the first thought of the weaker hands should be to save the game.

## GAME XXIX.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Hearts*—K, 9, 8, 7.          Diamonds—Q, 5, 2.
{ Clubs—Kn, 9, 5, 4.          Spades—Q, 9.

$Y$ { *Hearts* — Kn, 10, 6,
{          5, 4.
{ Clubs—Q, 6.
{ Diamonds — A, K,
{          6, 4.
{ Spades—K, 10.

|  |  | **B** |  |  |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|  | **Y** | *Tr. HQ.* **Z** |  |  |
|  |  | **A** leads. |  |  |

*Hearts*—Q, 3.
Clubs—A, K, 10, 8,
          7, 3.
Diamonds—10, 9.
Spades—8, 7, 3.
} $Z$

$A$ { *Hearts*—A, 2.          Diamonds—Kn, 8, 7, 3.
{ Clubs—2.          Spades—A, Kn, 6, 5, 4, 2

*Score :*—Four all.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | SA | S10 | S9 | S3 |
| 2. | S2 | SKg | SQ | S7 |
| 3. | HA | H4 | H7 | HQ |
| 4. | SKn | H10 | D2 | S8 |
| 5. | H2 | H5 | H8 | H3 |
| 6. | C2 | C6 | C4 | CKg |
| 7. | S4 | CQ | C5 | CA |
| 8. | DKn | DKg | D5 | D10 |
| 9. | D3 | DA | DQ | D9 |
| 10. | D7 | D6 | C9 | C3 |
| 11. | D8 | D4 | CKn | C7 |
| 12. | S6 | H6 | H9 | C8 |
| 13. | S5 | HKn | HKg | C10 |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1 and 2. $Y$ and $B$ hold no more Spades, and $A$ holds the three lowest at least.

3. Leading trumps when the score is "Four all" is not generally advisable. In the present case $Y$ should have led Diamonds—King, then Ace, then a little one; this his partner would have ruffed, leading King and Ace of Clubs, and then a little one, which $Y$ would have ruffed (unless $A$ played his trump Ace); then another Diamond lead would have forced the game, whether $B$ played his trump King or not. This was the right line of play at the score.

4. *A* (the Editor of the *Westminster Papers*) rightly forces *Y*, and *B* plays well in passing the trick. The command in trumps thus reverts to him.

5. *B* safely plays the eight, the Knave being certainly with *Y*.

7. *Z* sees that the tenace in Clubs remains with *B;* and, apart from the discard at trick 4, he knows that *B* is weak in Diamonds. *Y*'s play at trick 4 shifted the trump strength, and *B* properly therefore discarded from his weakest suit in playing to that trick.

8. As the cards actually lie, a Club lead here would have won the game, or rather have shown *Y* an easy course to win. But *Z*, our skilful correspondent, Mr. Lewis, would have played very ill—and therefore very unlike himself—had he led a Club here. He sees that the only chance left is that *Y* may be strong in Diamonds, but he has no just reason for supposing *Y* quite so strong as he is. The proper course is to lead through *A*, *B* being certainly weak in Diamonds. Thus *Y* gets the best chance of making two tricks in Diamonds, and winning.

But (8, 9, and 10) *Y* makes his two tricks in Diamonds, and has the game in his hands, yet throws it away. He knows certainly from *Z*'s play at trick 9 that the winning Diamonds are with *A*, and should have been able to form a shrewd guess that *both* *B*'s Clubs cannot be winning ones, or *Z* would not have played as he did. At any rate, the only chance of saving and winning the game lay here. Leading a Diamond at trick 10 was handing the game over to the enemy.

Game **XXIX.**, from the *Westminster Papers*, shows the disadvantage often arising from leading trumps at the score "Four all."

## GAME XXX.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { Spades—A, Kn, 10, 9, 2.          Clubs—5, 4.
     Hearts—5, 4.                      Diamonds—Q, 9, 6, 4.

$Y$ { Spades—6, 5, 3.
     Hearts—A, K, Kn,
              10, 9, 3, 2.
     Clubs—Q, 9.
     Diamonds—A.

B

Tr. S8.

Y          Z

A leads.

$Z$ Spades—K, 8, 7.
    Hearts—Q.
    Clubs—K, 8, 7, 6, 3.
    Diamonds—Kn, 10,
                 3, 2.

$A$ { Spades—Q, 4.                      Clubs—A, Kn, 10, 2.
     Hearts—8, 7, 6.                    Diamonds—K, 8, 7, 5.

*Score :*—Four all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

|      | A    | Y    | B    | Z    | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|------|------|------|------|------|------------------------|
| 1.   | D5   | DA   | D4   | D2   | 1. *A* should have led a Club. *Y* has no more Diamonds. |
| 2.   | H6   | HKg  | H4   | HQ   |  |
| 3.   | H7   | HA   | H5   | D3   | 3. *Z* should have discarded a Club. His head sequence was worth guarding. |
| 4.   | H8   | HKn  | S9   | SKg  |  |
| 5.   | D7   | S3   | D6   | DKn  | 4. *Y* holds all the remaining Hearts—four. |
| 6.   | D8   | H10  | S10  | C3   |  |
| 7.   | S4   | S5   | SA   | S7   | 5. *A* knows that the Queen is with *B;* and he can infer almost certainly from *Z's* discard that *B* holds one more Diamond at least, in which case, |
| 8.   | SQ   | S6   | S2   | S8   |  |
| 9.   | C10  | CQ   | C4   | C6   |  |
| 10.  | DKg  | H9   | SKn  | C7   | 6. Diamond 8 should not have been discarded, but the King; for the King unguarded could only block *B's* Diamonds. But |
| 11.  | C2   | H2   | DQ   | D10  |  |
| 12.  | CKn  | H3   | D9   | C8   |  |
| 13.  | CA   | C9   | C5   | CKg  |  |

probably at this stage *A* did not feel sure that he might not want a re-entering card later.

9. *A* should have led his Diamond King before the Club ten. He knows that *Y* has two Clubs and the three long Hearts; that *B* has the long trump and the Diamond Queen. Now, it matters not whether *B* has three Clubs or two Clubs and another Diamond: *A B* must win on the line indicated, making one trick in Diamonds, two in Clubs, and one with the long trump.

10. Here, says the Editor of the *Westminster Papers*, "the game is evidently lost unless *A* discards the Diamond King; this is almost the only point in the game; and yet, simple as it is, how many players will persist in keeping such a card; nay more, will scold their partner for throwing it away if it should happen to turn out of no avail." *A*, however, only simplified his partner's play by throwing away the Diamond King. Had he retained it, *B*'s reasoning, when about to lead at trick 11, would have run thus: "We must make all three tricks; a trick in Diamonds is certain: but it is equally certain that unless *A* can make two tricks in Clubs we are lost: he certainly has not both Ace and King, or he would neither have led Diamonds originally nor Club ten at trick 9 ; but any way, if he has these cards, we win; if he has not, we can only win by my leading up to him in Clubs." Therefore *B* would have led a Club, and *A* would have made the three remaining tricks. *A* was right, however, in throwing the Diamond King.

———

Game XXX. is from an old number of the *Westminster Papers*, where, however, it was carelessly annotated.

## GAME XXXI.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Spades*—A, 5, 2.  
{ *Hearts*—9, 2.

Clubs—A, Q, 8, 3, 2.  
Diamonds—A, Q, 2.

$Y$ { *Spades*—K, 10, 9, 4, 3.  
{ *Hearts*—A, 7, 6, 3.  
{ *Clubs*—9.  
{ *Diamonds*—K, 4, 3.

**B**

**Y**    *Tr.* S8.    **Z**

**A** leads.

*Spades*—8.  
*Hearts*—K, 5, 4.  
*Clubs*—10, 7, 6, 5, 4.  
*Diamonds*—9, 7, 6, 5. } $Z$

$A$ { *Spades*—Q, Kn, 7, 6.  
{ *Hearts*—Q, Kn, 10, 8.

Clubs—K, Kn.  
Diamonds—Kn, 10, 8.

*Score :*—Four all.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | HQ | H3 | H2 | HKg |
| 2. | CKn | C9 | C2 | C4 |
| 3. | S6 | S3 | SA | S8 |
| 4. | SKn | SKg | S5 | H4 |
| 5. | SQ | S9 | S2 | D6 |
| 6. | HKn | HA | H9 | H5 |
| 7. | S7 | S10 | D2 | D5 |
| 8. | D8 | D3 | DQ | D7 |
| 9. | CKg | S4 | CA | C5 |
| 10. | D10 | D4 | DA | D9 |
| 11. | H8 | H6 | CQ | C6 |
| 12. | H10 | H7 | C8 | C10 |
| 13. | DKn | DKg | C3 | C7 |

### NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. $A$ has Knave, ten, another, almost certain. $Y$ passes, having length in the suit and five trumps.

2. $Z$ leads lowest of his five-card suit. This was before the "penultimate" signal was invented. $Z$ sees that $Y$ has no more Clubs; $A$ $B$ know that he can hold none unless it be the ten.

3. $A$ leads trumps, because, the score being at "Four all," it is important to prevent the enemy from ruffing freely, as seems threatened.

4. $B$, of course, returns the highest of two, so that

5. *A* now finds *Y* with two trumps left. He also finds he has played the adversaries' game.

6, 7, and 8. The play here is simple enough. *Y* draws *A*'s last trump, and leads what must be *B*'s suit. It is the only chance of getting in *Z*'s Clubs. The game at this point looks ill for *Y Z*. The one bit of blue sky is the certainty that neither *B* nor *Z* can have a Heart. If *A* can get a lead after *Y*'s long trump has been forced, the game is lost.

9. The King falls, and *Y*'s hopes are strengthened.

10. He throws the lead again into *B*'s hand, and as

11. *B* luckily fails to take advantage of his major tenace in Clubs,

12, 13. *Z* makes the last two tricks, and *Y Z* win.

————

Game XXXI., from the *Westminster Papers*, shows how a game which seems lost may be saved by care to the last in placing the leads.

## GAME XXXII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Hearts}\text{—none.} \\ \text{Spades—A, K, Q, Kn.} \end{cases}$     Clubs—9, 6, 3, 2.
Diamonds—A, 6, 5, 3, 2.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Hearts}\text{—A, K, 5, 3.} \\ \text{Spades—9, 4.} \\ \text{Clubs—A, K, Q, Kn.} \\ \text{Diamonds—K, 7, 4.} \end{cases}$

|   | B | |
|---|---|---|
| Y | *Tr. H7.* Z | |
|   | A leads. | |

$\left. \begin{array}{l} \textit{Hearts}\text{—Q, Kn, 7, 2.} \\ \text{Spades—10, 3.} \\ \text{Clubs—10, 8, 7, 5, 4.} \\ \text{Diamonds—10, 9.} \end{array} \right\}$ $Z$

$A$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Hearts}\text{—10, 9, 8, 6, 4.} \\ \text{Spades—8, 7, 6, 5, 2.} \end{cases}$     Clubs—none.
Diamonds—Q, Kn, 8.

*Score :—A B*, 3; *Y Z*, 1.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | S5 | S9 | SKn | S3 | |
| 2. | S2 | S4 | SQ | S10 | |
| 3. | D8 | D7 | DA | D10 | |
| 4. | DKn | DKg | D2 | D9 | |
| 5. | H4 | H3 | D3 | HKn | |
| 6. | H8 | HKg | C2 | H2 | |
| 7. | H6 | H5 | SKg | HQ | |
| 8. | H9 | HA | SA | H7 | |
| 9. | H10 | CKg | C3 | C4 | |
| 10. | S8 | CKn | C6 | C5 | |
| 11. | S7 | CQ | C9 | C7 | |
| 12. | S6 | D4 | D5 | C8 | |
| 13. | DQ | CA | D6 | C10 | |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A* leads the penultimate of his long weak suit rather than trumps. The lead is unsound. *Y* begins a signal.

2. *B* leads the lowest of the head sequence to show *A* he holds the others. *Y* completes the signal. Neither *Y* nor *Z* has any more Spades.

3. *B* cannot go on with Spades, since that would be leaving *Z* to ruff and *Y* to discard. He therefore opens his long suit. *Z* begins "the echo of the signal."

4. *Z* completes the echo. The Queen lies either with *A* or *Z*.

5. *B* discards from his long suit, strength in trumps being with the enemy.

6. All the honors are with *Y Z*, who therefore win unless *A B* can make two by cards.  As *Y Z* are sure of four tricks in trumps, and have already won a trick in a plain suit, the case looks almost hopeless, since one more trick will win the game for *Y Z*.  *B* sees that the sole chance is that *A* may hold the long trump and be able with it to bring in his long Spades.  He does not begin *at once*, however, to get out of the way.  If he had allowed the seventh trick to pass before beginning to discard his big Spades the game would have been past saving.  But he had a reason for waiting to the seventh trick.

7. *Y* should at once have led Clubs.  There is only one chance for *A B*, viz., that *A*, holding the winning Diamond, should remain with the long trump.  If he does, then, as he has the three long Spades, he can have no Clubs, and will bring in his long suit by ruffing Clubs after the other trumps are out.  But if he is forced at trick 7 (and he cannot refuse the force) he is powerless to save the game.

8. *Y* having blundered, *Z* follows suit.  They thought the game so sure that no care was wanted.  "A mere 'walk over,'" said *Z*, as he led; and so it was, only the walking was done by the other side.  The discard of the Spade King, at trick 7, should have shown *Y Z* their danger.  That was why *B* delayed the significant discards.

9, 10, 11, 12, 13.  *A B* walk over.

————

Game XXXII. shows how a game may be saved when the holders of winning cards are over-confident.

## GAME XXXIII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} \text{Clubs—A, 10, 8, 6, 4.} \\ \text{Hearts—10, 7, 3.} \end{cases}$    Spades—7.
Diamonds—10, 8, 5, 4.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} \text{Clubs—9, 7, 2.} \\ \text{Hearts—6, 2.} \\ \text{Spades—8.} \\ \text{Diamonds — A, K,} \\ \qquad \text{Q, Kn, 9, 3, 2.} \end{cases}$

|  | **B** |  |
|---|---|---|
| **Y** | *Tr. CQ.* **Z** | |
|  | **A** leads. | |

$\left. \begin{array}{l} \text{Clubs—Q, Kn.} \\ \text{Hearts—K, Kn, 5, 4.} \\ \text{Spades—A, K, 6, 5,} \\ \qquad\qquad 2. \\ \text{Diamonds—7, 6.} \end{array} \right\} Z$

$A$ $\begin{cases} \text{Clubs—K, 5, 3.} \\ \text{Hearts—A, Q, 9, 8.} \end{cases}$    Spades—Q, Kn, 10, 9, 4, 3.
Diamonds—none.

*Score :—A B,* 0 ; *Y Z,* 0.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

|  | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | SQ | S8 | S7 · | <u>SKg</u> | 1. All know that $A$ holds Knave, ten. Position of nine remains unknown to all except $A$. $A$ knows that $Y$ and $B$ have no more Spades, unless one or other is signalling. |
| 2. | <u>H8</u> | H2 | H7 | H4 | |
| 3. | S9 | D2 | D5 | <u>SA</u> | |
| 4. | <u>H9</u> | H6 | H3 | H5 | |
| 5. | <u>CKg</u> | C2 | C4 | CKn | 2. $A$ sees that $Y$ has not been signalling, unless—which is unlikely—he held originally but two Spades, and a singleton in Hearts. $B$ may be signalling. $B$ knows that honors in Hearts are divided between $A$ and $Z$. |
| 6. | C3 | C7 | <u>CA</u> | CQ | |
| 7. | C5 | C9 | <u>C10</u> | D6 | |
| 8. | <u>HQ</u> | D3 | H10 | HKn | |
| 9. | <u>SKn</u> | D9 | D4 | S2 | 3. $A$ leads the nine in order that his partner may know what $Z$ already knows, that $A$ holds quart minor. $Y$ should have trumped |
| 10. | <u>S10</u> | DKn | D8 | S5 | |
| 11. | <u>HA</u> | DQ | D10 | HKg | |
| 12. | S3 | DKg | C6 | S6 | |
| 13. | S4 | DA | <u>C8</u> | D7 | |

even if he had been certain Z held the Ace.  Why, discarding, he selected his splendid Diamond suit, it is impossible to divine.  He may have had some vague idea of keeping a card wherewith to return his partner's suit.  But he should have seen how much better was the chance of bringing in his own suit after ruffing.  *B*, who *is* certain that Z holds the Ace, very properly declines to ruff, that his partner's suit may be cleared.  He sees further that Z will lead at a disadvantage.  He commences another signal.

4. *Z* would probably have led a Diamond, his partner being so weak in Hearts, but for *Y*'s discard.  *B* sees that *A* holds Heart Ace.  *B* completes his signal.  *Y* holds now only Diamonds and trumps.

5, 6, 7.  *A* responds to his partner's signal and the enemy's teeth are carefully extracted.

8. *B* gives his partner the lead, and

9, 10, 11, 12, 13.  The rest of the hand plays itself, *A B* making five by tricks.

———

Game XXXIII. illustrates the importance of clearing partner's suit.

## GAME XXXIV.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Spades*—10, 7, 2.          Clubs—A, 7, 5, 4.
    *Hearts*—10, 9, 3.          Diamonds—Q, 10, 5.

$Y$ {
*Spades*—8, 6.
*Hearts*—Q, 4.
*Clubs*—K, Q, 10, 9,
          2.
*Diamonds*—K, 7, 6,
          2.
}

|   | B |   |
|---|---|---|
| Y | Tr. SK. Z |   |
|   | A leads. |   |

*Spades*—K, Q, 5, 4. }
*Hearts*—A, 8, 2.
*Clubs*—Kn.              } $Z$
*Diamonds*—A, Kn,
          9, 8, 4. }

$A$ { *Spades*—A, Kn, 9, 3.          Clubs—8, 6, 3.
    *Hearts*—K, Kn, 7, 6, 5.     Diamonds—3.

*Score :—A B*, 3; *Y Z*, 3.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | H6 | H4 | H9 | <u>HA</u> | 1. *A* leads the penultimate. |
| 2. | D3 | D2 | D5 | <u>DA</u> | 3. *A* properly discards a Club, having ample strength in trumps. |
| 3. | C3 | <u>DKg</u> | D10 | D4 | |
| 4. | C6 | CKg | <u>CA</u> | CKn | 4. The fall of the ten in the previous trick leaves *B* with either Knave or Queen. *Y* opens his strong suit of Clubs. |
| 5. | C8 | D6 | <u>DQ</u> | D8 | |
| 6. | S3 | S6 | <u>S10</u> | S4 | |
| 7. | <u>SA</u> | S8 | S7 | SQ | 5. *B* gives his partner another discard. |
| 8. | <u>HKg</u> | HQ | H3 | H2 | 6. The lead of trump through the honor is here forced. *Z*, having four trumps, passes, but he ought to have played the Queen, so as to get the lead on the second round. |
| 9. | <u>HKn</u> | C2 | H10 | H8 | |
| 10. | H7 | C9 | C4 | <u>S5</u> | |
| 11. | S9 | D7 | S2 | <u>SKg</u> | |
| 12. | <u>SKn</u> | C10 | C5 | DKn | |
| 13. | <u>H5</u> | CQ | C7 | D9 | |

7. *B* continues; the fall of the cards shows *A* that the small trump is with *B*.

8. *A* now knows that he must continue his suit of Hearts. If he draws the third round of trumps, he is immediately forced, and leaves the long trump with *Z*, to enable him to bring in his Diamond. The fall of the Heart Queen enables *A* to see his way to the game, which now plays itself; but it is a curious fact that the penultimate of the original lead is, legitimately, the last card, and the winning one.

———

Game XXXIV. was supplied (with the notes) by Mr. F. H. Lewis. It is the more interesting that the hands are so well matched. The strength of *A B*, however, is divided, while *Y Z*'s lies nearly all in *Z*'s hands. Thus, I think, *Z* would have done well to lead trumps at trick 2, trusting to get some help from his partner. The game would then have opened as follows:

|  | *A* | *Y* | *B* | *Z* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | H 6 | H 4 | H 9 | <u>H A</u> |
| 2. | S 3 | S 8 | <u>S 10</u> | S 4 |
| 3. | <u>H K</u> | H Q | H 10 | H 2 (a) |
| or 3. | C 6 | <u>C Q</u> | C 4 | C Kn (b) |
| or 3. | <u>S A</u> | S 6 | S 2 | S Q (c) |

In case (a) it is obvious that *A* would be at a disadvantage. He would not force *Y*, the weak trump hand; he could not know that a lead of Ace Spade would draw *Y*'s last trump, and leave him, *A*, free to force *Z*, and he would have no means of determining which of the other suits would turn out the best lead. In case (b), *Y* would lead Spade six, and the cards falling would be those shown for trick 3.

10

## GAME XXXV.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Diamonds*—Q, 10, 9, 4.          Hearts—Q, 7, 4.
   *Clubs*—Q, Kn, 9, 3.              Spades—Kn, 3.

$Y$ { *Diamonds*—8, 6, 5.
     *Clubs*—6, 5, 2.
     *Hearts*—A, 10.
     *Spades*—A, 8, 7, 6, 2.

|   | **B** |   |
|---|-------|---|
| **Y** | | *Tr. D2.* |
|   |   | **Z** |
|   | **A** leads. |   |

*Diamonds*—7, 2.
*Clubs*—A, K, 8, 7.
*Hearts*—K, 5, 3, 2.
*Spades*—10, 4, 9.   } $Z$

$A$ { *Diamonds*—A, K, Kn, 3.          Hearts—Kn, 9, 8, 6.
   *Clubs*—10, 4.                    Spades—K, Q, 5.

*Score :*—*A B*, 3;  *Y Z*, 4.

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | D3 | D5 | DQ | D2 | 1. *A* regards the game as won; because with the four honors nothing can save *Y Z* but making the odd trick, which with such cards as *A* and *B* hold between them (to *A*'s knowledge, after trick 1) seems unlikely. |
| 2. | DKn | D6 | D4 | D7 | |
| 3. | DA | D8 | D9 | H2 | |
| 4. | DKg | C2 | D10 | S4 | |
| 5. | SKg | S2 | S3 | S9 | |
| 6. | S5 | S6 | SKn | S10 | 2. and 3. *B* has shown by the return of the small Diamond that he held four. But *A* is a rather young player, who has not as yet learned duly to notice such points. Accordingly, |
| 7. | C4 | C5 | C3 | CKg | |
| 8. | C10 | C6 | C9 | CA | |
| 9. | H9 | HA | H4 | H3 | |
| 10. | SQ | SA | CKn | C7 | 4. *A* draws partner's last trump instead of the adversaries'. |
| 11. | H6 | S8 | H7 | C8 | |
| 12. | H8 | S7 | HQ | H5 | 5. *Y* does not cover the King, as he sees it is important to win the third trick in Spades, |
| 13. | HKn | H10 | CQ | HKg | |

6. Still *Y* passes the trick.    Apart from the necessity of winning the third trick in Spades, there is a chance that *Z* may win the second.    However, it is won by *B*.    Observe that *Z*'s discard at trick 3 shows *A* that Hearts are *Z*'s longest suit (trumps being declared against *Y Z*).

8. *Z* is quite right, as the game and score stand, to secure a trick in Clubs before leading a Heart.    Every trick has to be made to save game, so that retaining the King-card of opponent's suit would here be of small use.

9, 10, 11, 12, 13.    The rest of the game plays itself.    *Y Z* win the odd trick.

Game XXXV. shows that a game should not be regarded as lost until it is won, nor *vice versâ*,

## GAME XXXVI.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Clubs*—A, Kn, 10, 5, 4.　　　　Hearts—Q, 9, 5, 4.
　　*Diamonds*—10, 5, 3.　　　　　　Spades—3.

$Y$ {
*Clubs*—Q, 2.
*Diamonds* — Kn, 8, 6, 4.
Hearts—K, Kn, 10, 7, 2.
Spades—K, 9.

**B**

**Y**　　**Z**　　*Tr. C7.*

**A** leads.

} $Z$
*Clubs*—9, 7, 6, 3.
*Diamonds* — A, K, 9.
Hearts—8.
Spades—A, 8, 6, 5, 4.

$A$ { *Clubs*—K, 8.　　　　　　　　Hearts—A, 6, 3.
　　*Diamonds*—Q, 7, 2.　　　　　Spades—Q, Kn, 10, 7, 2.

*Score :—A B, 1 ; Y Z, 4.*

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | SQ | SKg | S3 | S4 | 1. *A* rightly leads Queen, from Queen, Knave, ten, to five. |
| 2. | HA | H10 | H4 | H8 | |
| 3. | SKn | S9 | D5 | SA | 2. *B*, holding Heart nine, knows that *Z* has no more Hearts. He knows also that *Y*'s lead is from King, Knave, ten, and others, so that after this round *Y* holds the major tenace in Hearts. |
| 4. | D2 | D4 | D3 | DKg | |
| 5. | D7 | D6 | D10 | DA | |
| 6. | DQ | D8 | H5 | D9 | |
| 7. | CKg | C2 | C4 | C3 | 3. *B* rightly refrains from ruffing, though he knows *Z* holds the Ace. Not only to save his own strength in trumps but to get his partner's suit cleared, he lets the trick go to *Y Z*. All the table knows that the remaining Spades lie between *A* and *Z*. *B* begins a late signal. His hand |
| 8. | C8 | CQ | CA | C6 | |
| 9. | H3 | H2 | CKn | C7 | |
| 10. | H6 | H7 | C5 | C9 | |
| 11. | S7 | DKn | H9 | S5 | |
| 12. | S10 | HKn | HQ | S6 | |
| 13. | S2 | HKg | C10 | S8 | |

would not have justified an early one; but a late one is less imperative.

4. $Z$ should have led through $A$'s strength in Spades. $B$ has indicated length in trumps, so that forcing him would have been good policy for $Z$, who holds four himself.

6. $B$ knows that Diamond Knave lies with $Y$; for since the ten has been already played, the Knave would have been in sequence with $Z$'s nine, and would have been the right card for $Z$ to have led had he held it. Clearly $A$ does not hold it, or he would have played it as in sequence with the Queen and lower.

7. $A$ responds to his partner's signal with his best trump.

9. $B$ now knows that $Z$ holds club nine and three Spades; that $A$ holds a small Heart and three Spades, headed by the ten; and that $Y$ holds the long Diamond and major tenace in Hearts—$A$ $B$ wanting three tricks to win.

10. $B$ does not capture $Z$'s Club nine with his ten, for then he could make only two tricks; but, leading the small trump, lets $Z$ win the trick, who must lead a Spade through $A$'s major tenace.

11, 12. $A$ makes two tricks in Spades,

13. And $B$ one with his long trump. $A$ $B$ win two by cards and the game.

———

Game **XXXVI.** illustrates the importance of inferences made as the cards fall. $B$ knows that he can lose nothing by letting $Z$ take the tenth trick, and *may* win, $Z$ being obliged to lead through $A$'s strength.

## GAME XXXVII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Clubs*—K, 9, 6, 2.      Diamonds—A, Q, 6, 5.
{ Hearts—A, 5, 2.        Spades—10, 5.

$Y$ { *Clubs*—Q, 7, 5.
{ Hearts—Q, 8, 4, 3.
{ Diamonds—10, 4.
{ Spades—A, Q, Kn, 9.

|   | B |   |
|---|---|---|
| Y | | Z |
| | A leads. | |

*Tr. C4.*

$Z$ } *Clubs*—8, 4, 3.
} Hearts—K, 7.
} Diamonds—K, Kn, 9, 7, 3.
} Spades—7, 3, 2.

$A$ { *Clubs*—A, Kn, 10.      Diamonds—8, 2.
{ Hearts—Kn, 10, 9, 6.    Spades—K, 8, 6, 4.

*Score :*—*A B*, 3; *Y Z*, 4.

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | S4 | SKn | S5 | S2 |
| 2. | H6 | H3 | H2 | HKg |
| 3. | H9 | HQ | HA | H7 |
| 4. | C10 | CQ | C2 | C3 |
| 5. | D2 | D10 | DQ | DKg |
| 6. | D8 | D4 | DA | DKn |
| 7. | CKn | H4 | D6 | D7 |
| 8. | HKn | H8 | H5 | C4 |
| 9. | S8 | SQ | S10 | S7 |
| 10. | S6 | SA | D5 | S3 |
| 11. | SKg | S9 | C6 | C8 |
| 12. | H10 | C5 | C9 | D9 |
| 13. | CA | C7 | CKg | D3 |

NOTES AND INFERENCES.

1. *A* should have led his Heart Knave: Hearts are his best suit. *B* from his own hand and the fall of the cards infers that *A* has led from a long weak suit.

3. *B* infers that the winning Hearts are probably with *A*.

4. *A* makes an inexcusable finesse: and in trumps, led by his partner! *B* infers with confidence that the Ace lies with either *Y* or *Z*.

5. It is a fair inference from *Y*'s change of suit that he does not hold the trump Ace. But this is not yet certain.

6. *B* infers that *A* and *Y* have no more diamonds. *Y* certainly has none; therefore *Z*'s Knave cannot have been the higher of the two left; it would therefore not have been led unless the highest of a sequence—that is, unless (ten having been played) *Z* held the nine. Hence *A* can have no more.

7. *B*, very properly, forces his partner. It is now clear to him that *Z* holds the Ace of trumps.

9. At the end of this round *B* threw up his hand. It seemed clear from the play that besides the Ace of Spades, *Y Z* must hold the Ace of trumps: it was therefore apparently idle to continue the contest.

10. *B*'s Diamond is called.

11. His smallest trump is called.

12, 13. *Y Z* make two by cards, and win.

Obviously *A B* would have won the game had not *A*'s preposterous play deceived *B* utterly. But the game has another moral:

Never throw up your cards while there is any possible chance of saving the game, even though that chance may be that your partner has played very badly. Even a good player might through mishap have played as *A* did—either taking hold of the wrong card at trick 4, or overlooking the Club Ace in sorting. Both would indicate great carelessness, but sometimes even good players are careless.

———

The above amusing game was communicated by Pembridge to the *Westminster Papers*. It was described as showing "how to induce your partner to throw up his cards when the game is in his hands."

## GAME XXXVIII.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Diamonds}—\text{Kn, 10.} \\ \textit{Spades}—\text{10, 9, 4, 3.}\end{array}\right.$        Clubs—Q, 8, 3.
Hearts—K, 8, 7, 4.

$Y$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Diamonds}—\text{3.} \\ \textit{Spades}—\text{Kn, 8.} \\ \text{Clubs} — \text{K, Kn, 10,} \\ \qquad \text{9, 7, 6, 5, 4.} \\ \text{Hearts—Kn, 5.}\end{array}\right.$

| | B | |
|---|---|---|
| Y | Tr. DQ. Z | |
| | A leads. | |

$Z$ $\left.\begin{array}{l}\textit{Diamonds} — \text{K, Q,} \\ \qquad \text{9, 8, 2.} \\ \text{Spades—A, K, Q, 7,} \\ \qquad \text{6, 2.} \\ \text{Clubs—none.} \\ \text{Hearts—Q, 6.}\end{array}\right\}$ $Z$

$A$ $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\textit{Diamonds}—\text{A, 7, 6, 5, 4.} \\ \textit{Spades}—\text{5.}\end{array}\right.$        Clubs—A, 2.
Hearts—A, 10, 9, 3, 2.

*Score :—A B, 0 ; Y Z, 2.*

---

NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | D5 | D3 | D10 | D̲K̲g̲ | 1. *A* properly leads trumps from five; and in trumps it is better to lead the penultimate than the Ace. *Z* plays the King, because the Queen was turned up. |
| 2. | S5 | S8 | S3 | S̲K̲g̲ | |
| 3. | D̲4̲ | SKn | S4 | SQ | |
| 4. | H̲A̲ | H5 | H4 | H6 | |
| 5. | H2 | HKn | H̲K̲g̲ | HQ | |
| 6. | D̲A̲ | C4 | DKn | DQ | 3. *B* now knows that all the remaining Spades except the two he holds, or four spades, are with *Z*. Let us see what use he will presently make of his knowledge. |
| 7. | H10 | C5 | H7 | D̲2̲ | |
| 8. | D6 | C6 | S9 | D̲9̲ | |
| 9. | D7 | C7 | C3 | D̲8̲ | |
| 10. | C2 | C9 | S10 | S̲A̲ | |
| 11. | H3 | C10 | H8 | S̲7̲ | 4. Having been forced, *A* does not go on with trumps. He leads Ace from his five-card plain suit. |
| 12. | H9 | CKn | C8 | S̲6̲ | |
| 13. | CA | CKg | CQ | S̲2̲ | |

6. *B* leads trumps (though his partner has discontinued) because of the Queen turned up.   In this *B* was right, as there is good reason for expecting that after this second round *A* would draw two trumps for one.   But *Y*, failing to follow suit, shows *B*'s lead to have been unfortunate.

8. *B* sees that *Z* means to draw out *A*'s last trump, and to bring in Spades, which make up the rest of *Z*'s hand.   But he himself holds second and third best.   So he holds the command in the suit, and has nothing to do but to discard two small Clubs, suffer his Spade nine to fall to *Z*'s Ace, and then, winning the next trick in Spades, bring in his partner's Hearts.   Wherever Club Ace and King may be, this course is absolutely sure, and three tricks must thus be made. But *B* craftily seizes on the only possible course by which every remaining trick can be made over to *Y Z*.

9, 10, 11, 12, 13.   *B*'s triumph and *A*'s discomfiture.

To "Pembridge" is due the theory that *B*'s play in the above game was suggested by malignity.   The theory seems supported by strong evidence, especially as we are told that *B* deliberated for two minutes before playing to trick 8.   He cannot have been deliberating about his play, for there could be no manner of doubt about that. Clearly, a contest was going on between malignity on the one hand and the compunctious visitings of conscience on the other.   Alas, that evil feelings should have prevailed at last!

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The above game, from the *Westminster Papers* (by Pembridge), illustrates Whist Malignity.

## GAME XXXIX.

### THE HANDS.

$B$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Clubs}\text{—10, 7, 6.} \\ \text{Hearts—K, Kn, 7, 5, 4.} \end{cases}$   Spades—4.  
Diamonds—Kn, 10, 6, 2.

$Y$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Clubs}\text{—Kn, 3, 2.} \\ \text{Hearts—A, 10, 9.} \\ \text{Spades—Q, 10, 5, 3.} \\ \text{Diamonds—A, K, 3.} \end{cases}$

| | B | |
|---|---|---|
| **Y** | *Tr. CK.* **Z** | |
| | **A** leads. | |

$\begin{cases} \textit{Clubs}\text{—K, 8, 5.} \\ \text{Hearts—Q, 8, 2.} \\ \text{Spades—Kn, 9, 6, 2.} \\ \text{Diamonds—9, 8, 7.} \end{cases}$ $Z$

$A$ $\begin{cases} \textit{Clubs}\text{—A, Q, 9, 4.} \\ \text{Hearts—6, 3.} \end{cases}$   Spades—A, K, 8, 7.  
Diamonds—Q, 5, 4.

*Score :—A B,* 1; *Y Z,* 4.

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NOTE.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | A | Y | B | Z | NOTES AND INFERENCES. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | SKg | S3 | S4 | S2 | 1. *A* leads from his strongest suit. |
| 2. | SA | S5 | D2 | S6 | 2. The fall of the cards, and the discard of two of Diamonds, the lowest of the suit, shows *A* that no one is signalling for trumps. |
| 3. | H6 | H9 | HKg | H2 | |
| 4. | H3 | H10 | H4 | H8 | 3. *A*, having here two honors in trumps, might very well force his partner, but, having only six and three of Hearts, prefers to give his partner his suit. (See note (*) on next page.) |
| 5. | CQ | CKn | C6 | C5 | |
| 6. | S7 | S10 | C7 | S9 | |
| 7. | C4 | HA | H5 | HQ | 4. *B*, although having no strength in trumps, is here quite justified in returning the Heart. If his partner has avoided forcing him, in consequence of weakness, the chances are that the game is lost. If, however, a cross-ruff can be secured, such a position would be most advantageous. |
| 8. | S8 | SQ | C10 | SKn | |
| 9. | D4 | DKg | DKn | D7 | |
| 10. | DQ | DA | D6 | D8 | |
| 11. | D5 | D3 | D10 | D9 | 5. *Y* sees that a cross-ruff must be secured. He has the tenace in Spades, the best Heart, an honor has been turned; he has the command in Diamonds, and *A* has avoided forcing *B*. All this is too |
| 12. | C9 | C2 | HKn | C8 | |
| 13. | CA | C3 | H7 | CKg | |

much for human nature, and he cannot resist a trump lead ; he therefore leads the highest of his three trumps.

6. *A* is now in a position to force his partner advantageously.

7. The cross-ruff: conveying also to *A*'s mind, from the fall of the cards, that the two remaining Hearts are with *B*.

8. *A* is in a position to give another force.

9. *B* cannot lead one of his long Hearts, such play would be very bad, and accordingly he leads the best of his remaining Diamonds, treating the suit as though he had originally but three.

10. *A* now has the tenace in trumps, but he requires three tricks to win the game. If he keeps the Queen of Diamonds he can make only two ; he, therefore, cleverly throws the Queen, taking the chance of his partner having the ten of Diamonds. The fact being so, he secures four by cards and the game.* The rest of the hand plays itself.

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The above game, with notes, was supplied by Mr. F. H. Lewis. It illustrates the question of "forcing" at Whist. Mr. Lewis appended the following instructive remarks :

"When may I force my partner?" is a question frequently put. There are, undoubtedly, many positions in practice where the thoughtful but inexperienced player finds himself in difficulty. It is easy enough to understand the reasonableness of forcing an adversary who has shown great strength in trumps, or a partner who has shown great weakness. But suppose, for example, as an original lead, a player were to lead from manifest weakness, an honor having been turned to his right, that which, in ordinary cases, appears to be an invitation for a force, would, in fact, amount almost to a direction to lead through the honor. But I will endeavor to lay down the cases when a player, not having trump-strength, may, nevertheless, force his partner : (*a*) When, with no indication of strength, he asks for a force ; (*b*) When the position shows a cross-ruff; (*c*) When the adversaries have signalled ; (*d*) To make the fifth or odd trick ; or to save the game, when the hand of the forcing player, or the development of the game, does not raise a high degree of probability that the necessary trick may otherwise be made. But an interesting point relating to the force is where the player, in a position to force, has trump-strength amply justifying it. It often happens that a player renounces to the lead of his partner, who, with ample trump-strength, has no strength in the then declared suit. If he forces, and the declared suit be not headed by Ace King, or King Queen, the result is, after a force, a lead up to ruinous weakness. No trick is gained by the force, for another trick is lost in the suit. If, however, the player gives his partner his declared suit, the adversaries may infer that he has no strength in trumps, and lead trumps to their disadvantage.

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* If he had forced him, the game would, probably, have proceeded as follows :

| | A | Y | B | Z | | A | Y | B | Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3. | S 7 | S 10 | C 6 | S 9 | 9. | H 6 | H 10 | H 4 | H 8 |
| 4. | H 3 | H 9 | H 5 | H 2 | 10. | C 4 | H A | H 7 | H Q |
| 5. | D 4 | D K | D 6 | D 7 | 11. | C 9 | C Kn | C 10 | C 5 |
| 6. | D 5 | D A | D 10 | D 8 | 12. | C Q | C 2 | H Kn | C 8 |
| 7. | D Q | D 3 | D Kn | D 9 | 13. | C A | C 3 | H Kg | C Kg |
| 8. | S 8 | S Q | C 7 | S Kn | | | | | |

and the result would be two, instead of four, by cards.

### GAME XL.

#### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Diamonds*—A, Q, 10, 8, 3.     Hearts—9, 4.
     Clubs—K, 9, 5.                Spades—8. 7, 5.

$Y$ { *Diamonds*—K, 9, 7,
          5.
     Clubs—8, 4, 3.
     Hearts—Q, Kn, 10.
     Spades—K, 9, 2.

|  | **B** |  |
|---|---|---|
| **Y** | *Tr. DKn.* **Z** |  |
|  | **A** leads. |  |

*Diamonds*—Kn.
Clubs—A, Q.
Hearts—K, 7, 6, 5,
          3, 2.
Spades—A, Q, Kn,
          10.
} $Z$

$A$ { *Diamonds*—6, 4, 2.     Hearts—A, 8.
     Clubs—Kn, 10, 7, 6, 2.   Spades—6, 4, 3.

*Score :*—*A B*, 4; *Y Z*, 4

Note.—The underlined card wins trick.

| | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | C6 | C3 | CKg | CA |
| 2. | S3 | S2 | S7 | SA |
| 3. | S4 | SKg | S5 | S10 |
| 4. | HA | HQ | H9 | H2 |
| 5. | D6 | D5 | DQ | DKn |
| 6. | C2 | C4 | C9 | CQ |
| 7. | S6 | S9 | S8 | SQ |
| 8. | H8 | H10 | H4 | HKg |
| 9. | D4 | HKn | D3 | H3 |
| 10. | D2 | D7 | D8 | H5 |
| 11. | C10 | C8 | C5 | H6 |
| 12. | CKn | D9 | D10 | SKn |
| 13. | C7 | DKg | DA | H7 |

*A* and *B* win the odd trick.

## NOTES AND INFERENCES.

2. It is a question whether Z should not open the Heart suit, but Z's hand is not under consideration.

3. *B* has called.

5. *A* notes that *B* has the three of trumps. *B* can place all the remaining trumps.

9. *Z* ought to lead the Knave of Spades, on which his partner should discard the eight of Clubs, when *Y* and *Z* win the game. *A* plays a masterly *coup* in trumping with the four. His argument is as follows:—My partner, with his weak hand, would not have called for trumps unless he had at least five trumps, two honors. All the other trumps are in *Y*'s hand. I know my partner has the three of trumps, and as it is most probable that he has not Ace and King, or he would have continued trumps at Trick 6 instead of trying to give me the lead again, I shall most likely have to lead twice through *Y* in order to make every trick, which we require to save and win the game. But

even then I shall fail if my partner has to lead trumps up to $Y$. I must therefore give my partner an opportunity of playing the *grand coup* with his three of trumps if he deems it advisable to do so.

9 *cont.* $B$ plays the *grand coup*, undertrumping his partner. If he discards the Club he loses the game. Though $B$ plays extremely well, $A$'s *coup* in trumping with the four is entitled to the palm.

### ADDITIONAL NOTES.

6. $A$ believes in the penultimate game. He drops the two of Clubs to this trick. Therefore there are at least three more Clubs in his hand.

9. $Z$, knowing that there are three more Clubs in $A$'s hand, knows also that $A$ holds only two more trumps; and if he has noted the card played by $Y$ at trick 5, he can infer that both these trumps must be smaller than the five. It is evident, therefore, that in this illustrative hand $A$ derives no advantage whatsoever from his use of the penultimate signal in Clubs. All that he does is that at a critical stage of the game he gives his adversary, $Z$, detailed information as to the position of three of the remaining Clubs and two of the smallest trumps ; and, so far as we can see, $A$'s public intimation as to these facts leaves $Z$ without excuse for his lead of a Heart at the ninth trick, whereby he affords $A$ and $B$ the opportunity, of which they skilfully avail themselves, of pulling a lost game out of the fire.

But further, $A$ has dropped the eight of Hearts to the eighth trick, $B$ the nine, and $Y$ the ten. Therefore the Knave of Hearts is marked in $Y$'s hand ; and both $A$ and $B$ are void of the suit. Moreover, $B$ returned the nine of his partner's suit at the sixth trick, and hence he cannot have more than one Club remaining in his hand. Consequently, when $Z$ leads to the ninth trick, he knows that $B$ most probably holds four of the remaining trumps, together with one Club. Therefore he may count $Y$'s hand to consist of the Knave of Hearts, together with three trumps and one Club. If that Club be the winning Club, $Y$ and $Z$ will win the odd trick whatever $Z$ may now lead. The same thing is true if $Y$ hold the King and ten of trumps. But if the winning Club be with $A$, $Z$'s remaining chances of scoring the odd trick are that among his three trumps $Y$ holds either the King or the ten and the nine. Hence, if $Z$ lead the long Spade he gives $Y$ the double chance, either of discarding in the event of his holding a losing Club, or, in the event of his holding the command of the Club suit, of overtrumping $A$. In other words, the lead of $Z$'s long Spade places $Y$ in the best possible position for winning the odd trick, while the lead of the Heart transfers to $A$ and $B$ the complete control of all the conditions under which they can save and win the game.

Lastly, it needs no proof that at every stage of a game of Whist, and most of all at its most critical stage, the direction of the play ought to be left to the partner who has the greater trump strength. Hence, as the Knave of Hearts may be fairly assumed to be in $Y$'s hand after his lead of the Queen at the fourth trick, it is evident that $Z$ ought to have led a small Heart rather than his King of Hearts at the eighth trick.

Game XL. was sent to the *Field* by Mr. N. B. Trist of New Orleans. Notes by "Cavendish." Additional notes by the Whist Editor of the *Australian.* See Problems VIII. and IX., p. 176.

WHIST-WHITTLINGS, PARAGRAPHS, PROBLEMS, ETC.

# WHIST WHITTLINGS, PARAGRAPHS, PROBLEMS, Etc.

VALUE OF GOOD PLAY.—Many doubt whether good play really counts much at Whist. There is so much chance, unfortunately, in Whist as actually played (it might be immensely improved in this respect) that a casual observer, or one who watches play for only a few weeks, or even months, might very well suppose that bad players have quite as good a chance as the best players. But no one at all acquainted with the game practically can doubt that in the long-run good play must invariably get the better of bad play. Not a Whist evening passes but a practised player will note half a dozen cases or more in which tricks—sometimes two or three at once—have been lost by bad play; while not more than one or two cases will occur during the same time in which bad play has, by an accident, turned out well, or good play ill.

Cavendish's experience should suffice—owing to its wide extent and carefully noted results—to settle this point finally and forever. He tells us that of 30,668 rubbers played from January, 1860, to December, 1878, he won 15,648 rubbers, and lost 15,020, and counting points, which tell far more, he won in all 85,486 points, and lost 81,055, gaining thus a balance of 4431 points. It is practically impossible that so large a balance in his favor should be due to mere chance. The difference must have been due to play. Were two good players matched in as many rubbers against two bad ones, the difference would be far greater.

A correspondent, as a further proof that good play must tell, gives us his experience, which was carefully taken down: In two years' play, he tells us that the first year he played 2069 rubbers, winning 1097 and losing 972, leaving a balance of 125 to the good; and counting points, he won 5893 and lost 5233—a balance of 660 to the

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good. In the next year he played 1626 rubbers, winning 855 and losing 771, or a credit of 84 rubbers, the points being 4701 wins, 4159 losses—showing balance of 542 to the good. In the following year he played 2029 rubbers, winning 1107 and losing 922, leaving 185 balance on the winning; but that year he did not keep a record of points. This is, of course, a much higher winning average than Cavendish's; but, as our correspondent admits the inferiority of his play compared to Cavendish's, probably the element of luck steps in here. He adds that, in his long experience of play, there was never a week, scarcely even a sitting, that he did not see at least one rubber lost by bad play or won by good.

It Didn't Matter.—My partner trumps my best card, or does not trump a doubtful card after I have called for trumps, or commits some other Whist enormity. We win the game, notwithstanding, for we have prodigious cards. If I suggest that there was no occasion to perpetrate the enormity in question, my partner triumphantly informs me, "It didn't matter." This view is altogether fallacious. It did not happen to matter in that particular hand, but my confidence is impaired, and it will matter in every hand I play with that partner for a long time to come.—Cavendish's "Card-Table Talk."

Singular Hand and Singular Ill-Fortune.—The following remarkable hand of cards was dealt to the Duke of Cumberland, as he was playing at Whist at the rooms at Bath, by which he lost a wager of £20,000, not winning one trick. The Duke's hand consisted of King, Knave, nine, and seven of trumps (Clubs); Ace and King of Diamonds; Ace, King, Queen, and Knave of Hearts; and Ace, King, and Queen of Spades. The Duke led a small trump. Right hand of the Duke, five small trumps, all the other cards Hearts and Spades. Left hand of the Duke, Ace, Queen, ten, and eight of trumps; ten, nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three, and two of Diamonds. This hand, after winning the first trick, leads a Diamond. The Duke's partner's hand all insignificant cards.—*Kaleidoscope.* Was the Duke's lead judicious? (See frontispiece.)

In "Cœlebs on Whist" there is a somewhat similar case, only, instead of failing to make a trick, the holder of the strong hand loses

five by tricks. Cœlebs says a lead of trumps from such a hand is wrong. But ninety - nine players out of a hundred would lead trumps; and in my opinion the hundredth would lead wrongly. We must not judge by the event in such cases. The Whist-player can only play according to probabilities; and the chances are in favor of the trump-lead turning out well. It is far more likely, for instance, that, if a Heart is led (the Hearts' suit being already established, be it noticed), the adversary will ruff it, and perhaps establish a cross-ruff, than that the cards would be so singularly distributed in the other hands as they were in this case. Suppose, for example, that the cards had lain thus: The Duke's hand, as above (call it $A$'s hand); $B$'s, small cards, no trumps ; $Y$'s hand, the four trumps named above, no Spades, four Hearts and Diamonds; $Z$'s hand, five remaining trumps, no Hearts, three Spades and Diamonds. Then, if $A$ leads from his long suit, he loses two by tricks, which, with such a hand, and a plain-suit lead, is singular ill-fortune.

HE THAT WILL NOT WHEN HE MAY, ETC.—The following singular combination of cards is worth recording, as it may be made to point a moral. It came under my observation at the Portland, Clay and my father being partners. The game was "Four all." The dealer turned up a small Heart. Clay led a Diamond. The second hand had Ace, King, Queen, Knave, ten, nine, and two of trumps. With these cards, the problem is how to lose the odd trick:

The second hand contrived it in this way. He had no Diamond, and trumped the card led with the deuce of Hearts. My father (third hand) also had no Diamond, and only one trump—the three, with which he overtrumped. In the end, the holder of the sixième major only made his six trumps, his adversaries having six winning cards in the unplayed suits, which neither of the opponents could trump. They therefore lost the odd trick and the game. Had the second player ($B$) trumped with the nine originally, he must have won the game, however the cards lay. For, his partner being dealer, held the trump card, and consequently $B$, by then leading trumps must make seven tricks, even if all the remaining trumps are in one hand against him. No doubt $B$ regarded the chance of the third hand's having none of the suit in which he himself was void as practically *nil*. Nevertheless, he might have made the game practically sure.

The moral is: Never throw a chance away.—" Card-Table Talk:" CAVENDISH.

ALL THE TRUMPS IN ONE HAND.—Two cases were recorded a few years ago in the *Westminster Papers*, and the Editor made the remark that this showed mathematicians to be wrong in stating that the odds were, in round numbers, 159 thousand millions to one against such an occurrence. This was incorrect. It would not be very much out of the way to suppose that among all the Whist-playing nations of the earth a million Whist-parties play per diem; and, say that in each case there are twenty deals. Then it would require only 7950 days, or not much more than 20 years, to give 159,000,000,000 trials. Now, many reason as though this number of trials would give an even chance that any particular hand would be turned up once at least. But this is not correct; there are two possible results in tossing a coin, yet it does not require two trials to give an even chance of tossing head once at least; one trial suffices. The exact odds against the dealer having thirteen trumps are

$$158,753,389,899 \text{ to } 1.$$

Pretty long odds! The odds against the occurrence must, however, be diminished by the circumstance that when a ruffing game has been played, there are several cards of the same suit arranged one in each of several sets of four cards, after tricks are gathered. Supposing them to occupy the same position in each set, which might readily happen, that there is very little shuffling, and that the same suit is trumps in the next hand, it will easily be seen that four or five trumps might be already *en train* to fall to dealer, so that the chance of the remaining trumps falling to him alone would have to be considered. Say the chance of this happening in the case of five trumps, besides the turn-up card, were only $\frac{1}{1000}$. There are thus 20 cards disposed of in the five tricks supposed to have come together, in this special manner, in dealing. There remain 32 cards, one of which is the turn-up. Out of the 31 cards, 7 are trumps, and form one set of 7 out of

$$\frac{31 \cdot 30 \cdot 29 \cdot 28 \cdot 27 \cdot 26 \cdot 25}{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 5 \cdot 6 \cdot 7}$$

possible sets of 7, or 2,629,575. Hence the chance of both events coming off and all thirteen trumps falling into one hand is $\frac{1}{2629575000}$, or the odds only 2,629,574,999 to 1 against the event.

LORD LYTTON AS A WHIST-PLAYER.— Lord Lytton was very fond of Whist, and he and I both belonged to the well-known Portland Club, in which were to be found many of the celebrated players of the day. He never showed the slightest disposition of a gambler. He played the game well, and without excitement or temper, and apparently his whole attention was concentrated upon it; but it was curious to see that at every interval that occurred in the rubbers he would rush off to a writing-table, and with equally concentrated attention proceed with some literary work until called again to take his place at the Whist-table. There was a member of the club, a very harmless, inoffensive man, of the name of Townend, for whom Lord Lytton entertained a mortal antipathy, and would never play Whist while that gentleman was in the room. He firmly believed that he brought him bad luck. I was witness to what must be termed an odd coincidence. One afternoon, when Lord Lytton was playing, and had enjoyed an uninterrupted run of luck, it suddenly turned, upon which he exclaimed, "I am sure that Mr. Townend has come into the club." Some three minutes after, just time enough to ascend the stairs, in walked this unlucky personage. Lord Lytton, as soon as the rubber was over, left the table and did not renew the play.—SERGEANT BALANTINE'S "Experiences of a Barrister's Life."

A CORRESPONDENT, "A. B.," sends the following reasoning (given in a letter to the *Asian*) for analysis. The writer is showing how the odds on the rubber, after one game has been played, are calculated: "Supposing *A B* to have won the first game, there are four different ways in which two games can be played, and only four.

|     | 2d game. | 3d game. |                      |
| --- | -------- | -------- | -------------------- |
| (1) | *A B* win | *Y Z* win | *A B* win the rubber. |
| (2) | *A B* win | *Y Z* win | *A B* win the rubber. |
| (3) | *Y Z* win | *A B* win | *A B* win the rubber. |
| (4) | *Y Z* win | *Y Z* win | *Y Z* win the rubber. |

From this we see that in three of the cases *A B* win the rubber, and in one only *Y Z* win. Hence the odds on *A B* should be 3 to 1." Of course, in cases 1 and 2 the third game is not played, but is only given to show the different ways in which two games can be played.

On this A. B. remarks: "It seems to me that the first two cases are really one and the same, as the third game is not played; and that, therefore, only three ways are to be considered, viz.:

Supposing $A$ $B$ to have won the first game—

| 2d game. | 3d game. | Rubber. |
|---|---|---|
| $A$ $B$ win | ——— | $A$ $B$ win. |
| $Y$ $Z$ win | $A$ $B$ win | $A$ $B$ win. |
| $Y$ $Z$ win | $Y$ $Z$ win | $Y$ $Z$ win. |

Which would make it 2 to 1 on $A$ $B$; but I suppose I am wrong in my deduction."

The reasoning of the *Asian* correspondent is correct. We must consider both ways in which the two games *might* be played for $A$ $B$ to win, although in one case there is no occasion to play the second. The correctness of the result may, perhaps, be best shown thus:

Suppose there were $4n$ trials to determine experimentally the true odds, $n$ being some very large number. Then we know that in about half, or $2n$, of these trials $A$ $B$ would win the first game. In all these $2n$ cases (about) $A$ $B$ would win the rubber. In the other half, or about $2n$ cases, $Y$ $Z$ would win the first game, and a third game would have to be played. Of the $2n$ (about) third games thus played, $A$ $B$ would win about half, or $n$ games, and in each of these cases they would win the rubber. Thus in all they would win the rubber in about $2n + n$, or $3n$, cases out of the $4n$, while $Y$ $Z$ would win in about $n$ cases. Thus the odds in their favor are $3n$ to $n$, or 3 to 1.

Note that the law of probability assures us only that $A$ $B$ will win (the players being assumed of equal skill) in about $3n$ cases out of $4n$, or in $3n \pm r$ cases, $Y$ $Z$ winning in $n \mp r$ cases, where, if $n$ is very large, $r$ will be very small compared with $n$. Thus the proportion of wins to losses will be $3n \pm r$ to $n \mp r$, or $3 \pm \frac{r}{n}$ to $1 \mp \frac{r}{n}$, where $\frac{r}{n}$ may be made as small as we please by sufficiently increasing $n$.

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## CHANCES OF HOLDING CERTAIN HANDS AT WHIST.

A correspondent of *Knowledge* (Mr. Algernon Bray, New York) supplied the following calculations of the chance of holding hands at Whist, in which the cards are distributed among different suits in any possible way:

1 card or 12 cards may be taken from any suit in 13 ways.

2 or 11 cards may be taken from any suit in $\dfrac{13 \times 12}{2} = 78$ ways.

3 or 10 cards may be taken from any suit in $\dfrac{13 \times 12 \times 11}{2 \times 3} = 286$ ways.

4 or 9 cards may be taken from any suit in $\dfrac{13 \times 12 \times 11 \times 10}{2 \times 3 \times 4} = 715$ ways.

5 or 8 cards may be taken from any suit in $\dfrac{13 \times 12 \times 11 \times 10 \times 9}{2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5} = 1287$ ways.

6 or 7 cards may be taken from any suit in $\dfrac{13 \times 12 \times 11 \times 10 \times 9 \times 8}{2 \times 3 \times 4 \times 5 \times 6} = 1716$ ways.

The number of ways in which a complete hand of thirteen cards can be made, having the cards distributed among different suits in a certain way, is obtained by multiplying together the numbers of the ways in which the numbers of cards in the several suits may be taken, and multiplying that product by the number of ways in which the suits can be chosen. For instance, if the cards were divided among the suits thus—1, 3, 4, 5—the number of ways would be $13 \times 286 \times 715 \times 1287 \times 24$; 24 being $4 \times 3 \times 2$, the number of ways of choosing the suits. A hand divided thus—2, 2, 3, 6—might be made in $78 \times 78 \times 286 \times 1716 \times 12$ ways, 12 or $4 \times 3$ being the number of ways in which the suits of 3 and 6 can be chosen, the other two suits having two cards each. A hand composed of three cards of each of three suits and four of the fourth, may be made in $286^3 \times 715 \times 4$ ways, there being only four ways in which the four suit can be chosen.

The following table, made in the manner above indicated, will show the chances of holding any sort of hand, the number of chances in each case being one fourth of the number of the ways in which the hand can be made. The hands are arranged in the order of their respective frequencies:

| Hand. | Chances. | Hand. | Chances. | Hand. | Chances. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4, 4, 3, 2 | 34,213,221,900 | 5, 5, 3, 0 | 1,421,164,602 | 9, 2, 1, 1 | 28,275,390 |
| 5, 3, 3, 2 | 24,633,519,768 | 6, 5, 1, 1 | 1,119,705,444 | 9, 3, 1, 0 | 15,950,220 |
| 5, 4, 3, 1 | 20,527,933,140 | 6, 5, 2, 0 | 1,033,574,256 | 9, 2, 2, 0 | 13,050,180 |
| 5, 4, 2, 2 | 16,795,581,660 | 7, 2, 2, 2 | 814,331,232 | 7, 6, 0, 0 | 8,833,968 |
| 4, 3, 3, 3 | 16,726,464,040 | 7, 4, 1, 1 | 622,058,580 | 8, 5, 0, 0 | 4,969,107 |
| 6, 3, 2, 2 | 8,957,643,552 | 7, 4, 2, 0 | 574,207,920 | 10, 2, 1, 0 | 1,740,924 |
| 6, 4, 2, 1 | 7,464,702,960 | 7, 3, 3, 0 | 421,085,808 | 9, 4, 0, 0 | 1,533,675 |
| 6, 3, 3, 1 | 5,474,115,504 | 8, 2, 2, 1 | 305,374,212 | 10, 1, 1, 1 | 628,342 |
| 5, 5, 2, 1 | 5,038,674,498 | 8, 3, 1, 1 | 186,617,574 | 10, 3, 0, 0 | 245,388 |
| 4, 4, 4, 1 | 4,751,836,375 | 8, 3, 2, 0 | 172,262,376 | 11, 1, 1, 0 | 39,546 |
| 7, 3, 2, 1 | 2,985,881,184 | 7, 5, 1, 0 | 172,262,376 | 11, 2, 0, 0 | 18,252 |
| 6, 4, 3, 0 | 2,105,429,040 | 6, 6, 1, 0 | 114,841,584 | 12, 1, 0, 0 | 507 |
| 5, 4, 4, 0 | 1,973,839,725 | 8, 4, 1, 0 | 71,775,990 | 13, 0, 0, 0 | 1 |

The total number of chances is 158,753,389,900, which is one fourth of the whole number of ways in which a hand can be made. The chances cannot be exactly expressed in much simpler terms than these—the only factors which will divide the whole number of chances and the chances of any particular hand being 100 and the factors of 100. There are, however, only three hands of which the chances cannot be expressed more simply by dividing by 2, 4, 10, 20, 25, or 100.

If it is desired to know the chance of having any sort of hand with the condition that it shall contain, or not contain, a trump, the rule for determining it is as follows: If the hand comprises only two suits, one third of the whole number of chances of having such a hand is the number of chances of having such a hand, one of those suits being trumps; and two thirds of the whole number of chances is the number of chances of having such a hand without a trump. In a three-suit hand the proportions are reversed, two thirds of the possible hands containing a trump and one third not containing one. For, in the case of a two-suit hand, 26 of the 39 cards not in the hand, any one of which may be the trump card, belong to the two other suits; and in the case of a three-suit hand 13 of the 39 cards belong to the other suit. It is equally easy to determine the chance of having a certain hand of which a certain suit shall be trumps, for instance, in a 10, 2, 1, 0 hand, of the whole number of chances of having such a hand, $\frac{3}{39}$ or $\frac{1}{13}$ is the number of chances of having such a hand containing ten trumps, $\frac{11}{39}$ is the number of chances of the hand containing two trumps, and $\frac{12}{39}$ or $\frac{4}{13}$ is the number of chances of the hand containing only one trump. Of course, this applies only to a non-dealer's hand. The dealer being sure to have a trump, the chances of his having such a hand with 10 or 2 trumps, or only 1 trump, are respectively $\frac{10}{13}$, $\frac{2}{13}$, and $\frac{1}{13}$ of the whole number.

## A "YARBOROUGH" HAND AT WHIST.

A former Earl of Yarborough was always ready to wager £1000 to £1 against the occurrence of a hand at Whist in which there should be no card better than a nine.

The bet was decidedly unfair, and if made a great number of times must have resulted in large gains to the person who made it. It is easy to calculate the odds before the deal; after the deal, or if

the cards are cut and the lowest card is known, the odds are slightly altered. In each suit there are five cards, Ace, King, Queen, Knave, ten, above a nine, or in the pack, 20 cards above a nine. From the remaining 32 cards a hand of 13 cards may be formed in

$$\frac{32 \cdot 31 \cdot 30 \cdot 29 \ldots \ldots 20}{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \ldots \ldots 13}$$

different ways. The whole pack, however, will form

$$\frac{52 \cdot 51 \cdot 50 \cdot 49 \ldots \ldots 40}{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \ldots \ldots 13}$$

different hands of thirteen cards. The chance, then, that any hand taken at random will have no card better than nine is represented by the ratio which the former of these amounts bears to the latter, or by the fraction

$$\frac{32 \cdot 31 \cdot 30 \cdot 29 \ldots \ldots 20}{52 \cdot 51 \cdot 50 \cdot 49 \ldots \ldots 40} = \frac{32 \cdot 31 \cdot 30 \cdot 29 \cdot 28 \cdot 27}{51 \cdot 49 \cdot 47 \cdot 45 \cdot 43 \cdot 41 \cdot 2^7}$$

$$= \frac{31 \cdot 15 \cdot 29 \cdot 14 \cdot 27}{51 \cdot 49 \cdot 47 \cdot 45 \cdot 43 \cdot 41} = \frac{31 \cdot 29 \cdot 2 \cdot 3}{17 \cdot 7 \cdot 47 \cdot 43 \cdot 41}.$$

It will be found, on reducing, that this fraction is rather less than $\frac{1}{1828}$, so that Lord Yarborough, if he had been fair (assuming always that he knew how to calculate probabilities) should have offered rather more than £1827 to £1 against the occurrence of the hand in question. It must be understood, of course, that he wagered with one of the players against that player having a "Yarborough," not against the occurrence of a "Yarborough" among the four hands dealt. The chance of this latter event is, of course, greater.

Supposing Lord Yarborough offered a wager of £1000 to £1 to each member of a Whist party, for ten deals, on each of 100 nights in each of ten years, he would have cleared about £18,000.

## SKILL AT WHIST.

The following, from Cavendish's interesting "Card-Table Talk," will be found well worth studying by Whist-players of all classes, good, bad, and indifferent:

In the latter part of the winter of 1857, during an after-dinner conversation, it was remarked by some of the party that Whist is a mere matter of chance, since no amount of ingenuity can make a King win an Ace, and so on. This produced an argument as to the

merits of the game; and, as two of the disputants obstinately main-
tained the original position, it was proposed to test their powers by
matching them against two excellent players in the room.    To this
match, strange to say, the bad players agreed, and a date was fixed.
Before the day arrived, it was proposed to play the match in double,
another rubber of two good against two bad players being formed in
an adjoining room, and the hands being played over again, the good
players having the cards previously held by the bad ones, and *vice
versâ*, the order of the play being, of course, in every other respect
preserved.    The difficulty now was to find two players sufficiently
bad for this purpose; but two men were found, on condition of
having odds laid them at starting, which was accordingly done.

On the appointed day a table was formed in room A, and as soon
as the first hand was played, the cards were resorted and conveyed
into room B.    There the hand was played over again, the good
players in room B having the cards that the bad players had in room
A.    At the end of the hand the result was noted for comparison,
independently of the score, which was conducted in the usual way.
Thirty-three hands were played in each room.    In room A the good
players held very good cards, and won four rubbers out of six; in
points, a balance of eighteen.    In room B the good players had, of
course, the bad cards.    They played seven rubbers with the same
number of hands that in the other room had played six, and they
won three out of the seven, losing seven points on the balance. The
difference, therefore, was eleven points, or nearly one point a rubber
in favor of skill.

A comparison of tricks only showed some curious results.    In
seven of the hands the score by cards in each room was the same.
In eighteen hands the balance of the score by cards was in favor of
the superior players; in eight hands in favor of the inferior.    In one
of these hands the bad players won two by cards at one table, and
three by cards at the other.

The most important result is that at both tables the superior
players gained a majority of tricks.    In room A they won on the
balance nineteen by tricks; in room B they won two by tricks.

It will be observed that this experiment does not altogether elimi-
nate luck, as bad play sometimes succeeds.    But by far the greater
part of luck, viz., that due to the superiority of winning cards, is,
by the plan described, quite got rid of.

Dr. Pole (the *Field,* June 16, 1866) arrives at nearly the same result by a statistical method. He writes to this effect:

"It is very desirable to ascertain the value of skill at Whist.

"The voluntary power we have over results at Whist is compounded of—1. The system of play. 2. The personal skill employed."

The modern system, which combines the hands of the two partners, as against no system (the personal skill of all being pretty equal), is worth—Dr. Pole thinks—about half a point a rubber, or rather more. About 900 rubbers played by systematic against old-fashioned players gave a balance of nearly 500 points in favor of system.

The personal skill will vary with each individual, and is difficult to estimate; but, looking at published statistics, in which Dr. Pole had confidence, he puts the advantage of a very superior player (all using system) at about a quarter of a point a rubber; consequently the advantage due to combined personal skill (*i. e.,* two very skilful against two very unskilful players, all using system), would be more than half a point a rubber.

The conclusion arrived at by Dr. Pole is that "the total advantage of both elements of power over results at Whist may, under very favorable circumstances, be expected to amount to as much as one point per rubber."

Now, at play-clubs, nearly all the players adhere more or less closely to system, and the great majority have considerable personal skill. Consequently, only the very skilful player can expect to win anything, and he will only have the best player at the table for a partner, on an average, once in three times. It follows from this that the expectation of a very skilful player at a play-club will only average, at the most, say a fifth or a sixth of a point a rubber.

PLAYING WITH A BAD PARTNER.—In the face of the immense variety of the style of play one may meet with, the only general advice one can give is, as soon as it becomes apparent that your partner does not understand your own system, observe his play carefully, and endeavor to discover what his peculiarities are; and if you find he has any fixed habits at all, you may in most cases adapt your play to them, and so turn them to your joint advantage. If he cannot, or will not, fall in with your system, you must adopt his, and so en-

deavor, still in defiance of him, to make some sort of a combination, and avoid the cross purposes which are so beneficial to the adversary.—POLE.

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### GAME XXIV. (p. 116).

Referring to this remarkable game, the following passage from Cavendish's late " Card-Table Talk " will be found interesting:

" Of course I seldom played at the same table with my father at the Portland," writes Cavendish. " But it occasionally happened that there was only one table, and that we must either play together or lose our amusement. On one of those afternoons I was *Z* in Hand No. XXIV., and my father was *B*. By reference to the game " (p. 116) " it will be seen that I played the *grand coup* against him. My partner was a very good player. When the game was over the following conversation took place:

" *K*. (my partner to me).—' You trumped my best diamond.'

" *Ego*.—' I know I did. We won the trick by it.'

" *K*.—' I don't see how you could win a trick by trumping a winning card.'

" I should mention that my father had seen the position as well as I had, that he knew I had three trumps (as was clear after my discard at trick 8), and that he was waiting to be led to in trumps. I noticed, too, from his manner, that he hardly knew whether to feel pleased at my good play, or annoyed at being outmanœuvred.

" *Ego* (to *K*).—' Ask " the governor " if we didn't.'

" *Pater* (gruffly).—' Of course you did, of course you did.'

" I afterwards told Clay of this *coup*, and he was good enough to say that he admired the discard of the King of Spades at trick 8. He also chaffed ' the governor ' a bit about my unfilial conduct."

MAXIM.—The best Whist-player is he who plays the game in the simplest and most intelligible way.—*Clay*.

FORCING.—Speaking of the rule, " When weak in trumps do not force your partner," Col. Drayson makes the following sound remarks: " It does not mean *never* force your partner if weak in trumps yourself; but it means, if you see a good chance of making more tricks by not forcing your partner than you could make by forcing him, then refrain from the force; but you should always re-

member it does not follow that your partner *must* take a force, even though you offer it him.   He may conclude, and erroneously, that you are strong in trumps; but he would not conclude so unless he were considerably impressed with the importance of the advice, ' do not force your partner if weak in trumps.'   Many players, influenced by this recommendation, will frequently throw away a game in consequence of their fertile imagination."

## "DO YOU PLAY WHIST?"

It is amusing to compare the answers given to this question with the results observed when the game has fairly begun.   "Do you play Whist?"   "Certainly! I have played Whist for years, and I flatter myself I know something about it by this time."   The game begins, and you find the gentleman who has answered so confidently knows simply nothing about the game beyond the rules for following suit, counting honors, and so forth, which a beginner is taught in the first ten minutes of his acquaintance with Whist.   He not only has no idea of Whist as a game in which each player has a partner, but he does not even know how to play his own hand.   He leads out every winning card, weakens his trumps recklessly in ruffing, when — if he knew anything of the game — he would see that by leading trumps, or at any rate reserving his force in trumps, he might bring in a long suit.   He, perhaps, has just so much thought of his partner as to return whatever suit his partner may have led.   Very likely he does this when it is his clear duty to show his own suit, or when it should be obvious from the play that his partner has led from weakness.   Or, again, he may so far think of his partner as to force him whenever he gets the chance, though as often as not forcing means disarming.

Another tells you he plays Whist well, who has indeed an idea of the general principles on which sound play should depend, but knows none of the details essential to the application of these principles in a practical way.   He knows, for instance, that when you lead trumps you generally want trumps exhausted; but he imagines he does enough in helping you to this end when he returns your trump lead.   He is perplexed and aggrieved when you tell him that by returning the wrong card he has utterly foiled all your plans. Thus, holding Ace, Queen, nine, and two of trumps, you lead, let us

say, the two, on which fell seven, King, and five; he returns the three, on which fall the six, your Queen, and eight on your left. Now, so soon as he played the three, you were justified in assuming (if he knows how to play the game) that he holds the four and another; for neither of the opponents holds the four, and you have it not yourself; therefore he must have the card; and, having both the four and the three, he should return the four, if he holds no other: so that, as he returns the three, you assume he holds another. You play the Ace, the ten falls on your left, your partner plays the four, and the fourth player discards from a plain suit. You believe all the trumps to be extracted from the enemy; and, moreover, that you and your partner are four by honors. Acting on this belief, you play out King-cards which you would otherwise have retained; and then you bring in your partner's long suit, which had been already, we will suppose, established. But, to your disgust, you find that your opponent on the left still holds the Knave, with which he stops your long suit; brings in his, with which he finally forces out your long trump, and, having no card in your partner's suit, you are obliged to lead either from one of the adversaries' suits or from a suit in which they hold the King-card, so that they bring in their winning cards. *Then*, perhaps, you waste time trying to convince your partner that his playing the three before the four made all the difference, with no other result but to be rebuked by him for giving up the command in your adversaries' suits; a mistake which, but for your explanation, he would have known nothing about, and which would not have been a mistake at all if his play had really meant what to every understanding Whist-player it implied. Where you really mistook was in assuming that because he said he could play Whist he knew something about the elementary rules of the game.

Players who make such blunders as these are apt to argue, when, after a time, it becomes clear to them how badly they play, that, as they cannot get to remember what cards have been played and by whom, to notice the signal, and so forth, it is not worth their while to learn such minutiæ as the return of the proper card from two or from three. But that is just where they are mistaken. These points should not be regarded as minutiæ, but as the A B C of the game. It may be difficult to attend closely to the fall of the cards, to draw the right inferences, and to retain to the end what has thus

been learned, but it is not at all difficult to fall into the constant habit of returning the highest card of two, the lowest of three, left in the hand after the first round of a suit. It is noteworthy, too, how care in such matters helps to aid the memory and keep alive the attention. After learning to return the right card, you very soon find yourself noticing the card returned by your partner, or by the adversaries to each other. Next you find that when thus informed as to the number of cards of different suits in different hands, you presently begin to recognize where the individual cards of the suit must lie. The more you notice, the easier it is to retain what you notice in your recollection—precisely as Mr. Proctor, I do not doubt, finds it much easier to recollect new astronomical measures than most of us do, because, having already a number of such measures in his memory, new ones fit themselves in among the rest, so as to be more easily remembered.

## PLACING CARDS AT WHIST.*

*B* holds the following hand:

> *Spades.*—Ten, nine, six, five.   (Trumps.)
> Hearts.—Ace, Queen, four, two.
> Diamonds.—Queen, six.
> Clubs.—Ace, ten, eight.

And the first four tricks are as follows, the underlined card winning trick, and card below leading next:

|     | *A*    | *Y*    | *B*    | *Z*    |
|-----|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1.  | C 6    | C Kn   | C A    | C 3    |
| 2.  | H 9    | H 5    | H 2    | H 10   |
| 3.  | D 8    | D Kn   | D Q    | D 4    |
| 4.  | S Kn   | S A    | S 5    | S 7    |

After these four tricks have been played, *B* is able to place every card, supposing that all the players have followed the usual rules for play.

What we have said about Whist leads and two general rules, one for second, the other for third player, suffice to give the solution of

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this problem. These are, first, that second player, if he has a sequence of two high cards and one small one, plays the lowest of the sequence second hand on a small card led; secondly, that third in hand plays highest if he has any card higher than (and not in sequence with) his partner's lead, and no sound finesse open to him, but otherwise plays his lowest.

*First Trick.*—*A* has led the lowest from four at least (it should have been noticed that the inventor of this hand did not accept the rule for penultimate lead). Since two is not in *A*'s hand, nor in *Z*'s, for *Z*'s lead third hand shows he was not signalling for trumps, and *B* has it not himself, it must lie with *Y*. But no other small card can be in *Y*'s hand, who would only play Knave, having the two, if he held Queen, Knave, two, and no more. Hence four and five lie with *Z*, and no more, for *A* must have four Clubs. Thus the Clubs were originally distributed as follows:

With *Y*, Queen, Knave, two; with *Z*, five, four, three; with *B*, Ace, ten, eight; and the rest, viz., King, nine, seven, and six, with *A*.

*Second Trick.*—*A* has no Hearts above ten, and his play of nine shows he has none lower. Hence, *A* only holds Hearts nine. As *Y* plays the five, he does not hold the three (he had not begun a signal in first round, as *B* knows, holding Club ten in his own hand). Hence, Hearts three must be held by *Z*, and as he played ten, having the three, he must have the Knave, but no others. Hence, the Hearts lay originally as follows:

With *A*, the nine; with *Z*, Knave, ten, three; with *B*, Ace, Queen, four, two; and the rest, viz., King, eight, seven, six, and five, with *Y*.

*Third Trick.*—Diamonds four is the lowest of four at least. *A* has no card below the eight, hence the two and three must be with *Y*, as *A* is certainly not signalling. We know also that *A* has not five trumps, or he would have begun with one; hence, as he had originally four Clubs, one Heart, and fewer than five trumps, he must have more than three Diamonds. Since eight is his lowest, and *Z* has led from four at least, *B* having Queen, six, and *Y* Knave, three, two, it follows that *Z* must have held seven, five, four, and either Ace or King, showing that *A* must have had eight, nine,

ten, and either Ace or King. But $A$'s first lead shows that $A$ must have the Ace and not the King, for he would not have led Clubs from six, seven, nine, King, if he had had eight, nine, ten, King of Diamonds; though, following Clay's rule, he would have led a Club if holding eight, nine, ten, Ace of Diamonds, reserving the Ace-headed long suit to get in with later. Thus the Diamonds lay originally as follows:

With $Y$, Knave, three, two; with $A$, eight, nine, ten, Ace; with $B$, Queen, six; and the rest, viz., King, seven, five, four, with $Z$.

*Fourth Trick.*—$B$ knows already that $A$ holds four Spades; $Y$, two Spades; and $Z$, three. As $Z$ plays the seven, the only cards left which can make up his remaining two are the eight, the Queen, and the King. He cannot have both Queen and King, or he would have played the Queen. He must have, then, either eight Queen or eight King. But if he had the Queen, King would lie with $A$, and $A$ would not have finessed the Knave holding King, Knave, and two others. Therefore $Z$ held King, eight, seven. $Y$'s other card must be a small one, and Spades were originally distributed as follows:

$Z$—King, eight, seven; $B$—ten, nine, six, five; $Y$—Ace, two (or three, or four); and the rest, viz., Queen, Knave, four, three (or four, two, or three, two), with $A$.

The doubt as to the actual value of the small Spade in $Y$'s hand can hardly be said to affect the statement that $Z$ knows the position of every card in the pack, for the two, three, and four are in this case of practically equal value.

We would now leave our Whist readers to explain why $B$ led trumps fourth round, when, with his knowledge of the position of cards, he might, one would say, have led his only remaining Diamond, through $Z$'s King, enabling $A$ to make the trick with the nine.

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## THE CHILIAN METHOD OF SCORING AT WHIST.*

No honors are counted, and the score is kept in the same way as at Short Whist, with the addition of points for the tricks which one

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*Sent by a correspondent to *Knowledge*.

side make more than the other during the rubber. By the usual method, one side may win, even without the assistance of honors, having made fewer tricks than the losers, and good cards beyond those required for the necessary number of tricks are thrown away. The marking is easily done by each player keeping a score—one, on each side, the usual score; the other the $+$ and $-$ account: *e. g.*, let $A$, $B$, $C$, $D$, be players—



1st Game.—1st hand.  $A\,C$ win 4 by tricks.
          2d    ''    $B\,D$  ''  3   ''
          3d    ''    $A\,C$  ''  5   ''

|  | Score at Short Whist. | Chili Score. |
|---|---|---|
| 1st hand. | $A$ scores 4 | $C$ scores 4. |
| 2d   '' | $B$  ''  3 | $C$ marks off 3, leaving $A\,C$ $(4-3)=1.$ |
| 3d   '' | $A$  '' single | $C$ scores $5+1=6.$ |

Thus $A\,C$ start the 2d game with a single and 6 points to the good. The usual method would have left them with 4 tricks unscored.

Let us take one *extreme* example of the English game with and without honors, and the Chilian game :

### Counting Honors.

1st Game.—1st hand.  $A\,C$ win 4 by tricks, $\Big\}$ $A\,C$ win treble.
          2d   ''   $A\,C$  ''  7   ''
2d Game.—1st   ''   $A\,C$  ''  4   ''
          2d   ''   $B\,D$  ''  1 trick $+$ 4 honors, $B\,D$ win single.
3d Game.—1st   ''   $A\,C$  ''  4 by tricks.
          2d   ''   $B\,D$  ''  1 trick $+$ 4 honors, $B\,D$ win single.

Thus $B\,D$ win the rubber (1 point) with 2 tricks only gained against $A\,C$'s 19.

### Not Counting Honors.

Let $B\,D$ in the 2d hand of the 2d and 3d game win 5 tricks. They then win one point with 10 tricks against $A\,C$'s 19.

CHILIAN METHOD.—$A\,C$ instead of $B\,D$ win (8 points) $19-10-1$, as they ought to do, though it is very unusual to lose the rubber and yet win points.

To mark a high score, it is not necessary to use many counters , . . . . $= 5$, : . . . 6, . : . . $= 7$, etc., or any better way.

It is an objection to win the rubber and yet lose points, but this is not so objectionable as to win the rubber with 2 tricks against 19, or even with 10 against 19

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## UNSCIENTIFIC AMERICAN WHIST.

When I wrote, in *Longman's Magazine*, an article on the science of the game of Poker—which may be called a thoroughly American game—many journalists in America expressed their doubts whether I should not be altogether beaten at the game itself by men who know nothing of the scientific principles which are really involved in the game. I think this not unlikely, considering that I have never taken a hand at the game—to which I may add that I am never likely to do so, the game being a purely gambling one, and gambling, in my opinion, a degrading practice for any above the condition of the savage. But, during my recent stay in America, I have had occasion to play pretty frequently at the more scientific game—Whist—and I have been led to notice certain peculiarities in the way in which Americans play this game (growing gradually in favor among them) which shows that they have still much to learn. Of course, nothing of what I am about to say is intended to apply to those Americans who know and appreciate what may be called the European method of playing Whist; only to those, ninety-nine I think out of a hundred, who regard themselves as good Whist players, but are not acquainted with, or despise, the conventional language of the game.

I note, first, that Americans very sensibly object to the part which honors play in Whist at home. The utmost they will allow honors to count is one half our estimate. That is to say, if two partners hold three honors out of the four, they count "one" only, instead of "two;" if they hold all four they count "two" instead of "four." But most Americans prefer to count nothing for honors. In one sense this is good, for it makes more depend on skill, and Whist is a game of skill; in another sense, however, it rather injures the game, because it eliminates those pretty positions which frequently arise where the saving of a game or of a point depends on making a certain number of tricks, counting before honors already declared against you. Looking keenly out for the honors, or indications of their position, a good player sees that such and such

tricks must be made to save the game, and plays simply to make them, entirely changing his tactics, perhaps, for the purpose.

Again, Americans prefer long Whist to short; and here, again, the game loses certain points of great interest, arising when the play depends on details of the score.

But the chief point which is noticeable in American Whist-play is that which Deschapelles (far and away the greatest Whist-player ever known) called the most detestable fault a Whist-player can have: Americans at Whist are inveterate "players of their own hand." They will not admit, or cannot see, the advantage (in nine cases out of ten) of that system by which each player regards his own hand and his partner's as one—a system by which the game is made really scientific. For this system the general rule holds that it is better to inform your partner than to deceive the enemy. The American who considers himself strong at Whist adopts, instead, the principle that it is best to play a dark game. He reasons that by playing dark he hides his own hand from the adversaries, while, if they play the open game, he knows something about their hands —a manifest advantage, if his unfortunate partner had no part to play. But as the partner is equally deceived, and, so far from helping, is likely to obstruct, the mischief much outbalances the advantage of the dark game. This I had known theoretically long since. But never till I played Whist in America did I have such clear proof of the fact as I have recently had. I have played repeatedly with a partner who knows the Whist language, against two partners, each of whom plays his own hand with considerable skill. Repeatedly I have been perplexed by the play of one or other of the adversaries, and occasionally I have seen that they have been able to make use to their advantage of those indications by which I and my partner show the cards we hold in particular suits. But I have satisfied myself that at least one trick in ten is gained in the long run (by which I mean that ten tricks are made for nine) by playing the open game, the two partners working together against two adversaries working separately.

Among the methods of play arising from this one-hand (or myown-hand) system is the practice of leading from a short suit or a singleton, if no suit has much strength. This Americans do quite irrespectively of the question whether they hold few or many trumps. It is bad enough to lead thus, even when you hold only

two or three trumps; but to lead from a singleton or a two-card suit when you hold four trumps is surely a Whist atrocity of the first magnitude. You get your anxiously desired ruff, and presently find that your partner has a fine suit, which only needed that fourth trump of yours to be brought in; instead, however, the enemy lead trumps, get the command in them owing to your cleverness, bring in their good suits, and make a great game. To which must be added that while, by leading from a very short suit, you fail to tell your partner which is your long suit, you quickly disclose to the whole table which is your weak suit: you omit to give your partner the only kind of information which, as a rule, can really be of use to him, and give the enemy just that kind of information which is most useful to them. For, as double dummy shows, there is no information at Whist more useful than that which tells where the weak suits of the enemy lie.

It will be understood that Americans like to play a ruffing game, and are in their glory when they get a cross-ruff. (In fact, the only excuse for leading from a singleton is the chance of establishing a cross-ruff.) I roused intense wrath in an American partner when, after he had established a cross-ruff, I broke it by leading trumps. I had five, and a strong suit which had been established; he had led me a suit which I had been obliged to trump, and I could have led him twice from a suit he could ruff. We should thus have made by the cross-ruff five tricks, but no more, and two of these would have been sure ones anyhow. But, of course, I played no such game. I led trumps to stop the cross-ruff; got out all the trumps (making three tricks in that suit besides the two ruffs), brought in my strong suit, making three tricks in that, or eight instead of five. Yet he never ceased to rebuke me for stopping a cross-ruff which would have ruined us.—MR. RICHARD A. PROCTOR in the *Newcastle Weekly Chronicle.*

## PROBLEMS.

### PROBLEM I.

Lieutenant-Colonel Drayson gives the following ingenious little double-dummy puzzle: Give the adversaries four by honors in every

suit; give yourself and partner any of the other cards you choose; and win five by cards against them, you to have the lead.

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## PROBLEM II.—AN EASY DOUBLE-DUMMY PROBLEM.

Colonel Drayson gives the following amusing example (which occurred to himself at double-dummy) of the difference between practical and theoretical Whist. As he says, if any player had played at Whist as it is necessary to play in the following case, he would probably have been accused of trying to lose the game:

### THE HANDS.

| A | Y |
|---|---|
| *Hearts*—10, 6, 4. | *Hearts*—A, K, Q, Kn. |
| Spades—A. | Spades—K, 10, 7, 4. |
| Clubs—A, K, Q. | Clubs—10, 7, 4. |
| Diamonds—10, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3. | Diamonds—K, 2. |

Center box: **B** / *Tr. H9.* / **Y** ... **Z** / **A leads.**

| B | Z |
|---|---|
| *Hearts*—5, 3, 2. | *Hearts*—9, 8, 7. |
| Spades—9, 8, 5, 3, 2. | Spades—Q, Kn, 6. |
| Clubs—none. | Clubs—Kn, 9, 8, 6, 5, 3, 2. |
| Diamonds—A, Q, Kn, 9, 8. | Diamonds—none. |

*Score:—A B*, 4; *Y Z*, Love.

*Y Z* to save (and win) the game.

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## PROBLEM III.—DOUBLE-DUMMY ENDING.

### By Mr. F. H. Lewis.

*A*—S A, 2;  D A, 6, 4;  H K, 10.
*Y*—S 9, Q;  D Q, K;  C 9;  H 6, Q.
*B*—S 10, K;  C 5, 10;  H 3;  D 7, 10.
*Z*—S 3, 8;  H 4, 8;  C Kn;  D 5, 8.

Spades trumps.  *B* to lead, and *A B* to make all seven tricks.

## Problem IV.

### The Hands.

| A holds | | Y holds |
|---------|---|---------|
| Spades—9, 6. | | Spades—10, 8. |
| Diamonds—Kn, 5. | | Hearts—9, 7. |

B
Tr. S.
Y          Z
A leads.

| B holds | Z holds |
|---------|---------|
| Spades—5, 2. | Spades—Q, 3. |
| Diamonds—10, 3. | Hearts—4, 2. |

*Score :—A B, 4; Y Z, 2.*

Two honors have been played by *Y Z*, one honor by *A*, so that *Y Z* hold two by honors, to *Z*'s knowledge. *A B* have turned six tricks.

*A* having led Diamond Knave, how is *Z* to play to save and win the game ?

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## Problem V.—Double-dummy.

### The Hands.

| A | | Y |
|---|---|---|
| Hearts—Kn, 6. | | Hearts—K, 8, 7. |
| Clubs—5, 3, 2. | | Clubs—9, 8, 7, 4. |
| Diamonds—A, Q, Kn, 6, | | Diamonds—2. |
| Spades—A, Q, Kn.  [5. | | Spades—6, 5, 4, 3, 2. |

B
Tr. H 2.
Y          Z
A leads.

| B | Z |
|---|---|
| Hearts—A, Q, 10, 9, 4, 3. | Hearts—5, 2. |
| Clubs—10, 6. | Clubs—A, K, Q, Kn. |
| Diamonds—3. | Diamonds—K, 10, 9, 8, |
| Spades—10, 9, 8, 7. | Spades—K.  [7, 4. |

The lead being with *A*, *A B* make every trick.

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## Problem VI.—Simple Ending.

### By Mr. F. H. Lewis.

*A*'s cards.  H A, 10 ; S 10 ; D Kn, 7.

*Y*'s cards.  C K ; H Kn ; S Kn, 2 ; D 9.

*B*' cards.  C A, 5 ; S 4 ; D 4, 2.

*Z*'s cards.  H K, 5 ; S 6 ; D 10, 5.

Clubs trumps ; *A* to lead ; *A B* to make all five tricks.

### PROBLEM VII.—SIMPLE ENDING.

#### By Mr. F. H. Lewis.

A's cards.   *C* A, Kn ;   H 6 ;   S 4 ;   D 10, 9, 8.
Y's cards.   *C* 10, 7 ;   H A, Kn ;   S Q, 10, 2.
B's cards.   H K, 7, 4 ;   S K, 9 ;   D A, Q.
Z's cards.   *C* 9, 6 ;   H 9, 8 ;   S 8, 7, 6.

Clubs trumps; *A* to lead; *A B* to make all seven tricks.

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### PROBLEMS VIII. AND IX.

| Y held | B held |
|---|---|
| *Diamonds*—K, 9, 7. | *Diamonds*—A, 10, 8, 3. |
| Club—8. | Club—5. |
| Heart—Kn. | |
| | |
| A held | Z held |
| *Diamonds*—4, 2. | Hearts—7, 6, 5, 3. |
| Clubs—Kn, 10, 7. | Spade—Kn. |

It was *Z*'s lead, and *A B* must make every trick to save and win the game. *A*, the original leader, had shown by leading the penultimate that he held five Clubs, of which three remain in his hand. This is known to the whole table. *B* had signalled for trumps, and from the play it is clear that he now holds four trumps one honor. Moreover, this honor must be the Ace or the game is lost. *A* further knows that his partner holds trump three. *Z* knows from the play that *A* holds both four and two of trumps. He also knows that the Knave of Hearts is with his partner, and that *Y* holds a Club which, if the winning Club, insures the game. The game is also sure if *Y* holds the King and ten of trumps.

1. How is *Z* to play to make sure of winning if *Y* play correctly, even though *Y* shall be found to hold a losing Club, but with either King nine, or ten nine of trumps, besides a small one ?

2. *Z* actually led a Heart; how can *A B* now save and win the game ?

PROBLEM X. — GREAT VIENNA COUP AT DOUBLE - DUMMY, AS
GIVEN BY CLAY.

|  | THE HANDS. |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **A** |  | **Y** |
| *Clubs*—A, K, Q, 3. |  | *Clubs*—8, 6, 5. |
| Hearts—2. |  | Hearts—10, 9, 7, 6, 5. |
| Spades—A, Q. |  | Spades—K, 6. |
| Diamonds — A, Q, 7, 6, 4, 3. |  | Diamonds—Kn, 10, 8. |

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                          B
                  Y           Tr C.
                              Z
                  A leads.
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
| **B** |  | **Z** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Clubs*—7, 4, 2. |  | *Clubs*—Kn, 10, 9. |
| Hearts—A, K, Q, Kn, 3. |  | Hearts—8, 4. |
| Spades—Kn, 10, 3. |  | Spades—9, 8, 7, 5, 4, 2. |
| Diamonds—5, 2. |  | Diamonds—K, 9. |

*A* leading is to make every trick.

WHIST LAWS, GLOSSARY, SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS

# WHIST LAWS, GLOSSARY, SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS.

## THE LAWS OF SHORT WHIST.

### (*Verbatim from the Club Code.*)

#### THE RUBBER.

1. THE rubber is the best of three games. If the first two games be won by the same players, the third game is not played.

#### SCORING.

2. A game consists of five points. Each trick, above six, counts one point.

3. Honors, *i. e.*, Ace, King, Queen, and Knave of trumps are thus reckoned:

If a player and his partner, either separately or conjointly, hold—

> I. The four honors, they score four points.
> II. Any three honors, they score two points.
> III. Only two honors, they do not score.

4. Those players who, at the commencement of a deal, are at the score of four, cannot score honors.

5. The penalty for a revoke takes precedence of all other scores. Tricks score next. Honors last.

6. Honors, unless claimed before the trump card of the following deal is turned up, cannot be scored.

7. To score honors is not sufficient; they must be called at the end of the hand; if so called, they may be scored at any time during the game.

8. The winners gain—

> I. A treble, or game of three points, when their adversaries have not scored.
>
> II. A double, or game of two points, when their adversaries have scored less than three,

<p style="text-align:center;">III. A single, or game of one point, when their<br/>
adversaries have scored three, or four.</p>

9. The winners of the rubber gain two points (commonly called the rubber points), in addition to the value of their games.

10. Should the rubber have consisted of three games, the value of the losers' game is deducted from the gross number of points gained by their opponents.

11. If an erroneous score be proved, such mistake can be corrected prior to the conclusion of the game in which it occurred, and such game is not concluded until the trump card of the following deal has been turned up.

12. If an erroneous score, affecting the amount of the rubber, be proved, such mistake can be rectified at any time during the rubber.

### CUTTING.

13. The Ace is the lowest card.

14. In all cases, every one must cut from the same pack.

15. Should a player expose more than one card, he must cut again.

### FORMATION OF TABLE.

16. If there are more than four candidates, the players are selected by cutting: those first in the room having the preference. The four who cut the lowest cards play first, and again cut to decide on partners; the two lowest play against the two highest; the lowest is the dealer, who has choice of cards and seats, and, having once made his selection, must abide by it.

17. When there are more than six candidates, those who cut the two next lowest cards belong to the table, which is complete with six players; on the retirement of one of those six players, the candidate who cuts the next lowest card has a prior right to any aftercomer to enter the table.

### CUTTING CARDS OF EQUAL VALUE.

18. Two players cutting cards of equal value, unless such cards are the two highest, cut again: should they be the two lowest, a fresh cut is necessary to decide which of those two deals.

19. Three players cutting cards of equal value cut again; should the fourth (or remaining) card be the highest, the two lowest of the new cut are partners, the lower of those two the dealer; should the

fourth card be the lowest, the two highest are partners, the original lowest the dealer.

## CUTTING OUT.

20. At the end of a rubber, should admission be claimed by any one, or by two candidates, he who has, or they who have, played a greater number of consecutive rubbers than the others is, or are, out; but when all have played the same number, they must cut to decide upon the out-goers; the highest are out.

## ENTRY AND RE-ENTRY.

21. A candidate wishing to enter a table must declare such intention prior to any of the players having cut a card, either for the purpose of commencing a fresh rubber, or of cutting out.

22. In the formation of fresh tables, those candidates who have neither belonged to nor played at any other table have the prior right of entry; the others decide their right of admission by cutting.

23. Any one quitting a table prior to the conclusion of a rubber, may, with consent of the other three players, appoint a substitute in his absence during that rubber.

24. A player cutting into one table while belonging to another loses his right of re-entry into that latter, and takes his chance of cutting in, as if he were a fresh candidate.

25. If any one break up a table, the remaining players have the prior right to him of entry into any other, and should there not be sufficient vacancies at such other table to admit all those candidates, they settle their precedence by cutting.

## SHUFFLING.

26. The pack must neither be shuffled below the table nor so that the face of any card be seen.

27. The pack must not be shuffled during the play of the hand.

28. A pack, having been played with, must neither be shuffled, by dealing it into packets, nor across the table.

29. Each player has a right to shuffle, once only, except as provided by Rule 32, prior to a deal, after a false cut, or when a new deal has occurred.

30. The dealer's partner must collect the cards for the ensuing deal, and has the first right to shuffle that pack.

31. Each player after shuffling must place the cards properly

collected, and face downwards, to the left of the player about to deal.

32. The dealer has always the right to shuffle last; but should a card or cards be seen during his shuffling, or while giving the pack to be cut, he may be compelled to reshuffle.

### THE DEAL.

33. Each player deals in his turn; the right of dealing goes to the left.

34. The player on the dealer's right cuts the pack, and, in dividing it, must not leave fewer than four cards in either packet; if in cutting, or in replacing one of the two packets on the other, a card be exposed, or if there be any confusion of the cards, or a doubt as to the exact place in which the pack was divided, there must be a fresh cut.

35. When a player, whose duty it is to cut, has once separated the pack, he cannot alter his intention; he can neither reshuffle nor recut the cards.

36. When the pack is cut, should the dealer shuffle the cards, he loses his deal.

### A NEW DEAL.

37. There must be a new deal—

    I. If during a deal, or during the play of a hand, the pack be proved incorrect or imperfect.

    II. If any card, excepting the last, be faced in the pack.

38. If, while dealing, a card be exposed by the dealer or his partner, should neither of the adversaries have touched the cards, the latter can claim a new deal; a card exposed by either adversary gives that claim to the dealer, provided that his partner has not touched a card; if a new deal does not take place, the exposed card cannot be called.

39. If, during dealing, a player touch any of his cards, the adversaries may do the same, without losing their privilege of claiming a new deal, should chance give them such option.

40. If, in dealing, one of the last cards be exposed, and the dealer turn up the trump before there is reasonable time for his adversaries to decide as to a fresh deal, they do not thereby lose their privilege.

41. If a player, while dealing, look at the trump card, his adversaries have a right to see it, and may exact a new deal,

42. If a player take into the hand dealt to him a card belonging to the other pack, the adversaries, on discovery of the error, may decide whether they will have a fresh deal or not.

## A MISDEAL.

43. A misdeal loses the deal

44. It is a misdeal—

    I. Unless the cards are dealt into four packets, one at a time, in regular rotation, beginning with the player to the dealer's left.

    II. Should the dealer place the last (*i. e.*, the trump) card, face downwards, on his own, or any other pack.

    III. Should the trump card not come in its regular order to the dealer; but he does not lose his deal if the pack be proved imperfect.

    IV. Should a player have fourteen cards, and either of the other three less than thirteen.

    V. Should the dealer, under an impression that he has made a mistake, either count the cards on the table, or the remainder of the pack.

    VI. Should the dealer deal two cards at once, or two cards to the same hand, and then deal a third; but if, prior to dealing that third card, the dealer can, by altering the position of one card only, rectify such error, he may do so, except as provided by the second paragraph of this law.

    VII. Should the dealer omit to have the pack cut to him, and the adversaries discover the error, prior to the trump card being turned up, and before looking at their cards, but not after having done so.

45. A misdeal does not lose the deal if, during the dealing, either of the adversaries touch the cards prior to the dealer's partner having done so; but should the latter have first interfered with the cards, notwithstanding either or both of the adversaries have subsequently done the same, the deal is lost.

46. Should three players have their right number of cards—the fourth have less than thirteen, and not discover such deficiency until he has played any of his cards, the deal stands good; should he have played he is as answerable for any revoke he may have made as if the missing card, or cards, had been in his hand; he may search the other pack for it, or them.

47. If a pack, during or after a rubber, be proved incorrect or imperfect, such proof does not alter any past score, game, or rubber; that hand in which the imperfection was detected is null and void; the dealer deals again.

48. Any one dealing out of turn, or with the adversary's cards,

13

may be stopped before the trump card is turned up, after which the game must proceed as if no mistake had been made.

49. A player can neither shuffle, cut, nor deal for his partner, without the permission of his opponents.

50. If the adversaries interrupt a dealer while dealing, either by questioning the score or asserting that it is not his deal, and fail to establish such claim, should a misdeal occur, he may deal again.

51. Should a player take his partner's deal and misdeal, the latter is liable to the usual penalty, and the adversary next in rotation to the player who ought to have dealt then deals.

### THE TRUMP CARD.

52. The dealer, when it is his turn to play to the first trick, should take the trump card into his hand; if left on the table after the first trick be turned and quitted, it is liable to be called; his partner may at any time remind him of the liability.

53. After the dealer has taken the trump card into his hand, it cannot be asked for; a player naming it at any time during the play of that hand is liable to have his highest or lowest trump called.

54. If the dealer take the trump card into his hand before it is his turn to play, he may be desired to lay it on the table; should he show a wrong card, this card may be called, as also a second, a third, etc., until the trump card be produced.

55. If the dealer declare himself unable to recollect the trump card, his highest or lowest trump may be called at any time during that hand, and unless it cause him to revoke, must be played; the call may be repeated, but not changed, i. e., from highest to lowest, or *vice versâ*, until such card is played.

### CARDS LIABLE TO BE CALLED.

56. All exposed cards are liable to be called, and must be left on the table; but a card is not an exposed card when dropped on the floor, or elsewhere below the table.

The following are exposed cards:

   I. Two or more cards played at once.

   II. Any card dropped with its face upwards, or in any way exposed on or above the table, even though snatched up so quickly that no one can name it.

57. If any one play to an imperfect trick the best card on the

table, or lead one which is a winning card as against his adversaries, and then lead again, or play several such winning cards one after the other, without waiting for his partner to play, the latter may be called on to win, if he can, the first or any other of those tricks, and the other cards thus improperly played are exposed cards.

58. If a player, or players, under the impression that the game is lost—or won—or for other reasons—throw his or their cards on the table face upwards, such cards are exposed, and liable to be called, each player's by the adversary; but should one player alone retain his hand, he cannot be forced to abandon it.

59. If all four players throw their cards on the table face upwards, the hands are abandoned; and no one can again take up his cards. Should this general exhibition show that the game might have been saved, or won, neither claim can be entertained, unless a revoke be established. The revoking players are then liable to the following penalties. They cannot under any circumstances win the game by the result of that hand, and the adversaries may add three to their score, or deduct three from that of the revoking players.

60. A card detached from the rest of the hand so as to be named is liable to be called; but should the adversary name a wrong card, he is liable to have a suit called when he or his partner have the lead.

61. If a player, who has rendered himself liable to have the highest or lowest of a suit called, fail to play as desired, or if when called on to lead one suit leads another, having in his hand one or more cards of that suit demanded, he incurs the penalty of a revoke.

62. If any player lead out of turn, his adversaries may either call the card erroneously led, or may call a suit from him or his partner when it is next the turn of either of them to lead.

63. If any player lead out of turn, and the other three have followed him, the trick is complete, and the error cannot be rectified; but if only the second, or the second and third have played to the false lead, their cards, on discovery of the mistake, are taken back; there is no penalty against any one, excepting the original offender, whose card may be called, or he or his partner, when either of them has next the lead, may be compelled to play any suit demanded by the adversaries.

64. In no case can a player be compelled to play a card which would oblige him to revoke,

65. The call of a card may be repeated until such card has been played.

66. If a player called on to lead a suit have none of it, the penalty is paid.

## Cards Played in Error, or not Played to a Trick.

67. If the third hand play before the second, the fourth hand may play before his partner.

68. Should the third hand not have played, and the fourth play before his partner, the latter may be called on to win, or not to win, the trick.

69. If any one omit playing to a former trick, and such error be not discovered until he has played to the next, the adversaries may claim a new deal; should they decide that the deal stand good, the surplus card at the end of the hand is considered to have been played to the imperfect trick, but does not constitute a revoke therein.

70. If any one play two cards to the same trick, or mix his trump, or other card, with a trick to which it does not properly belong, and the mistake be not discovered until the hand is played out, he is answerable for all consequent revokes he may have made. If, during the play of the hand, the error be detected, the tricks may be counted face downwards, in order to ascertain whether there be among them a card too many: should this be the case, they may be searched, and the card restored; the player is, however, liable for all revokes which he may have meanwhile made.

## The Revoke.

71. Is when a player, holding one or more cards of the suit led, plays a card of a different suit.

72. The penalty for a revoke :

I. Is at the option of the adversaries, who, at the end of the hand, may either take three tricks from the revoking player, or deduct three points from his score, or add three to their own score ;

II. Can be claimed for as many revokes as occur during the hand ;

III. Is applicable only to the score of the game in which it occurs ;

IV. Cannot be divided ; *i. e.*, a player cannot add one or two to his own score and deduct one or two from the revoking player ;

V. Takes precedence of every other score ; *e. g.*, the claimants two, their opponents nothing, the former add three to their score, and thereby win a treble game, even should the latter have made thirteen tricks and held four honors.

73. A revoke is established if the trick in which it occur be turned and quitted, *i. e.*, the hand removed from the trick after it has been turned face downwards on the table, or if either the revoking player or his partner, whether in his right turn or otherwise, lead or play to the following trick.

74. A player may ask his partner whether he has not a card of the suit which he has renounced; should the question be asked before the trick is turned and quitted, subsequent turning and quitting does not establish the revoke, and the error may be corrected, unless the question be answered in the negative, or unless the revoking player or his partner have led or played to the following trick.

75. At the end of the hand the claimants of a revoke may search all the tricks.

76. If a player discover his mistake in time to save a revoke, the adversaries, whenever they think fit, may call the card thus played in error, or may require him to play his highest or lowest card to that trick in which he has renounced; any player or players who have played after him may withdraw their cards and substitute others : the cards withdrawn are not liable to be called.

77. If a revoke be claimed, and the accused player or his partner mix the cards before they have been sufficiently examined by the adversaries, the revoke is established. The mixing of the cards only renders the proof of a revoke difficult, but does not prevent the claim, and possible establishment, of the penalty.

78. A revoke cannot be claimed after the cards have been cut for the following deal.

79. The revoking player and his partner may, under all circumstances, require the hand in which the revoke has been detected to be played out.

80. If a revoke occur, be claimed and proved, bets on the odd trick, or on amount of score, must be decided by the actual state of the latter, after the penalty is paid.

81. Should the players on both sides subject themselves to the penalty of one or more revokes, neither can win the game ; each is punished at the discretion of his adversary.

82. In whatever way the penalty be enforced, under no circumstances can a player win the game by the result of the hand during which he has revoked ; he cannot score more than four. (*Vide* Rule 61.)

### CALLING FOR NEW CARDS.

83. Any player (on paying for them) before, but not after, the pack be cut for the deal, may call for fresh cards. He must call for two new packs, of which the dealer takes his choice.

### GENERAL RULES.

84. Where a player and his partner have an option of exacting from their adversaries one of two penalties, they should agree who is to make the election, but must not consult with one another which of the two penalties it is advisable to exact ; if they do so consult they lose their right ; and if either of them, with or without consent of his partner, demand a penalty to which he is entitled, such decision is final.

This rule does not apply in exacting the penalties for a revoke; partners have then a right to consult.

85. Any one during the play of a trick, or after the four cards are played, and before, but not after, they are touched for the purpose of gathering them together, may demand that the cards be placed before their respective players.

86. If any one, prior to his partner playing, should call attention to the trick—either by saying that it is his, or by naming his card, or, without being required so to do, by drawing it towards him—the adversaries may require opponent's partner to play the highest or lowest of the suit then led, or to win or lose the trick.

87. In all cases where a penalty has been incurred, the offender is bound to give reasonable time for the decision of his adversaries.

88. If a bystander make any remark which calls the attention of a player or players to an oversight affecting the score, he is liable to be called on, by the players only, to pay the stakes and all bets on that game or rubber.

89. A bystander, by agreement among the players, may decide any question.

90. A card or cards torn or marked must be either replaced by agreement, or new cards called at the expense of the table.

91. Any player may demand to see the last trick turned, and no more. Under no circumstances can more than eight cards be seen

during the play of the hand, viz., the four cards on the table which
have not been turned and quitted, and the last trick turned.

[It would be a great improvement to the game if this law were
annulled.]

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## ETIQUETTE OF WHIST.*

The following rules belong to the Established Etiquette of Whist.
They are not called laws, as it is difficult, in some cases impossible,
to apply any penalty for their infraction, and the only remedy is to
cease to play with players who habitually disregard them.

Two packs of cards are invariably used at Clubs; if possible this
should be adhered to.

Any one, having the lead and several winning cards to play,
should not draw a second card out of his hand until his partner has
played to the first trick, such act being a distinct intimation that the
former has played a winning card.

No intimation whatever, by word or gesture, should be given by
a player as to the state of his hand or of the game.

A player who desires the cards to be placed, or who demands to
see the last trick, should do it for his own information only, and not
in order to invite the attention of his partner.†

No player should object to refer to a bystander who professes

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* From Jas. Clay's Treatise on Short Whist.

† To these rules may be added the following:

A player who holds Queen of a suit in which his partner has led King should
not extend his hand to take the trick before fourth hand has played. This is a
distinct intimation that he knows his partner has the Ace, and therefore that he
himself holds the Queen.

A player whose hand is nearly good enough to signal should not hesitate pur-
posely when it is his turn to play, and then play his lowest. Such hesitation
means obviously, "I have four trumps and a good hand, but am not quite strong
enough to signal; if you are also strong you can lead trumps."

A player whose course is clear should not simulate hesitation. If he has but one
card in the suit led, and should hesitate as if in doubt, he is deliberately telling an
untruth.

A player should direct his attention to the play, not to the looks of the players,
the arrangement of their cards, and so forth. Still less should he look at his ad-
versaries' hands. But note also that a player is bound to keep his cards well
hidden. I have heard of an old lady who kept her trumps under an arm till
wanted; her adversaries and partner were entitled to ask her to adopt the usual
course.

himself uninterested in the game, and able to decide any disputed question of facts: as to who played any particular card; whether honors were claimed though not scored, or *vice versâ*, etc.

It is unfair to revoke purposely; having made a revoke, a player is not justified in making a second in order to conceal the first.

Bystanders should make no remark, neither should they by word or gesture give any intimation of the state of the game until concluded and scored, nor should they walk round the table to look at the different hands.

[I omit Mr. Clay's remarks about the etiquette of betting, for the simple reason that this book is not meant for betting folk.]

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## DUMMY

Is played by three players.

One hand, called Dummy's, lies exposed on the table.

The laws are the same as those of Whist, with the following exceptions:

I. Dummy deals at the commencement of each rubber.

II. Dummy is not liable to the penalty for a revoke, as his adversaries see his cards. Should he revoke and the error not be discovered until the trick is turned and quitted, it stands good.

III. Dummy being blind and deaf, his partner is not liable to any penalty for an error whence he can gain no advantage. Thus, he may expose some, or all of his cards, or may declare that he has the game or trick, etc., without incurring any penalty; if, however, he lead from Dummy's hand, when he should have led from his own, or *vice versâ*, a suit may be called from the hand which ought to have led.

### DOUBLE-DUMMY

Is played by two players, each having a Dummy or exposed hand for his partner. The laws of the game do not differ from Dummy Whist, except in the following special law: There is no misdeal, as the deal is a disadvantage.

# GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN THE GAME OF WHIST.

*Bumper.*—Winning two games—*i. e.*, eight points—before your adversaries have scored.

*Command of a suit.*—Having the best cards of that suit. See *Establish*.

*Conventional signals.*—Certain recognized methods of playing by which information is afforded to your partner as to the state of your hand, more especially as to its numerical strength.

*Cross-ruff.*—See *See-saw*.

*Discard.*—The card you play when you cannot follow suit, and do not trump it (if a plain suit).

*Double.*—Scoring five before your adversaries have scored three.

*Echo, The.*—Asking for trumps in response to your partner's signal. The *Echo* means that you have four trumps at least.

*Eldest hand.*—The player on the dealer's left hand.

*Establish.*—A suit is said to be established when either you have exhausted all the best cards in it which were against you, or have the power of doing so by playing your commanding cards. See *Command*.

*False card.*—Playing a card contrary to the conventional rules of the game with the view of deceiving your adversary.

*Finessing.*—An endeavor, when second or third player, to take a trick with a lower card, when a higher, not in sequence with it, is in your hand, in the hopes that the intermediate card or cards may be with your right-hand adversary or your own partner.

*Forcing.*—Leading a plain-suit card that compels your adversary or partner to play a trump to take the trick.

*Fourchette.*—The two cards on either side of a card led, thus: King and Knave make the *fourchette* to the Queen led; Queen and ten make the *fourchette* to the Knave; and so on.

*Game.*—Scoring five points.

*Guarded.*—A second-best card is said to be "guarded" if you hold a small card of the suit which you can play to the best card. A third-best card generally requires *two* guards.

*Hand.*—The thirteen cards held by each player.

*Honors.*—Ace, King, Queen, and Knave of trumps. Ten and nine are sometimes called the Dutch honors.

*King-card.*—The best card left in each suit.  Thus, if the Ace and King were out, the Queen would be the King-card.

*Lead, the.*—The play of first card to a round or trick.

*Leader.*—The first to play each round.

*Leading through* and *up to.*—If you play first you are said to lead *through* your left-hand adversary, and *up-to* your right-hand adversary.

*Long suit.*—One of which you hold originally more than three cards. The term is, therefore, indicative of strength in *numbers.*

*Long trumps.*—The last trumps held in one hand.

*Long cards.*—The last cards of the suit held in one hand.

*Losing card, a.*—A card which will not take a trick in its suit.

*Love.*—Nothing scored.

*Make.*—To *make a card* means to win a trick with it.  To *make the cards* means to shuffle.

*Opening.*—The plan on which the game is commenced.

*Partie, a.*—The same players playing two rubbers consecutively, or, should it be necessary, a third rubber, to decide which is the best of the three rubbers.

*Penultimate, the.*—The lowest card but one of a suit led.  It is the conventional signal that you hold more than four cards in the suit you have thus led.

*Peter, the.*—The signal for trumps.

*Plain suits.*—Suits not trumps.

*Points.*—The score made by tricks or honors; for each trick after six, one point is scored.

*Quarts.*—Sequence of any four cards.

*Quart-major.*—The sequence of the four highest cards of a suit.

*Quitted.*—A trick is said to be quitted when the four cards constituting it have been gathered up, turned on the table, and left.

*Quint.*—Sequence of any five cards.

*Re-entry.*—Winning a trick at an advanced period of the hand, so as to secure you the lead.

*Renounce.*—To play a card of another suit than that led, holding none of the latter.

*Revoke.*—To play a card of another suit though holding a card of the suit led.

*Rubber.*—Two games won in succession, or two out of three games.

*Ruffing.*—Trumping a suit.

*Score.*—The points marked by coins, counters, or otherwise.

*Seesaw.*—Partners trumping each a suit, and leading to each other for that purpose.    Also called a *Cross-ruff*.

*Sequence.*—Three or more consecutive cards in the order of their merit.    A sequence of three cards is called a tierce, of four a quart, of five a quint, and so on.    Ace, King, and Queen are called tierce-major.    An *under* sequence is one at the bottom of the suit.    An *intermediate* one neither at the top nor at the bottom of the suit.

*Short suit.*—A suit of three or less than three cards.

*Signal for trumps.*—Playing an unnecessarily high card, following it by a smaller card of the same suit.

*Single, a.*—Making game after your adversary has scored three or four up.

*Singleton.*—One card only in a suit.

*Slam.*—Making every trick.

*Strong suit.*—One containing more than the average number of high cards—in contradistinction to numerical strength or length.

*Tenace.*—The best and third best card (in the same hand), for the time being, of any suit.

*Tierce.*—Sequence of any three cards.

*Tierce-major.*—The sequence of the three highest cards of a suit.

*Treble.*—Scoring five before your adversary scores one.

*Trick, a.*—Four cards played to a round, viz., the card led, and the three cards played to it.

*Trump card, the.*—The card turned up by the dealer.

*Trumps.*—Cards of the same suit as that turned up by the dealer.

*Under-play.*—Speaking generally, it means keeping back best cards, and playing subordinate ones (not in sequence) instead.    It differs from finessing in this, that the object is not to take the trick with the smaller card, but to conceal the possession of the higher card or cards, so as to use them more effectively later.

*Weak suit.*—One containing less than the average number of high cards, in contradistinction to a suit short in *number* of cards, or length.

## SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS.

### PROBLEM I.—FIRST SOLUTION.

#### THE HANDS.

$B$ { *Diamonds*—10, 8, 6, 4, 3.        Hearts—10, 9, 8, 7.
    Spades—10, 9, 8, 7.               Clubs—none.

|  | **B** |  |
|---|---|---|
| **Y** | *Tr. D.* | **Z** |
|  | **A** leads. |  |

$Y$ { *Diamonds*—K, Kn.
    Spades—K, Kn.
    Hearts—K, Kn, 6,
        5, 4, 3, 2.
    Clubs—K, Kn.

$Z$ { *Diamonds*—A, Q.
    Spades—A, Q, 6, 5,
        4, 3, 2.
    Hearts—A, Q.
    Clubs—A, Q.

$A$ { *Diamonds*—9, 7, 2, 5.        Hearts—none.
    Spades—none.                   Clubs—10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4,
                                          3, 2.

|     | $A$ | $Y$ | $B$ | $Z$ |
|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 1.  | C 2 | C Kn | D 3 | C Q |
| 2.  | D 2 | D Kn | D 4 | D Q |
| 3.  | D 5 | S Kn | S 7 | S 2 |
| 4.  | C 3 | C K | D 6 | C A |
| 5.  | D 7 | D K | D 8 | D A |
| 6.  | D 9 | H Kn | H 7 | H A |

Then $A$ brings in his Clubs, $Y$ and $Z$ playing any cards whatever, and $B$ retaining the long trump till the thirteenth trick. It is obvious that $Y$ and $Z$ are powerless. If $Z$ leads Diamond Ace at trick 3, the order of tricks 3, 4, and 5 is simply changed, but the result remains the same. So also, if $Z$ leads a Heart or a Club at trick 3 instead of a Spade.

#### SECOND SOLUTION.

#### Club, trumps.

$A$—C 10, 6, 5, 4;  D 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2.
$Y$—C A, K;  H Q, Kn;  D A, Q;  S K, Kn, 10, 9, 8, 6, 5.
$B$—C 9, 8, 7, 3, 2;  H 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3.
$Z$—C Q, Kn;  H A, K, 2;  S A, Q, 7, 4, 3, 2;  D K, Kn.

| A | Y | B | Z | | A | Y | B | Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| D 2 | D Q | C 2 | D Kn | | | | | |
| C 4 | C K | C 3 | C Kn | | | | | |
| C 6 | H Kn | H 3 | H 2 | or | D 3 | S 6 | C 7 | S 2 |
| D 3 | D A | C 7 | D K | | C 5 | C A | C 8 | C Q |
| C 5 | C A | C 8 | C Q (a) | | C 6 | S 8* | H 3 | S 3 |
| | | | | | D 4 | D A | C 9 | D K |
| | | | | | C 10 | H Kn | H 4 | H 2 |

(a) Whether Y plays a Heart or Spade, A is bound to bring in his Diamonds.

## PROBLEM II.—SOLUTION.

Trick 1.  A leads Spade Ace.
   "   2.  A leads Club Ace, trumped by B.
   "   3.  B leads small Spade, trumped by A.
   "   4.  A leads King of Clubs, trumped by B.
   "   5.  B leads Spade, trumped by A.
   "   6.  A leads Queen of Clubs, trumped by B.
   "   7.  B leads Spade, trumped by A.

## PROBLEM III.—SOLUTION.

1. B plays Club.  A puts Spade Ace.  Won by A.
2. A plays Diamond Ace.  Won by A.
3. A plays Spade 2.  Won by B.
4. B plays Spade King.  A discards Diamond.  Won by B.
5. B plays Club.  A discards Diamond.

Then Y must discard either Diamond or Heart, and B plays accordingly.

## PROBLEM IV.—SOLUTION.

If Z wins the trick with his small trump, Y Z lose.  Winning with his Queen of trumps, Z leads the three.  Y having the tenace over A wins two rounds of trumps, and leads his winning Heart.

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* It does not matter what Y plays.

### Problem V.—Solution.

|        |           | A      | Y     | B      | Z      |
|--------|-----------|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| 1st Trick. |       | S A    | S 2   | S 7    | S K    |
| 2d     | "         | H Kn   | H 7   | H 3    | H 2    |
| 3d     | "         | H 6    | H 8   | H 9    | H 5    |
| 4th    | "         | S Kn   | H K   | H A    | D 4    |
| 5th    | "         | S Q    | D 2   | H 4    | D 7    |
| 6th    | "         | C 5    | S 3   | S 10   | D 8    |
| 7th    | "         | C 3    | S 4   | S 9    | C Kn   |
| 8th    | "         | C 2    | S 5   | S 8    | C Q    |
| 9th    | "         | D 5    | C 4   | H Q    | C K    |
| 10th   | "         | D 6    | S 6   | H 10   | D 9    |
| 11th   | "         | D Kn   | C 7   | D 3    | D 10   |
| 12th   | "         | D A    | C 8   | C 6    | D K    |
| 13th   | "         | D Q    | C 9   | C 10   | C A    |

The lead of Spade Ace and the discard of Queen and Knave are the "points" of this problem.

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### Problem VI.—Solution.

A leads Ace Heart, B discarding Spade Four ; A leads Spade ten ; B trumps if necessary (the play being simplified if he has not to), leads winning trump, and the remainder of the hand plays itself according to the discards.

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### Problem VII.—Solution.

A clears out trumps, B discarding his Diamonds ; A continues with his long Diamonds ; and B wins the remaining tricks, his play varying according to the discards, but being obvious in every case.

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### Problems VIII. and IX.—Solution (see Game XL.).

The additional notes for Problem VIII.; the game itself for Problem IX.

## Problem X.—The Great Vienna Coup.

The key to this problem, interesting as having occurred in actual play—though we venture to demur to the statement that the holder of the winning hands said he should make every trick *as soon as he had seen the hands*—consists in forcing the opposite hands to discard from one or other of the suits which seem to be perfectly guarded. *A* takes out three rounds in trumps, then leads his small trump. If now second player discards either a Spade or a Diamond, there is no difficulty, as he thereby unguards the suit from which he discards. If second player discards a Heart at the fourth round, he equally unguards that suit ; but, owing to the position of the other two suits, it would not do for *A* now to lead a Heart. He must first lead the Ace of Spades, then a Heart, discarding Queen of Spades at the first opportunity. The rest is obvious. One of the features of this double-dummy puzzle is that it is easy to suppose that one has solved it when one really has not.

THE END.

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